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Abstract
This thesis provides an in-depth examination of accounting conservatism, which is
one of the oldest and most important principles of accounting (Sterling, 1967; Watts,
2003a). Two main questions relating to accounting conservatism are extensively
studied in this thesis: (1) How to measure accounting conservatism? (2) Why do
firms adopt accounting conservatism?
This thesis consists of three main chapters that answer these two questions from
three different perspectives. The first chapter studies the existing empirical mea-
sures of accounting conservatism from a construct validity perspective and con-
cludes that construct validity of the existing measures is mixed to low.
The second chapter examines the validity and bias in the Basu (1997) measure
of accounting conservatism – one of the most widely used measure of conservatism
in the accounting literature. The second chapter shows, analytically and empiri-
cally, that the Basu (1997) measure is biased upwards by the default risk of a firm,
and proposes a new measure of conservatism that is free from this bias. This new
measure of conservatism is called the “Default-Adjusted-Basu” measure.
The third chapter investigates the economic rationale for accounting conser-
vatism, and proposes a signalling theory for accounting conservatism. In a debt
market characterized by information asymmetry, a borrower firm’s degree of con-
servatism can serve as a credible signal about that borrower firm’s level of operat-
ing risk to the lenders in the debt market. Thus, one potential benefit of accounting
conservatism is that it can reduce the degree of information asymmetry in the debt
market.
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General Introduction
The accountant transcends the conservatism of the proverb, ‘Do not
count your chicken before they are hatched,’ saying, ’Here are a lot
of chickens already safely hatched, but for the love of Mike, use
discretion and don’t count them all, for perhaps some will die.’
— Henry R. Hatfield (1927, p. 256)
0.1 Background and motivation
The subject of this thesis is accounting conservatism, which is one of the oldest and
most important principles of accounting (Sterling, 1967; Watts, 2003a). Broadly
speaking, conservatism is a tendency that accountants, when encountering uncer-
tainties in economic transactions, choose to report lower estimates for the values of
assets and revenues, but higher estimates for the values of liabilities and expenses.
Conservatism in accounting ensures that costs are not understated in the accounts
and revenues are not overstated. Conservatism appears to be closely related to the
concept of realisation, as conservatism implies that a profit should not be recognized
before it is realized. Sterling (1967) suggests that conservatism may in fact be the
root of the realisation principle.
Conservatism, as viewed by modern researchers and accounting standard setters,
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is a principle under which accountants exercise a reasonable degree of prudence in
recognizing transactions subject to genuine economic uncertainties. The modern
view of accounting conservatism does not seem to include, or permit, any deliberate
manipulations of the accounts by understating income in one period and overstating
income in a latter period, if there is no or little economic uncertainty surrounding
the transactions. The latter behaviour is often called “big bath” accounting, which
creates hidden reserves, and is inconsistent with the principle of accounting conser-
vatism. The view of accounting standard setters towards conservatism and hidden
reserves is clearly evident in FASB’s conceptual framework:
Conservatism in financial reporting should no longer connote deliber-
ate, consistent understatement of net assets and profits. (FASB, 1980,
para. 93)
Then in paragraph 95, the FASB conceptual framework indicates that:
Conservatism no longer requires deferring recognition of income be-
yond the time that adequate evidence of its existence becomes avail-
able or justifies recognizing losses before there is adequate evidence
that they have been incurred. (FASB, 1980, para. 95)
Therefore, while conservatism and the creation of hidden reserves are superficially
similar, there is however a clear line that separates these two types of behaviours.
Conservatism is a genuine, prudent response to uncertainty, whereas big bath ac-
counting is a deliberate attempt to mislead the users of financial statements when
there is in fact no uncertainty. As W. A. Paton so clearly pointed out, “sheer under-
statement where it is possible to ascertain the actual facts is not conservatism but
concealment.” (Paton and Stevenson, 1916, p. 237)
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Modern accounting researchers recognise that conservatism has the effect of
accelerating the recognition of economic losses and deferring the recognition of
economic gains (e.g. Basu, 1997; Watts, 2003a). Therefore, economic losses are
reflected in earnings faster than economic gains, under conservatism. This prop-
erty of conservatism is described by Basu (1997) as the asymmetric timeliness of
earnings, which has become the anchor for a number of empirical and theoretical
works on accounting conservatism in recent years (see Watts, 2003b; Ryan, 2006,
for literature reviews).
The asymmetric timeliness of earnings property of accounting conservatism, as
described above, highlights the intertemporal nature of accounting conservatism:
the recognition of unverifiable or unrealised economic gains in earnings are delayed
until they subsequently become verifiable or realised in later periods. Thus, in a typ-
ical life cycle of a firm, earnings tend to lag economic income by several accounting
periods. In the early stages of the life of the firm where investment outlays tend to be
high and revenues low, earnings tend to be lower than the economic income of the
firm; but in the mature stage of the firm, where revenues are larger and more stable,
earnings tend to catch up with the economic income or even exceed it (Monahan,
2005; Zhang, 2005). However, one should not argue that accounting conservatism
is not always “conservative” simply because it may lead to lower earnings in one
period and higher earnings in another. To make that argument would be to entirely
miss the main purpose of accounting conservatism, which is to create a higher stan-
dard of verification for recognition of good news, as a mechanism for coping with
economic uncertainties. Thus, the intertemporal properties of earnings are merely a
consequence of that main purpose of accounting conservatism, rather than the cause
of it.
The most common example of conservatism is the “lower of cost and market”
10
rule of inventory valuation. This well-known rule states that inventory values should
not be written up when the market value of inventory exceeds its cost, but should
immediately be written down when the market value falls below the cost. According
to a renowned accounting historian, R. H. Parker (1969), the lower of cost and
market rule was firmly established somewhere in the 19th century. George O. May
reportedly said that by the time he entered the accounting profession in England in
1892, the rule had already been well established (Parker, 1969). This suggests that
conservatism probably has been around since the 19th century at the latest, while
some researchers argue that the time is even longer.1
Sivakumar and Waymire (2003) conducted a historical study into the account-
ing of U.S. railroads at the beginning of the 20th century, using modern empirical
methods. Their study shows that railroad companies in the US around the turn of the
20th century were not only conservative in their accounting methods and policies,
but also gradually increased their levels of accounting conservatism, in response
to changing regulations and other factors. This study provides some of the most
convincing empirical evidence that accounting conservatism has existed for a long
period of time, resonating the similar conclusion reached by accounting historians
based on other (mostly non-empirical) methods.
Conservatism’s influence on modern accounting standards is pervasive, and ex-
amples of accounting conservatism can be found in many modern accounting stan-
dards. Apart from the lower of cost and market rule, which still remains in the US
and international accounting standards today, many other rules and standards ex-
ist that are examples of accounting conservatism. They include the impairment of
fixed-assets, the expensing of the majority of the research and development costs,
1Basu (1997) argues that accounting conservatism has been established for at least 500 years in
Europe. Basu’s claim is supported by the historical evidence that traces the lower of cost and market
rule back to Italy in the 15th century, and to France in the 17th century (Littleton, 1941).
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provisions, and contingent assets and liabilities, among many others. All these rules
or standards demonstrate the basic characteristic of conservatism, which is that ac-
countants must exercise a degree of prudence in recognizing uncertain economic
gains.
Empirical studies into accounting conservatism in the second half of the 20th
century have provided ample evidence that accounting conservatism is a fundamen-
tal characteristic of financial reporting in virtually all the developed countries in the
world, and also in many developing countries (See Watts, 2003b; Ball et al., 2000;
Bushman and Piotroski, 2006; Basu, 1997; Ball et al., 2003). This is an active area
of research and more studies in this area are currently being undertaken.
The phenomenon of accounting conservatism has intrigued many accounting
researchers since the very early stages of the development of accounting theory.
However, there have been an eclectic and divided range of opinion about account-
ing conservatism, and much of the argument has still to be resolved even today.
Beginning in the late 1930s, and until the 1980s, conservatism had been criticised
by a number of prominent accounting scholars, including Gilman, Hatfield, May
and Paton (Chatfield, 1996). According to Chatfield (1996), some of the most fre-
quently used arguments against conservatism are: (1) accounting conservatism is
not consistent in that it produces lower income in one period and leads to higher
income in another period; (2) accounting conservatism is arbitrary and gives man-
agers too much discretionary power over reporting, among other problems.
However, as Watts (2003a; 2003b) has noted, despite the criticisms of conser-
vatism, not only has accounting conservatism survived numerous accounting re-
forms, regulations and economic crises in the past century, but also the average
degree of accounting conservatism, in the US at least, has even increased slightly
during the past 30 years or so. And this claim has been substantiated by many em-
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pirical studies based on large samples of data from the US and worldwide. It seems
that conservatism is extremely resilient in the modern economy.
For example, in regard to the lower of cost and market rule, Parker observes:
“The astonishing thing about the lower of cost and market rule is its
ability to survive attack. G. O. May was probably right in suggesting
that most accountants are ‘content to regard the demonstrated practical
wisdom of the rule as outweighing any supposed illogicality’.” (Parker,
1969, p. 257)
But why do accountants want to conform with the “practical wisdom” of conser-
vatism despite its criticisms? After all, is there any logic, if any, hidden behind the
seeming illogicality of conservatism? In fact, finding that logic to support conser-
vatism has become the main occupation of many positive accounting researchers
over the last decade.
The main interest of contemporary accounting researchers in conservatism is to
find the rationale, if any, behind conservatism, and thus to explain why conservatism
is so resilient in the modern economy. While the search for rational explanations of
conservatism is still ongoing, it has already paid big dividends. A large part of the
recent advancements in the conservatism literature can be summarised in the fol-
lowing five rational explanations of accounting conservatism: (1) the litigation risk
explanation, (2) the debt-contracting explanation, (3) the managerial-contracting
explanation, (4) the political cost explanation, and (5) the tax-incentive explana-
tion (See Watts, 2003a, for a review of these explantions). These explanations have
made conservatism, once unjustifiable in the eyes of Paton and Hatfield, signifi-
cantly more justifiable.
The theoretical developments in the area of accounting conservatism appear to
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be fueled by an additional factor – the movement against conservatism by account-
ing standard setters, especially the FASB and the IASB. These accounting standard
setting bodies have been attempting to abandon the conservatism principle in favour
of the “neutrality principle” (IASB, 2006; FASB, 2006). It is claimed that if the neu-
trality principle is followed, there should be no downward bias in the reported net
profit, even though there is some uncertainty as to the amount and the realisation of
the profit. The chief justification for this view is that the conservatism principle ap-
pears inconsistent with the qualitative characteristic of representational faithfulness
due to the bias it introduces. In contrast, neutrality is argued to lead to unbiased
representations of the underlying economic performance and condition of the firm,
thereby providing more reliable and relevant information to users of financial state-
ments.
For example, in the discussion paper issued by the IASB in 2006 in a joint
project with the FASB to review and revise the conceptual framework of accounting,
the boards comment that:
However, the boards concluded that describing prudence or conser-
vatism as a desirable quality or response to uncertainty would conflict
with the quality of neutrality. Even with the proscriptions of delib-
erate misstatement that appear in the existing frameworks, an admo-
nition to be prudent is likely to lead to a bias in reported financial
position and financial performance. Moreover, understating assets (or
overstating liabilities) in one period frequently leads to overstating fi-
nancial performance in later periods—a result that cannot be described
as prudent. Neither result is consistent with the desirable quality of
neutrality, which encompasses freedom from bias. Accordingly, the
proposed framework does not include prudence or conservatism as de-
14
sirable qualities of financial reporting information. (IASB, 2006, para.
BC2.22)
However, the above view taken by accounting standard setters is not shared by all
accounting academics and practitioners. Many, including Watts (2003a; 2003b;
2006), disagree with the standard setter’s movement away from conservatism in
the accounting conceptual frameworks and accounting standards. The dissenters
argue that accounting conservatism is not as illogical as it may initially appear;
conservatism is, in fact, driven by some fundamental economic forces, and is an
efficient reporting mechanism in response to the economic, legal and political envi-
ronment in which firms operate. The dissenting opinion is primarily based on the
five rational explanations of conservatism mentioned above and the results of recent
empirical studies on accounting conservatism. Therefore, the proponents of conser-
vatism argue that if conservatism is compulsorily replaced by neutrality, firms will
likely adopt sub-optimal accounting techniques that will damage their economic
efficiency, in particular their contracting efficiency.
A controversy therefore arises between the supporters and the opponents of ac-
counting conservatism, which may have in part stimulated the academic research
into accounting conservatism in the past decade or so.2 It is hoped that the research
into conservatism will provide academics, standard setters, and policy makers with
a deeper and richer understanding of the likely impacts of the policy of replacing
the conservatism principle with the neutrality principle in the conceptual framework
and in accounting standards.
Against this backdrop, this PhD thesis is the author’s own research efforts to at-
tempt to understand the important and interesting phenomenon of accounting con-
2A good starting point for seeing the arguments in this debate is a pair of articles published by
each side of the debate in Journal of Accounting Economics (2001): Holthausen and Watts (2001)
and Barth et al. (2001). And more recently, the view of the proponents of accounting conservatism
is re-expressed by Kothari et al. (2009)
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servatism. The main thrust of this thesis is to contribute to answering the following
two questions:
Research Question (1): How can we empirically measure the degree of ac-
counting conservatism?
Arguably, the first step towards understanding the causes and effects of the phe-
nomenon of accounting conservatism is to be able to accurately observe and mea-
sure it in empirical studies. That is not just true of accounting research, but true
of science in general. The history of science is in some respect a history of obser-
vations and measurements, careful and ingenious ones, of course. If Galileo had
not constructed a superior and sharper telescope in the early 17th century, it would
have taken astronomers much longer to realize that the earth goes around the sun,
instead of the other way around. If Rutherford had not meticulously taken his ob-
servations about the trajectories of alpha particles being shot through a very thin
paper of gold, physicists would probably have taken years longer, if ever, to dis-
cover the internal structure of atoms. For researchers of accounting conservatism
and for any financial analysts interested in understanding the causes and effects of
accounting conservatism, it is just as essential to first observe and measure the de-
gree of accounting conservatism in financial reporting as it was for Galileo to first
make better telescopes before peeking into the sky. Chapter 1 & Chapter 2 of this
thesis are devoted to the task of measuring accounting conservatism.
Research Question (2): Why does conservatism exist in accounting, and why
is the degree of conservatism higher in some firms than others?
After all, conservatism in financial reporting decreases the earnings and net book
values of a firm, and in doing so, it could be claimed that conservatism distorts
the information content of the firm’s financial reports. But why, under economic
16
uncertainty, does the accountant tend to report a lower and more conservative figure
as the net profit out of all possible net profits? Is not the mean value, or even the
median, of all possible net profits the best number to summarise the distribution
of all possible net profits? If we look at the classical example of conservatism
– the lower of cost and the market rule, why did the early accounting pioneers
choose to report the the lower of cost and market value? Why not the higher of
cost and market value, or perhaps the average of these two? So is there any rational
explanations behind the tendency to report a low and more conservative net profit?
As already noted, researchers have proposed several theories to explain accounting
conservatism (see the literature review by Watts, 2003a). But these explanations are
still far from being conclusive, and ongoing research is being conducted. Chapter
3 of this thesis contributes to this fledgling literature by proposing a new economic
explanation for why accounting conservatism exists and why empiricists find that
some firms are more conservative than others.
I now provide a brief overview of each of the three main chapters of the thesis
(Chapters 1 to 3) as follows.
0.2 Overview of the chapters
Chapter 1: Measures of accounting conservatism: a construct va-
lidity perspective3
Chapter 1 provides a survey of the literature on accounting conservatism, with a
focus on assessing the construct validity of existing measures of conservatism. Ac-
counting conservatism has been the subject of intensive empirical research in the
3A paper based on Chapter 1 is forthcoming in Journal of Accounting Literature (2009).
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past decade. It is essential for empiricists to develop a valid, accurate and reliable
measure of accounting conservatism. To date, five key measures of conservatism
have emerged in the literature: (1) Basu’s(1997) asymmetric timeliness of earnings
measure (“AT”), (2) Ball and Shivakumar’s (2005) asymmetric-accruals-to-cash-
flow measure (“AACF”), (3) the commonly suggested Market-to-Book ratio mea-
sure (“MTB”), (4) Penman and Zhang’s (2002) Hidden Reserves Measure (“HR”),
and (5) Givoly and Hayn’s (2000) Negative Accruals Measure (“NA”). However,
few studies have examined, directly or tangentially, whether the applications of
these measures produce facts or artefacts. Chapter 1 examines this issue from the
perspective of construct validity and focuses on the the following aspects:
1. The main features of each of the five measures of accounting conservatism;
2. The construct validity of the five measures of conservatism;
3. Inconsistencies between the results of different measures of conservatism;
4. Biases in these measures of conservatism.
Chapter 1 first describes each of the five measures. Then, it considers these mea-
sures against four of the sub-validities of construct validity, within the constraints
imposed by the limited and mixed relevant evidence, and guided by construct valid-
ity theory. While the available evidence is insufficient to reach a definite conclusion
on the construct validity of the existing five measures of conservatism, the analysis
of this chapter nevertheless suggests that the construct validity of these measures
is weak. Chapter 1 then explores the challenges of measuring conservatism facing
accounting researchers, and concludes with suggestions for future research.
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Chapter 2: The impact of default risk on the Basu measure of
accounting conservatism4
Chapter 2 continues the previous chapter’s theme of examining the measures of
accounting conservatism. But instead of surveying several measures in general, the
chapter investigates the validity of one particular measure of conservatism – the
Basu (1997) asymmetric timeliness measure (“AT”) – in great depth. Chapter 2
focuses on the Basu measure, because it is currently the most frequently employed
measure of accounting conservatism in the accounting literature and has had the
greatest impact on the literature.
Chapter 2 has two closely related objectives: (1) to analytically and empirically
examine the impact of default risk on the Basu (1997) measure of conservatism;
and (2) to design and test a new measure of accounting conservatism – the Default-
Adjusted-Basu Measure, or the “DAB” measure.
In regards to the first objective, Chapter 2 first analytically shows that the Basu
asymmetric timeliness coefficient is biased upward by the existence of default risk
in a firm, and that the bias tends to increase with the level of default risk. The
analytical model is primarily based on Merton’s (1974) classic call-option model
of equity. The empirical evidence reported in Chapter 3 is consistent with this
analytical proposition.
In regards to the second objective, Chapter 2 argues that the Default-Adjusted-
Basu measure is likely to be more robust to the bias caused by default risk than the
original Basu measure. The empirical tests reported in Chapter 2 indicates that the
DAB measure is indeed free from the default-risk-bias.
The main proxy for default risk used in Chapter 2 is the distance-to-default, de-
4A paper based on Chapter 2 is currently under second review at Journal of Accounting & Eco-
nomics.
19
veloped by Merton (1974) and estimated by Vassalou and Xing’s (2004) iterative
method. Vassalou and Xing’s (2004) iterative method enables the author to obtain a
relatively accurate estimate for the distance-to-default for each firm-year. Further-
more, the Vassalou and Xing (2004) method also yields the estimates for several
essential inputs to the DAB measure.
Chapter 3: The signalling role of accounting conservatism in the
debt market with asymmetric information
Having examined the measures of conservatism in Chapters 1 and 2, Chapter 3
shifts the focus to the economic theories of conservatism. In particular, Chapter 3
investigates the signalling role of accounting conservatism in a debt market charac-
terized by information asymmetry. Chapter 3 constructs a signalling game model
in order to analyse firms’ decisions on their optimal degrees of conservatism under
information asymmetry in the lending market. The market has asymmetric informa-
tion because the borrower firms have private information about their true operating
risk levels (proxied by asset volatility) that the lenders do not.
Based on this simple model, I show that the borrower firms’ decision on their
optimal levels of accounting conservatism depend on their own operating risk. Un-
der mild regularity conditions, the signalling game exhibits a “stable” separating
equilibrium, in which the high risk firms adopt a low degree of conservatism and
vice versa. By simply observing the degree of conservatism adopted by each bor-
rower firm, the lenders in the debt market can correctly figure out the true level of
operating risk in each borrower firm. As a result, conservatism becomes a credible
signalling device for the borrower firms to reveal their private information about
their true risk levels to the lenders in the debt market.
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Chapter 3 also derives 4 basic properties of accounting conservative, which are
stated as 4 lemmas. These basic properties mainly deal with the joint impacts of
accounting conservatism and risk on firms’ earnings, thereby providing a direct link
between conservatism, risk and earnings. While most of these basic properties are
already well known in the accounting literature, the contribution of my analysis is
to show that, using Basu’s (1997) definition of accounting conservatism, they can
be rigorously proved with very few additional assumptions.
Appendix B to Chapter 3 offers some preliminary empirical evidence on what
I call the signalling theory of accounting conservatism developed in the chapter.
The results of the tests of whether firms with a lower degree of asset volatility (i.e.,
fundamental operating risk) adopt a higher degree of accounting conservatism, and
vice versa, are consistent with the signalling theory of conservatism. Low-volatility
firms indeed tend to have a higher degree of conservatism, and high-volatility firms
indeed tend to have a lower degree of conservatism.
It should be noted that the risk addressed in Chapter 3 is of a very different kind
from that addressed in Chapter 2. Chapter 2 deals with default risk, which is chiefly
concerned with downward movements in the value of the firm, subject to a degree of
leverage. In contrast, Chapter 3 deals with the operating risk of the firm, as defined
by asset volatility, which encompasses two-sided movements in the value of the
firm, regardless of the degree of leverage. There are two key differences between
these two types of risk: (1) default risk is one-sided, while asset volatility is double-
sided, and (2) default risk is contingent upon the degree of leverage, while assets
volatility is independent of leverage.
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0.3 Contributions of the thesis
This thesis contributes to the accounting literature in the following six main areas:
First, this thesis is the first in the literature that systematically examines the con-
struct validity of existing measures of accounting conservatism. Other researchers,
like Watts (2003b) and Ryan (2006), have surveyed the empirical measures of ac-
counting conservatism, and (in the case of Ryan, 2006) the Basu measure in partic-
ular. This thesis contributes to the literature by examining the construct validity of
the existing measures in a systematic way. The result of my examination shows that
the existing measures may suffer from low construct validity and further research is
much needed in this area.
Second, this thesis contributes to the literature by identifying and testing a new
kind of bias in the well-known Basu (1997) measure of accounting conservatism.
The Basu measure is currently the most widely applied measure of accounting con-
servatism (Ryan, 2006, and Chapter 1), and its validity has recently been questioned
by Dietrich et al. (2007) and Givoly et al. (2007). This thesis examines the validity
of the Basu measure from the perspective of the default risk of a firm. This thesis
finds that an upward bias in the Basu measure of conservatism is induced by the
existence of default risk in a firm. The greater the degree of default risk there is, the
greater this bias in the Basu measure of conservatism.
Third, this thesis further contributes to the literature by constructing a new mea-
sure of accounting conservatism – the Default-Adjusted-Basu (or “DAB”) measure
- which is based on the original Basu (1997) measure but is free from the effects of
default risk. Empirical testing of the DAB measure shows that it is very effective at
removing the bias caused by default risk in the data. Therefore, the DAB measure
is likely a more accurate and less-biased measure of accounting conservatism than
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is the original Basu (1997) measure.
The fourth contribution of this thesis is that it proposes a new signalling the-
ory of accounting conservatism. The model developed in Chapter 3 is currently
the only signalling model of accounting conservatism in debt markets. In contrast,
all but one of the existing analytical models that examine accounting conservatism,
such as Givoly et al. (2007), Chen et al. (2007), and Kwon et al. (2001), are primar-
ily moral hazard games, which focus on the role of accounting conservatism in an
agency setting either between equity- and debt-holders, or between equity-holders
and managers, ex post (i.e., after the signing of the lending contract or the compen-
sation contract). In comparison, the proposed model is ex ante and focuses on the
behaviour of borrowers and lenders prior to the signing of the lending contract.
The only existing published study that examines accounting conservatism in the
information asymmetry (and signalling) framework is Bagnoli and Watts (2005).
Bagnoli and Watts (2005) show that a high degree of conservatism sends out a
signal to the equity market that the managers of the firm expect good profits in
the future, and conversely a low degree of conservatism signals that the managers
expect low profits in the future. However, Bagnoli and Watts’ (2005) study focuses
on the signalling role of conservatism in the equity market, whereas Chapter 3 of
this thesis focuses on signalling role of conservatism in the debt market.
One of the original contributions of the proposed signalling model is that it
shows that low-risk borrower firms tend to adopt higher degrees of conservatism,
while high-risk borrower firms tend to adopt lower degrees of conservatism. This
conclusion somewhat contradicts the prevailing view on the debt-contracting role
of conservatism, which typically asserts that high risk firms would adopt a higher
degree of conservatism (e.g. Watts, 2003a,b; Lara et al., 2009b). The empirical
evidence reported in Appendix B of Chapter 3 lends direct support to the signalling
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theory by showing that high-risk firms actually adopt a lower degree of accounting
conservatism than do low-risk firms.
Fifth, Chapter 3 of the thesis further contributes to the conservatism literature
by analytically deriving four basic properties of accounting conservatism. While
most of these properties are already well-known in the accounting literature, this
thesis is the first study that rigorously and analytically derives these properties as-
suming little more than Basu’s (1997) definition of accounting conservatism as the
asymmetric timeliness of earnings.
Finally, this thesis is the first study in the accounting literature to apply Vassalou
and Xing’s (2004) iterative method of estimating default risk. Vassalou and Xing’s
(2004) method is a relatively modern technique of calculating default risk and has
shown considerable power in predicting firms’ default probabilities. In accounting
research, Bushman and Williams (2009) have recently employed a simpler, but non-
iterative, approach to measure the default risk in banks, first used by Ronn and
Verma (1986). However, whilst simpler to implement, the non-iterative approach is
not as accurate as the iterative approach used by Vassalou and Xing (2004), because
the actual market leverage moves too fast for the non-iterative approach to reliably
estimate firms’ asset volatility (Crosbie and Bohn, 2003, pp. 16-17). Therefore, the
use of the Vassalou and Xing (2004) method in this chapter is an innovation in the
accounting literature.
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Chapter 1
Measures of Accounting
Conservatism: A Construct Validity
Perspective
1.1 Introduction1
Over the last decade, accounting conservatism has become the subject of an active
field of empirical research in accounting. An interesting feature of the conservatism
literature is the variety of existing measures of conservatism, and the apparent lack
of consistency among these measures. From my review of the accounting conser-
vatism literature, I have identified five key measures of accounting conservatism:
(1) Basu’s(1997) asymmetric timeliness of earnings measure (“AT”), (2) Ball and
1A paper based on this chapter co-authored with my thesis supervisors is forthcoming in the
Journal of Accounting Literature (2009). I would like to thank the editor, Bipin Ajinkya, and the
anonymous referee of Journal of Accounting Literature for their valuable suggestions and construc-
tive criticisms. I would also like to thank Stephen L. Taylor for his comments on an earlier version of
this chapter during his tenure as the Don Trow Visiting Fellow at Victoria University of Wellington,
as well the conference participants at the European Accounting Association 2008 Annual Meeting
in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, for helpful comments.
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Shivakumar’s (2005) asymmetric-accruals-to-cash-flow measure (“AACF”), (3) the
commonly suggested Market-to-Book ratio measure (“MTB”), (4) Penman and Zhang’s
(2002) Hidden Reserves Measure (“HR”), and (5) Givoly and Hayn’s (2000) Neg-
ative Accruals Measure (“NA”). While there are several other approaches to mea-
surement of conservatism, these five measures are the most widely applied and have
had the most significant impact on the empirical literature on conservatism.
To the extent that these measures are used in empirical studies to test theories
and hypotheses concerning accounting conservatism, the empirical results obtained
may differ with the choice of measure used and therefore leave uncertainty about
the validity and significance of the results obtained from any particular measure.
Therefore, it is important that accounting researchers consider the validity of these
measures of accounting conservatism. In this chapter, I attempt to address the ques-
tion of the validity of the measures of accounting conservatism and focus on the
following specific questions:
1. What are the main features of each of the five measures of accounting conser-
vatism?
2. Could application of different measures of conservatism produce the same
result?
3. How should the differences, if any, resulting from the use of different mea-
sures of conservatism be interpreted?
4. Are there any biases in these measures of conservatism?
The above four questions set the key issues that are relevant to empirical researchers
studying accounting conservatism. I address these questions by conducting a survey
of the accounting conservatism literature using the methodological framework of
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construct validity theory, as set out in Messick (1989), Cook and Campbell (1979)
and others. Broadly speaking, construct validity addresses the question “are the
measures representing what they are supposed to represent?” Construct validity
provides a scientific framework for assessing this overall question and the subsidiary
questions set out above. The concept of construct validity has been in existence for
more than 50 years and has been applied in many branches of the social sciences,
including psychology, education, sociology, organizational behavior and market-
ing. In this chapter, I apply this well-established framework to analyze the issues
surrounding the validity of the existing measures of accounting conservatism.
While the primary method of investigation in Chapter 1 is one of reviewing
and analyzing the existing empirical literature on accounting conservatism, I also
conduct some supplementary empirical tests in Section 1.3.1, because the existing
empirical evidence is incomplete in regard to convergent validity. These simple
empirical tests in Section 1.3.1 allow me to get a complete view of convergent va-
lidity among all five measures of conservatism. Apart from Section 1.3.1, all other
sections of Chapter 1 are based on the empirical evidence provided by the existing
literature, and no further empirical tests are conducted.
The precise meaning of the construct of accounting conservatism has not been
universally agreed upon by accounting researchers. A general interpretation of
“conservatism” in accounting is articulated by the IASB, which states that conser-
vatism is “a degree of caution in the exercise of the judgments needed in making the
estimates required under conditions of uncertainty, such that assets or incomes are
not overstated and liabilities or expenses are not understated” IASB (1989, p. 37).
Nevertheless, compared to many other constructs or subject areas of accounting,
the construct of conservatism does not have a well-articulated and as yet commonly
agreed upon interpretation. Regardless of the meaning of conservatism, it is a the-
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oretical construct that belongs to the world of ideas and, as such, can be linked to
other constructs by analytical reasoning. On the other hand, the measures of con-
servatism are operationalizations of the construct and application of the measures
results in facts that simply reflect the relevant operationalizations. A fact observed
regarding conservatism from applying any measure has no independent reference in
any circumstance. In order for such facts to have significance they should obviously
bear close correspondence to the underling theoretical construct.
The framework of construct validity provides a basis for discriminating between
the different measures and thus it provides a useful approach to frame a review of
the developing literature on conservatism. Although this chapter is mainly based
on the existing evidence from the empirical literature, its contribution is to put the
existing evidence into a new perspective – the perspective of construct validity.
The present survey reviews papers which adopt measures of conservatism that
have been widely applied (and therefore constitutes a significant strand of the con-
servatism literature) and have been published in peer-reviewed journals through to
May 2009. Application of these criteria leads us to review the five measures of
conservatism identified above, and my literature survey covers 53 journal articles as
summarized in Table 1.1.2
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.2 reviews the tech-
niques, strengths, weaknesses and the research applications of the five identified
2Papers that are not covered by the survey include Khan and Watts (2009) and Cotter and Don-
nelly (2006). Khan and Watts (2009) propose a measure of conservatism that is an extension of the
Basu AT measure and assesses the firm-specific degrees of asymmetric timeliness. However, Khan
and Watts’ paper was published after May 2009, my cut-off date for the literature review, and the
measure proposed has to date not been widely adopted. Cotter and Donnelly (2006) propose a firm-
specific measure of conservatism that is based on the accounting-policy choices made by each firm.
The measure requires researchers to form subjective judgments about the degree of conservatism of
a firm based on reading the firm’s statement of accounting policies in the annual report. The measure
is inevitably subjective and would not be feasible for application to a large set of firms. The paper
was published by a professional body and to date the proposed approach does not appear to have
been adopted by other researchers.
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measures of accounting conservatism. Section 1.3 critically evaluates the construct
validity of these measures against a number of key validation criteria. Section 1.4
discusses the main challenges to construct validity in the measures of conservatism,
and offers some suggestions for future research. Section 1.5 concludes the chapter.
1.2 Existing measures of conservatism
In this section, I review the techniques, rationales, and the strengths and weaknesses
of the five existing measures of accounting conservatism. The measures are:
1. Basu’s (1997) asymmetric timeliness of earnings measure (AT),
2. Ball and Shivakumar’s (2005) asymmetric-cash-flow-to-accruals measure (AACF),
3. The Market-to-Book (or Book-to-Market) ratio,
4. Penman and Zhang’s (2002) hidden reserves measure (HR), and
5. Givoly and Hayn’s (2000) negative accruals measure (NA).
Table 1.1 summarizes the use of these five measures in the empirical literature sur-
veyed, including the main topic area and key findings of each paper. Table 1.2
summarizes the frequency of the use of each measure in the papers surveyed. It
can be seen from Table 1.2 that the frequency of use differs significantly, and the
Basu AT measure is by far the most frequently used measure of conservatism in the
literature. Below, we discuss the five measures individually.
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Table 1.1: A summary of the empirical literature on conser-
vatism
Authors Topic areas Sample Measures Main findings
Ahmed and Duellman
(2007)
Corporate governance
and conservatism
US (S&P 500) AT, BTM. NA Conservatism is negatively correlated with
the percentage of inside directors, and
positively correlated with the percentage of
shareholding by outside directors.
Ahmed et al. (2002) Debt contracting and
conservatism
US BTM, NA Conservatism reduces the cost of debt, in
support of the debt-contracting hypothesis of
conservatism.
Ahmed et al. (2000) Testing residual
income valuation
model
US HR Conservatism is positively correlated with
the valuation weight on operating assets.
Ball and Shivakumar
(2005)
Comparing
conservatism in UK
private and public
firms
UK AACF, an
earnings
persistence
measure
UK private firms have lower reporting
quality of earnings than do UK public firms,
as measured by the degree of accounting
conservatism
Ball and Shivakumar
(2006)
Accrual models and
conservatism
US AACF Existing accrual models (e.g. Jones (1991)
and others) are extended to incorporate
conservatism, for the purpose of further
investigating the role of conservatism in
accounting accruals.
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Authors Topic areas Sample Measures Main findings
Ball et al. (2000) International
differences in
corporate governance
and legal environment
and conservatism
International AT Common law countries are more
conservative in their financial reporting
practices than code law countries as
measured by Basu’s AT measure.
Ball et al. (2008) Equity vs. debt
markets demand for
conservatism
International AT This paper finds that conservatism increased
with the relative importance of the debt
market in each country.
Ball et al. (2003) Legal, political, and
institutional factors’
impacts on
conservatism
4 East Asian
countries
AT In four East-Asia countries, conservatism is
affected by several legal, political and
institutional factors.
Basu (1997) Asymmetric
timeliness of earnings,
litigation costs
demand for
conservatism
US AT, an earnings
persistence
measure
Defined, measured and tested the
asymmetric timeliness of earnings concept
of conservatism, and show that conservatism
level increases with higher litigation costs
Bauman (1999) Testing residual
income valuation
model (RIVM)
US HR Fixed assets accounting and R&D
accounting are the most significant
contributors to conservatism. Weak
association between conservatism and RIVM
parameters.
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Authors Topic areas Sample Measures Main findings
Beatty et al. (2008) Debt-contracting
benefits of
conservatism
US (debt
covenants)
AT, BTM, NA Debt-covenant modifications are associated
with the demand for accounting
conservatism.
Beaver et al. (2008) The simultaneity of
the Basu AT measure
US AT The Basu AT measure is significantly
weakened if jointly estimated with Hayn’s
(1995) non-linear ERC model, using a 2SLS
method.
Beaver and Ryan
(2000)
transitory vs.
permanent
components of BTM
US BTM Separate BTM into the transitory and
permanent components. The permanent
component is regarded as a measure of
conservatism.
Beekes et al. (2004) Corporate governance
of conservatism
UK AT The percentage of outside directors is
positively associated with conditional
conservatism.
Brown et al. (2006) Value-relevance and
conservatism
International AT, AACF,
BTM
For countries with higher accrual levels,
some evidence shows that conservatism is
associated with a higher level of
value-relevance, although with conflicting
evidence. Accrual density is another
conditioning variable.
Bushman and
Piotroski (2006)
Legal, political, and
institutional factors’
impacts on
conservatism
International AT, AACF Country-level variations in conditional
conservatism associated with a variety of
legal & political factors.
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Authors Topic areas Sample Measures Main findings
Callen et al. (2009) Return/earning
relationship,
economic demands
for conservatism
US A VAR based
measure
A new measure of conservatism is developed
based on the vector-auto-regressive (VAR)
decomposition of stock returns, and is used
to test the economic demands for
conservatism.
Cheng (2005) Return on Equity
(ROE), RIVM
US HR Abnormal return on equity (ROE) is
decomposed into a conservatism component
and an economic rent component. More
conservative accounting leads to a higher
ROE.
Choi et al. (2006) RIVM US a RIVM-based
measure
Using analyst forecast information, this
paper proposes and estimates a
conservatism-correction method for the
empirical tests of RIVM.
Choi (2007) Debt-contracting
benefits of
conservatism
Korea
(mid-cap)
AT Conditional conservatism is increasing in a
firm’s bank-dependence.
Dietrich et al. (2007) Econometrics of the
Basu model
Monte Carlo
simulations
AT Basu’s method is upwards biased and does
not measure accounting conservatism.
Francis et al. (2004) Costs of equity and
conservatism
US AT A study of the effects of various earnings
attributes on the cost of equity (information
risk proxy). Conservatism is one of them,
but is shown to be not significant.
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Authors Topic areas Sample Measures Main findings
Gassen et al. (2006) Earnings management
and conservatism
International AT, NA, MTB,
skewness of
earnings
Conditional conservatism and income
smoothing appear to be distinct concepts,
and are only weakly correlated.
Giner and Rees (2001) International
differences
France,
Germany &
UK
AT Earnings of UK firms are more conservative
than the earnings of firms in France and
Germany, as explained by the litigation cost
hypothesis.
Givoly and Hayn
(2000)
historic trend of
accounting
conservatism
US NA, an earning
persistence
measure
An empirical survey of the historical patterns
of US accounting, developing the
non-operating accrual measure of
conservatism.
Givoly et al. (2007) Validity tests of the
Basu model
US AT An empirical investigation into the validity
of the Basu measure, and shows that the
Basu AT measure is not reliable.
Grambovas et al.
(2006)
Conservatism in EU
and US
EU & US AT Applying the AT measure and panel data
techniques, financial reporting has become
more conservative in both the US and the
EU, and the degrees of conservatism in the
US and and the EU are not markedly
different.
Huijgen and
Lubberink (2005)
UK-US Cross-listing
and conservatism
UK
(cross-listed in
US)
AT UK firms cross-listed in the US are
significantly more conservative than UK
firms that are not cross-listed in the US.
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Authors Topic areas Sample Measures Main findings
Klein and Marquardt
(2006)
Accounting losses US NA Negative non-operating accruals are
associated with higher frequency of
accounting losses. But accounting losses are
determined by other non-accounting factors
as well.
Krishnan (2005b) Auditor quality and
conservatism
US AT, an earnings
persistence
measure
Ex Arthur Andersen’s Houston clients
showed less conservative earnings than other
firms.
Krishnan (2005a) Auditor quality and
conservatism
US AT The big 6 auditor’s industry experience is
positively correlated with conservative
reporting by their clients.
Krishnan (2007) Auditor quality and
conservatism
US AT, AACF Ex Arthur Andersen’s clients switched to
more conservative accounting practices
compared to the control group, in order to
reduce litigation risk following the Arthur
Andersen’s collapse
LaFond and
Roychowdhury (2008)
Managerial-agency-
problem’s demand for
conservatism
US AT Conditional conservatism is negatively
associated with managerial ownership in a
firm.
LaFond and Watts
(2008)
Information
asymmetry and
conservatism
US AT Conditional conservatism is increasing in
information asymmetry, which is measured
by the probability of an information-based
trade (PIN score).
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Authors Topic areas Sample Measures Main findings
Lara and Mora (2004) International
accounting differences
8 European
countries
AT, MTB Continental countries show higher balance
sheet conservatism than the UK, however no
significant difference in earnings
conservatism. Also found negative
correlation between the Basu AT measure
and the MTB measure of conservatism.
Lara et al. (2009a) Corporate governance
and conservatism
US (S&P 1500) AT, AACF, NA Corporate governance quality is positively
associated with the Basu measure of
conservatism.
Lara et al. (2009b) Various determinants
of conservatism
(contracting,
litigation, tax and
political)
US AT, BTM In general, this study confirms the known
factors that determine the degree of
accounting conservatism.
Lara et al. (2005) Earnings management
and conservatism
France,
Germany &
UK
AT The Basu measure of conservatism is more
significantly different between code law and
common law countries, after discretionary
accruals are controlled for.
Lobo and Zhou (2006) Sarbanes-Oxley Act
and conservatism
US AT The level of conservatism increased after the
introduction of SOX in the US.
Mason (2004) Testing residual
income valuation
model
US HR, MTB Conservatism is positively correlated with
the valuation weight on operating accruals.
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Authors Topic areas Sample Measures Main findings
Mensah et al. (2004) Analyst forecast US HR, NA Conservatism is negatively correlated with
analyst forecast accuracy. The higher the
conservatism, the lower the accuracy. It is an
overt sign of market inefficiency.
Monahan (2005) RIVM, Earning/return
relation
US HR Conservatism affects the earning/return
relation only for firms with high growth in
R&D, and impacts on the accuracy of RIVM
estimates.
Narayanamoorthy
(2006)
Post-Earnings-
Announcement Drift
(PEAD)
US Asymmetric
autocorrelation
of standardized
unexpected
earnings (SUE)
The stock market systematically overlooked
the predictable implications of conservatism
for the time-series of earnings, leading to
cross-sectional variations in PEAD.
Pae (2007) Conditional
conservatism and
unexpected accruals
US AT, AACF,
MTB, HR
Conditional conservatism is found to be
mainly achieved by managers manipulating
unexpected accruals.
Pae et al. (2005) The negative
correlation between
the Basu measure and
MTB
US AT, MTB This paper shows that Basu’s AT measure
and the MTB measure are negatively
correlated, and proposes the conditional vs.
unconditional conservatism distinction.
Penman and Zhang
(2002)
Equity valuation,
market efficiency
US HR Conservatism results in lower earnings
quality and the market is not efficient enough
to see through the effects of conservatism on
earnings.
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Authors Topic areas Sample Measures Main findings
Pope and Walker
(1999)
extraordinary items
and conservatism
US vs. UK AT Compared to the US as a benchmark, UK’s
FRS 3 tightens the reporting for
extraordinary items, reflected by a higher
degree of conservatism in UK firms after the
introduction of FRS-3.
Qiang (2007) Various determinants
of conservatism
(contracting,
litigation, tax and
political)
US Modified BTM
and NA
In general, this study confirms the known
factors that determine the degree of
accounting conservatism, as well as the
negative correlation between Basu measure
and MTB.
Rajan et al. (2007) Return on Investment
(ROI), RIVM
US HR Conservative and past growth jointly impact
on firms’ return on investment (ROI).
Roychowdhury and
Watts (2007)
Reconciling the Basu
measure and MTB
US AT, MTB Basu measure and the MTB measure are
reconciled, based on a valuation model.
Ruddock et al. (2006) Non-audit-services
and conservatism
Australia AT High Non-Audit-Services are not related to
conservatism, offering evidence that NAS
does not impair audit quality/independence.
Sivakumar and
Waymire (2003)
History of US railroad
accounting
US (history) AT Early 20th-century U.S. railroads
demonstrated increased conservatism
following new fixed asset accounting rules
issued by the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) in 1907 and 1908.
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Authors Topic areas Sample Measures Main findings
Zhang (2008) Debt-contracting
benefits of
conservatism
US AT, NA,
earnings
skewness
Conservatism induces efficiency gains to
lenders and consequently results in lower
cost of borrowing if the market is efficient.
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Table 1.2: Statistics on the measures of conservatism in the paper survey
Panel A: Frequency of the measures of conservatism in the paper survey
AT AACF
MTB
/BTM
NA HR Others
No. of papers 37 7 13 10 9 9
Panel B: Papers by the number of measures of conservatism used
1 measure 2 measures ≥ 3 measures Total
No. of papers 32 13 8 53
1.2.1 Basu’s Asymmetric Timeliness Measure (AT)
Basu’s (1997) operationalization of accounting conservatism focuses on the impli-
cation that earnings will reflect ‘bad news’ more quickly than ‘good news’, which
is known as the asymmetric timeliness of earnings. Basu (1997) was the first to link
asymmetric timeliness with accounting conservatism - the greater the asymmetric
timeliness, the greater the degree of accounting conservatism. Empirically, Basu
(1997) developed the following cross-sectional regression, also known as the Basu
regression, to estimate the degree of conservatism (i.e. asymmetric timeliness):
EPSit
Pit
= α0+α1DRit +β0Rit +β1RitDRit + εit
where:
• EPSit : Earnings per share for firm i year t
• Pit : Opening stock market price for firm i year t
• Rit : Stock markets return for firm i year t
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• DRit : Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the stock market return for firm i
in year t is negative, and equal to 0 if the stock market return for firm i in year
t is non- negative.
In essence, Basu (1997) regresses accounting earnings (EPS/P) on stock returns
(R) separately for ‘good-news’ and ‘bad-news’ firm-year observations. A firm-year
is deemed as a ‘good-news’ firm-year, if its market return is positive or zero, i.e.
Rit ≥ 0. Conversely, a firm-year is deemed as a ‘bad-news’ firm-year, if its stock
return is negative, i.e. Rit < 0. The estimated slope coefficient measures how timely
the news embodied in the stock return is recognized in earnings, conditional on the
sign of stock returns.
Technically, the Basu regression model uses the dummy variable, DR, to dis-
tinguish between ‘good-news’ and ‘bad-news’, and thereby allows the slope co-
efficients and the intercepts to differ between these two groups. Under good news
(Rit ≥ 0), DR is equal to 0 and the good-news timeliness coefficient is β0. Under bad
news (Rit < 0), DR is equal to 1 and the bad-news timeliness coefficient is β0+β1.
Clearly, β1 is the asymmetric timeliness coefficient and is the primary indicator of
accounting conservatism in the Basu model. The greater β1 is, the higher the degree
of conservatism.
Tables 1.1 and 1.2 show that Basu’s AT measure was used in 37 of the 53 papers
reviewed by this chapter, making AT the most frequently used measure of conser-
vatism in this survey. This finding supports Ryan’s (2006, p. 514) statement that the
Basu AT measure is the most popular measure of conservatism in the literature. Ta-
ble 1.1 also demonstrates that the papers using the AT measure cover a wide range
of topic areas, including (i) the contracting hypothesis of conservatism, (ii) the lit-
igation risk hypothesis of conservatism, (iii) the impact of corporate governance
on conservatism, and (iv) the impact of auditor quality on conservatism, as well as
41
other topic areas.
In particular, I find that all international comparative studies of conservatism
have without exception adopted the Basu AT measure. These international studies
typically test the impacts of a variety of legal, political and institutional factors on
the firm’s degree of accounting conservatism (for example: Bushman and Piotroski,
2006; Ball et al., 2000, 2003). Ball et al. (2008) use an international comparative
empirical design to test the significance of the debt market relative to the equity
market in influencing the firm’s degree of accounting conservatism and find that
firms’ degree of financial reporting conservatism increases with the importance of
the debt market in a country, but not with the importance of the equity market.
The literature has identified a number of strengths and weaknesses of the Basu
AT measure [see Ryan (2006) for a comprehensive discussion on this topic]. The
strengths of the Basu AT measure include: (1) it has been widely applied, and for
nearly nine years it was the only measure in the literature to implement the asym-
metric timeliness operationalization of conservatism;3 (2) many papers using the
AT measure have produced results that are consistent with their theoretical predic-
tions, which increases researchers’ confidence not only in the theory but also in
the measure itself (Ryan, 2006); (3) the AT measure is well suited to large-sample
cross-sectional analysis, manifested by the use of the AT measure in the very large
scale international comparative studies discussed earlier.
On the other hand, critics of the Basu AT measure have identified the following
weaknesses: (1) the AT measure shows poor performance in time-series research
designs (Givoly et al., 2007); (2) the AT measure does not work well when infor-
mation is aggregated over a time-period (Givoly et al., 2007); (3) there are econo-
3The second measure implementing the asymmetric timeliness idea is the AACF measure, which
was published in 2006 – 9 years after Basu’s seminal paper in 1997.
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metric deficiencies in the AT measure, including a sample-variance-ratio bias and a
sample-truncation bias4 (Dietrich et al., 2007); (4) there is a simultaneity problem
in the relationship between earnings and stock returns (Beaver et al., 2008); (5) the
AT measure does not provide a firm-specific measure of conservatism; (6) changes
in economic rents should not be included in the stock return variable in the Basu
regression (Roychowdhury and Watts, 2007); and (7) market mispricing may cause
the stock returns to incorrectly reflect the true extent of the underlying economic
news (Beatty, 2007).
These weaknesses suggest that the AT measure may be a biased estimator of the
true degree of accounting conservatism in the sample. But the debate about the ex-
istence and the direction of the bias in the AT measure is still unsettled in the litera-
ture. Gigler and Hemmer (2001) and Dietrich et al. (2007) argue that the Basu mea-
sure may be biased upward. Although the conclusions are similar, these two studies
are based on very different theoretical grounds. Gigler and Hemmer’s (2001) study
is based on an agency model of pre-emptive voluntary disclosure, while Dietrich
et al.’s (2007) study is almost entirely based on econometric issues (see footnote 4
for Dietrich et al.’s main argument). Givoly et al. (2007) also come to a similar
conclusion that the Basu measure is not valid, but do not provide any indication as
to whether it is biased upward or downward.
On the other side of the debate, Ryan (2006) strongly supports the AT measure
and argues that, with more robust model specifications as well as empirical designs,
the AT measure may not be as strongly biased as it is argued by Dietrich et al.
4In Dietrich et al (2007), the sample-variance-ratio bias describes the well-known econometric
result that reverse regressions are generally biased, except in certain limited situations. The sam-
ple truncation bias is caused by partitioning the sample into good-news and bad-news firms based
on stock returns. However, at a more fundamental level, both problems appear to be caused by
the fact that stock returns contain non-earnings news as well as earnings news, which introduces
measurement errors to the regressor in the Basu AT regression.
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(2007). In particular, he suggests that the validity and robustness of the AT measure
can be improved by incorporating industry-specific proxies for economic ‘news’
and by controlling for the effects of business cycles (Ryan, 2006).
1.2.2 Asymmetric Accrual to Cash-flow Measure (AACF)
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) developed the AACF measure in order to estimate the
degree of accounting conservatism in private (unlisted) companies, as Basu’s AT
measure is not suitable for private companies given that there is no stock price
information available for private companies. To overcome this difficulty, Ball and
Shivakumar (2005) developed essentially the non-stock-market equivalent of the AT
measure, which is based on the following cross-sectional regression:
ACCit = β0+β1DCFOit +β2CFOit +β3DCFOitCFOit + εit
where
• ACCit : Operating accruals, measured as ∆Inventory + ∆Debtors + ∆Other
current assets - ∆Creditors - ∆Other current liabilities - Depreciation.
• DCFOit : Dummy variable that is set to 0 if CFOit ≥ 0 , and is set to 1 if
CFOit < 0.
• CFOit : Cash-flow for period t.
In the regression above, the coefficient β3 is the AACF measure of accounting
conservatism. A higher β3 indicates a higher degree of accounting conservatism.
Clearly, the AACF measure and the Basu AT measure are based on the same fun-
damental idea of asymmetric timeliness and are estimated from models with a very
similar structure. In essence, both models regress an earnings variable on a proxy
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for economic ‘news’. Both models employ dummy variables (DR and DCFO) to
distinguish between ‘good-news’ and ‘bad-news’. The main difference between
these two measures comes from their different choices of the proxies for economic
‘news’ and the response variable. The Basu AT model uses stock return as the
proxy for news, whereas the AACF measure uses operating cash-flow as the proxy
for news. In terms of the response variable, the Basu AT model uses total earnings,
whereas the AACF measure selects only the accrual component of total earnings.
Ball and Shivakumar (2005; 2006) use the accrual component of total earnings be-
cause, in their view, accounting conservatism mainly influences the accruals com-
ponent of earnings rather than the cash flows component.
Table 1.1 shows that, out of the 53 papers surveyed, only seven papers applied
the AACF measure. This relatively low frequency is probably due to the AACF
measure being the most recently developed among the five measures reviewed.
However, it appears that conservatism researchers are increasingly interested in us-
ing the AACF measure as an alternative to the Basu AT measure, given the criticisms
of the Basu AT measure. For example, the concerns about validity of the Basu AT
measure have led Lara et al. (2009a) to estimate the AACF measure in addition to
the AT measure in their study of the relationship between corporate governance and
accounting conservatism. The main reason for adopting the AACF measure in ad-
dition to the AT measure, as explained by Lara et al. (2009a), is to ensure that the
paper’s main empirical results obtained by the AT measure are not spurious.
The strengths and weaknesses of the AACF measure have not been discussed to
any great extent in the conservatism literature, possibly due to the fact that this mea-
sure is a relatively new one and its robustness has not yet been validated. To date,
the conservatism literature has not identified any bias in the AACF measure either.
Clearly, more validation research is required before the strengths, weaknesses and
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any potential bias in the AACF measure can be fully understood.
1.2.3 The Market-to-Book (“MTB”) or Book-to-Market (“BTM”)
ratio
The idea underlying the use of MTB (or BTM) as a measure of accounting conser-
vatism is that, ceteris paribus, a conservative accounting system tends to depress
the net book value of a firm relative to the firm’s ‘true’ economic value. There-
fore, a higher MTB (and a lower BTM) implies a higher degree of accounting con-
servatism, and vice versa.5 The MTB measure is strongly rooted in the analytical
work based on the Residual Income Valuation Model (RIVM) (Feltham and Ohlson,
1995; Zhang, 2000; Beaver and Ryan, 2000). Feltham and Ohlson (1995) first intro-
duced accounting conservatism in the RIVM context, and characterize conservatism
as a tendency to bias downwards the book value of a firm relative to its market value.
This manifestation of conservatism has been carried into later analytical work on
conservatism, such as Beaver and Ryan (2000; 2005) and Zhang (2000).
In addition to the raw MTB (or BTM) ratio, Beaver and Ryan (2000) developed
a refinement in using the BTM as a measure of conservatism, which has been quite
widely applied in the literature. This refinement decomposes the BTM ratio into
two components - the bias component and the lag component. Beaver and Ryan
(2000) argue that the bias component of BTM should be interpreted as a measure
of accounting conservatism. In order to decompose BTM, Beaver and Ryan (2000)
regress BTM on a series of lagged stock returns, leading up to six lagged years, as
in the following fixed-effect panel data regression:
5It should be noted that MTB is positive measure of conservatism, whereas BTM is a negative
measure of conservatism.
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BT Mit = αt +αi+
6
∑
j=0
β jROEi,t− j + εit
where
• BT Mit : Book-to-Market (BTM) ratio of firm i, at the end of year t.
• αt : Year-to-year variation in the BTM common to the sample firms
• αi: Bias component of BTM for firm i
• ROEt− j: Return on Equity (ROE) in each of the 6 years preceding year t.
• β j: Regression coefficients on ROEi,t− j
In the regression above, the time intercept, αt , is fixed for all firms in any particular
year, but may change from year to year. Therefore, αt captures the time effect of
market-wide BTM movements. The fixed effect coefficient, αi , captures the firm-
specific persistent bias component of BTM for firm i, and is fixed for each firm.
β j is the regression coefficient of the lag component of the BTM ratio. According
to Beaver and Ryan (2000), the bias component of BTM, αi, is a more accurate
measure of the firm’s degree of conservatism than the raw BTM.
As Table 1.2 - Panel A demonstrates, 13 papers in the literature surveyed here
have applied MTB (or BTM), making it the second most widely applied measure of
conservatism. In general, the papers that apply the MTB (or BTM) measure use it
to estimate the degree of ‘unconditional’ conservatism, as opposed to ‘conditional’
conservatism.6 For example, Lara and Mora (2004) use the MTB ratio as a measure
6Conditional conservatism is defined as news-dependent conservatism – the asymmetric treat-
ment of good news and bad news. Unconditional conservatism is defined as news-independent
conservatism – that is the accounting system always creates a downward bias to book values and
earnings, irrespective of whether there is good news or bad news. According to Beaver and Ryan
(2005), conditional conservatism is measured by Basu’s AT measure, and unconditional conser-
vatism is measured by MTB (or BTM). For further discussion see sub-section 1.4.1.
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for ‘unconditional’ conservatism, and find that continental European countries have
a higher degree of ‘unconditional’ conservatism (i.e. higher MTB) than the UK.
A key advantage of the MTB (or BTM) measure of conservatism is that it is firm-
specific. In comparison, the AT measure and the AACF measure generally cannot
make firm-specific measurements.7 Another advantage is that the MTB measure has
the theoretical underpinning of Feltham and Ohlson’s RIVM model (1995), which
is one of the most rigorous valuation models in the accounting literature.
In terms of weaknesses, the theory developed by Roychowdhury and Watts
(2007) implies that the MTB (or BTM) ratio may be a (upward) biased estima-
tor of the degree of conservatism, due to the existence of economic rents in most
firms. They argue that the economic rents of a firm are generally not recognizable
in the book value of the firm, per GAAP. Therefore, regardless of the degree of con-
servatism, economic rents generally depress the book value of a firm relative to the
market value of the firm. The more economic rents the firm has, the more likely its
MTB (or BTM) ratio overstates the true degree of conservatism in that firm. Only
if the firm has zero economic rents, can the MTB ratio be an unbiased estimator of
the firm’s true degree of accounting conservatism.
Another problem is that the MTB (or BTM) ratio is also a well-known proxy for
many factors other than accounting conservatism in the empirical accounting and
finance research literature and therefore it is prone to confounding problems. For
instance, MTB is widely used as a proxy for default risk by finance researchers (e.g.
Fama and French, 1993, 1995). Varying roles played by MTB such as this creates
considerable uncertainty as to how researchers should interpret MTB.
7Even though, in principle, the Basu AT measure can be estimated from time-series data for each
individual firm, Givoly et al. (2007) show that in practice the AT measure performs very poorly
in time-series in terms of detecting conservatism in firms. No studies have yet attempted to fit the
AACF model to time-series data, and hence there is currently no evidence on how well AACF could
perform as a firm-specific measure in time-series data.
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1.2.4 The Negative Accruals Measure (NA)
Givoly and Hayn (2000) propose a measure of conservatism that focuses on non-
operating accruals as a subset of the firm’s book value. Non-operating accruals are
calculated as total accruals minus operating accruals. Total accruals are equal to the
firm’s net income before depreciation minus the cash flow from operating activities,
whereas operating accruals are calculated using the balance sheet approach, which
is very similar to the calculation of operating accruals (i.e. ACC) used in the AACF
method.
NA = TACC−OPACC
where
TACC : Total Accrual, calculated as Net Income (after depreciation) - Operating
Cash Flow
OPACC : Operating accrual, measured as ∆Inventory + ∆Debtors + ∆Other cur-
rent assets - ∆Creditors - ∆Other current liabilities.
The rationale behind using negative accruals as a measure of accounting conser-
vatism is that accounting conservatism uses the mechanism of accruals to defer the
recognition of economic gains and accelerate the recognition of economic losses.
Through the process of delaying gains and accelerating losses, the level of accumu-
lated non-operating accruals in a firm gradually becomes more and more negative
(Givoly and Hayn, 2000). Using a sample of 896 firms, Givoly and Hayn (2000)
show that the cumulative negative non-operating accruals for these sample firms in-
creased significantly in the sample period 1965 to 1998. They also found that for the
same period (positive) operating accruals of these 896 firms had increased. But on a
net basis, the increases in operating accruals were not large enough to offset the in-
creasingly negative non-operating accruals, which leads to decreasing total accruals
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(operating plus non-operating accruals) over that period. Givoly and Hayn (2000)
argue that the trend of increasing negative accruals is a manifestation of increases
in the overall degree of accounting conservatism in the sample firms that occurred
between 1965 and 1998.
One strength of the NA measure is that it is a firm-specific measure of conser-
vatism. Another strength is that NA is generally easy to implement, as it does not
require many data items. Furthermore, the NA measure is not market-based, and
therefore, in contrast to the AT and MTB measures, it can also be applied to private
firms.
However, this survey also indicates that the NA measure has two weaknesses:
First, the original form of NA as in Givoly and Hayn (2000) requires researchers
to measure the accumulated accrual over an extended time period beginning from a
particular base year. But in practice, the base year is difficult to standardize across
firms. A strategy adopted in recent studies is to calculate the average non-operating
accruals over 3 years, centered around year t (that is, year t−1 to year t+1), and use
the three-year average as the proxy for accounting conservatism (Lara et al., 2009a;
Ahmed and Duellman, 2007). Obviously, at the same time that this new approach
of measuring NA avoids the base-year problem, it creates another potential problem
as it is no longer a measure of accumulated non-operating accruals, but rather an
average measure of periodic non-operating accruals.
The second weakness of the NA measure is that the depreciation charge is an
important element of accrual accounting, but is ignored in the NA measure. In fact,
Givoly and Hayn (2000) added back the depreciation expense to earnings when they
calculated the operating and non-operating accruals in order to make the adjusted
earnings compatible with operating cash flows, as depreciation is a non-cash item.
Although this exclusion of depreciation from the accruals calculation is justified,
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it nevertheless leaves a crucial item of accrual accounting entirely out of consid-
eration. Therefore, it may be useful for researchers in the future to investigate the
impact of conservatism on allowances assigned to depreciation and the possibility of
designing new measures of accounting conservatism that incorporate depreciation
allowances.
To date there has not been a discussion in the literature on any potential biases
in the NA measure. I therefore encourage other researchers to consider this issue in
future research.
1.2.5 The Hidden Reserves Measure (HR)
The fifth measure of accounting conservatism is the hidden reserves measure. Pen-
man and Zhang (2002) argue that accounting conservatism creates hidden reserves
(i.e. cookie jar reserves), the amount of which can be used to gauge the degree
of conservatism in a firm. They argue that the higher the amount of the hidden
reserves, the more conservative is the firm’s financial reporting system. However,
since hidden reserves are not explicitly reported in either the financial statements or
anywhere else, they can only be estimated by the researchers themselves.
Two methods have been employed in the conservatism literature to estimate
the amount of hidden reserves. The methods are similar and yield similar proxies
for accounting conservatism. The first, developed by Ahmed et al. (2000), uses
two ratios, R&D/sales and advertising expenditures/sales, as proxies for hidden
reserves. But the second method, developed by Penman and Zhang (2002) is a
more commonly used and more sophisticated method of estimating hidden reserves.
Thus, this review concentrates on this second method. Penman and Zhang (2002)
construct a hidden reserves measure of accounting conservatism, called the C score,
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based on the following method:
Cit =
ERit
NOAit
where
ERit : Estimated hidden reserves created by accounting conservatism, where i
indicates firms and t balance sheet dates.
NOAit : Net Operating Assets, the book value of operating assets minus operat-
ing liabilities, excluding financial assets and liabilities.
But estimating ERit remains a non-trivial challenge. To address this issue, Pen-
man and Zhang (2002) propose the following formula for estimating ERit :
ERit = INV resit +RD
res
it +ADV
res
it
where
• INV resit : Inventory reserve
• RDresit : R&D reserve
• ADV resit : Brands asset
INV resit is the value under US GAAP of the LIFO reserve as reported in the footnotes
to the financial statements. RDresit is the R&D reserve calculated as the estimated
amortized R&D asset that would have been capitalized had accounting standards
permitted such capitalizations. The calculation involves two steps: first, capitalize
all R&D expenses from the income statement as if R&D were an asset; second,
amortize the balance of capitalized R&D asset, using the estimated average industry
rates of amortization. The resulting R&D asset after amortization is the RDresit .
Similarly, the advertising reserve, ADV resit , is an estimated brand asset, derived by
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first capitalizing all advertising expenses and then amortizing them, in much the
same way as the estimation of RDresit .
Several data items required by the Penman and Zhang method are frequently
unavailable, such as R&D expense and advertising expense, as these items are often
not disclosed by firms and do not often appear in the Compustat database. As
a consequence, the sample size for HR is generally much smaller than in studies
using the other measures of conservatism. This data requirement also makes the
HR measure more difficult to apply to international studies of conservatism, as the
accounting regulations in many countries do not mandate the disclosure of R&D
and advertising expenses. Perhaps for this reason, I found that none of the existing
international studies of accounting conservatism have applied the HR measure.
Table 1.2 - Panel A shows that 9 papers out of the 53 reviewed in this chapter
have adopted the HR measure. For example, Mensah et al. (2004), apply the HR
measure, and find that conservatism is negatively correlated with the accuracy of
analyst forecasts of firm earnings. Also using the HR measure, Rajan et al. (2007)
demonstrate that conservatism and a firm’s growth rate jointly impact on the firm’s
return on investment (ROI). They find that a higher past growth rate combined with
a conservative accounting system leads to a lower ROI, while a higher past growth
combined with a liberal accounting system leads to a high ROI (Rajan et al., 2007).
The theoretical and empirical evidence by Penman and Zhang (2002) and Rajan
et al. (2007) show that HR is intertwined with firms’ investment growth rates. When
a firm’s investment growth is high, HR tends to accumulate. In contrast, when a
firm’s investment growth slows down, HR decreases and tends to be released back
into earnings. This pattern suggests that the HR measure may be biased. Depending
on the firm’s growth rate, HR may either overstate or understate the true degree of
conservatism in a firm. If the growth rate is positive, the bias may be positive; and
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vice versa.
1.3 Construct validity & the existing measures of con-
servatism
The construct validity framework is a methodology of the social sciences that specif-
ically addresses measurement issues (Messick, 1989; Campbell and Overman, 1988).
Messick’s (1989, p. 13) seminal chapter on construct validity theory defines it as
“the degree to which empirical evidence and theoretical rationale support the ad-
equacy and appropriateness of interpretations and actions based on test scores”.
That is, construct validity is concerned with the degree of correspondence between
the result of applying a measure (often called an operationalization) and the theoret-
ical construct that the measure is supposed to operationalize. If a measure is valid,
that is, there is a high degree of correspondence, then conclusions or inferences
drawn from applying that measure are also likely to be valid. Conversely, if the
measure is not valid, showing a low degree of correspondence, then the likelihood
is that the conclusions or inferences are not valid either.
A theoretical construct, by its abstract nature, is inherently unobservable (Camp-
bell and Overman, 1988). A construct is a subjective meaning, concept or interpre-
tation in the world of ideas that is commonly shared by a certain group of people
(such as researchers) which denotes an abstract physical or social being. However,
a construct might and often does have observable operationalizations in the real
world. For example, human intelligence is a theoretical construct that is inherently
unobservable. Although the theoretical construct intelligence cannot be directly
observed, its operationalizations, that is, its footprints, in society can be observed.
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Table 1.3: Validation Criteria (sub-validities)
Name of Validation
Criterion (sub-validity)
Descriptions of key features and key questions asked
by each criterion.
Convergent validity Are multiple methods of measuring the same
construct highly correlated? In other words, do
they converge?
Concurrent validity (Comparing different groups under the same
construct) Is a measure able to distinguish
between groups that it should theoretically be
able to distinguish between? That is, is this
measure able to give a score that it is
theoretically expected to give under certain
predetermined conditions (criteria)?
Discriminant validity (when measuring the same group of samples
under different constructs) Is a measure of
construct A significantly different from, or
uncorrelated with, measures of some other
constructs (say B or C), when there are no
reasons why these measures of different
constructs (A, B and C) should be significantly
similar and correlated with each other?
Predictive validity Is the measure able to predict whatever it should
theoretically be able to predict? Although
similar to concurrent validity, predictive validity
is about a measure’s ability to predict a future
condition, whereas concurrent validity is about a
measure’s ability to describe a current condition.
Internal consistency
(reliability)
Does the single measure give consistent results
for the same group in repeated measures?
Content validity Does the measure include all the contents
pertinent to that theoretical construct, usually by
inspection by other experts in the field?
Statistical conclusion
validity
Is the statistical conclusion from the test valid?
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An operationalization can be interpreted as the overt manifestation in the ob-
servable real world of some abstract construct that is inherently unobservable. For
example, high scores in mathematics or language tests may be regarded as indica-
tors of high intelligence. Similarly, a high memory score could be regarded as an
indicator of high intelligence. Alternatively, a particular IQ test, devised by psychol-
ogists, might be used to indicate a person’s level of intelligence. Philosophically, it
is possible that there is an infinite number of operationalizations of any construct,
but at the same time no single measure in itself is perfect (Campbell and Overman,
1988).
In this section, I evaluate the construct validity of the existing five measures
of accounting conservatism described in the previous section. Construct validity
is chiefly concerned with two issues: (1) How to operationalize (or measure) a
theoretical construct? (2) How to determine which measures (operationalizations)
represent the construct well and which ones do not? In order to deal with these two
issues, construct validity methodologists have developed a set of rigorous criteria
that can be employed to validate specific measures in a wide range of contexts.
There are seven common operational criteria (also known as sub-validities) that
may be used to assess construct validity. These are summarized in Table 1.3.
The criteria have been extensively applied in many areas of social sciences. For
example, Adcock (2002) provide a review of the applications of these criteria in
political science research. Also based on these criteria, Venkatraman and Grant
(1986) report on a survey of the construct validity of the measures employed in
the organizational behavior literature. Kwok and Sharp (1998) offer an excellent
summary of the status of construct validity in behavioral accounting research and
the issues arising from such research.
Each individual validation criterion in Table 1.3 emphasizes a particular aspect
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of construct validity. Taken together, these criteria provide the general evidential
basis for concluding on the construct validity of a given measure of a theoretical
construct. In general, satisfying only a single criterion is not sufficient to validate
a measure and the interpretations of it. Rather, all, or at least the majority, of the
criteria in Table 1.3 must be simultaneously met if a measure is to be judged as
valid. On the other hand, depending on the particular construct and the measures,
some criteria may be more relevant than others when we validate certain measures.
I wish to emphasize that construct validity is always a matter of degree, rather
than being binary (yes or no). Therefore, it is rare, if ever, that a measure can per-
fectly represent the underlying construct without any errors. However, the degree
to which a measure’s validity should be regarded as being acceptable is a matter of
judgment.
In this chapter, I evaluate the existing measures of accounting conservatism
against only four of the criteria, or sub-validities: (1) convergent validity; (2) con-
current validity; (3) statistical conclusion validity; (4) internal consistency (reliabil-
ity). An evaluation of the measures of conservatism against the other three criteria
(predictive validity, discriminant validity, and content validity) cannot be carried
out due to the absence of the relevant evidence in the literature.
1.3.1 Convergent validity
Sources of convergent validity evidence
Convergent validity is a validation criterion that considers whether several measures
of the same construct tend to converge (Cook and Campbell, 1979; Campbell and
Fiske, 1959; Shepard, 1993). If different measures of the same construct are mea-
sured with the same sample data and significantly different results emerge, those
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measures lack convergent validity. I examine convergent validity by looking at the
pair-wise association of the five measures of conservatism. As the literature pro-
vides evidence on only three of the possible pair-wise associations among the mea-
sures (Basu’s AT and MTB, MTB and NA, and Basu’s AT and AACF) I estimate
the missing associations myself. I thus consider the following sources of evidence
on convergent validity:
(1) The correlations reported in the literature; and
(2) Supplementary estimates of associations: correlations and regressions.
As the AT and AACF measures are not firm-specific, it is not possible to calculate
correlations involving these measures. To tackle this issue, I estimate the associ-
ations from augmented cross-sectional regressions, as implemented in Roychowd-
hury and Watts (2007) and Lara et al. (2009b). I run AT and AACF regressions aug-
mented by each of MTB, NA and HR, and use the relevant regression coefficients
to determine the direction of the association between the cross-sectional measures
and the firm-specific measures.8 Details of this estimation procedure are given in
the notes at the foot of Table 1.4. Given that regression and correlations coefficients
are not comparable, I only report (in Table 1.4) the direction of the associations (as
indicated by correlations and regression coefficients) along with their significance
levels, but not the values of the associations.
My estimates of the associations are based on a US sample of publicly traded
firms covered in Compustat that are or were listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NAS-
DAQ stock exchanges, for the period from 1989 to 2007. In forming this sample, I
8Augmented regressions are necessary because there is no natural way of calculating the correla-
tion coefficient between a cross-sectional measure (e.g., AT and AACF) and a firm-specific measure
(e.g., MTB, NA and HR). The augmented regressions approach employed in Table 1.4 has been
widely applied in the accounting conservatism literature (e.g., Roychowdhury and Watts, 2007).
58
deleted firms that had missing values on any of the measures of conservatism. After
deleting the missing observations and trimming the key variables (see appendix) by
1% from both the top and the bottom, the final sample contained 15,735 firm-years.
Using this sample, I obtain the MTB ratio from Compustat directly, and estimate
the other 4 measures of conservatism according to the methods described in Section
1.2. The appendix to this chapter reports the descriptive statistics of this sample.
Key convergent validity results
Overall, Table 1.4 shows that the five measures of conservatism seem to fall into
two distinct groups: (1) The AACF and the AT measures appear to belong to one
group and (2) the MTB, NA and HR measures appear to belong to another group.
More specific characteristics are outlined below.
First, the Basu AT measure and the AACF measure are positively associated, as
shown in the top left corner of Table 1.4. The MTB, NA and HR measures are also
all positively associated among themselves, as shown in the bottom right corner.
This shows that within each group, the measures are all positively correlated.
Second, all the across-group associations were negative and, with the exception
of AT and NA, were significant at the 1% or 5% levels. This suggests that, overall,
the two groups of measures tend to diverge from each other.
Third, the values of both the Pearson and Spearman correlations among the
firm- specific measures (MTB, NA and HR) appear rather low. For example, the
Pearson correlation between MTB and NA is 0.141 and between MTB and HR is
0.114. Likewise, NA and HR have a Pearson correlation of 0.104. None of these
correlations exceed 0.2. The Spearman rank correlations have similar values. The
evidence obtained from Ahmed et al. (2000) corroborates these results. Ahmed
et al. (2000) considered the correlation between (1-BTM), as a positive measure
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Table 1.4: Evidence of convergent validity
(Signs of pair-wise associations among different measures of conservatism)
Basu-
AT
AACF MTB NA HR
Basu-AT +
(a)
-
***(b)
-
(c)
-
*(d)
AACF +
(a)
-
***(e)
-
***(f)
-
**(g)
MTB +
***(h)
+
***(h)
NA +
***(h)
+
***(h)
HR +
***(h)
+
***(h)
Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%, two-tailed.
Note: the sources or the method of estimation of each correlation/regression coefficient in the above table:
(a) AACF and Basu-AT: estimated by Brown et al. (2006). The Pearson correlation is above the main diagonal and the
Spearman rank correlation is below it.
(b) Basu-AT and MTB: reported as the sign of β3 from the following augmented Basu AT regression:
EPSit/Pit−1 = α0 +α1DRit +α2MT Bit +α3DRit MT Bit +β0Rit +β1Rit DRit +β2Rit MT Bit +β3Rit DRit MT Bit + εit
(c) Basu-AT and NA: reported as the sign of β3 from the following augmented Basu AT regression:
EPSit/Pit−1 = α0 +α1DRit +α2NAit +α3DRit NAit +β0Rit +β1Rit DRit +β2Rit NAit +β3Rit DRit NAit + εit
(d) Basu-AT and HR: reported as the sign of β3 from the following augmented Basu AT regression :
EPSit/Pit−1 = α0 +α1DRit +α2HRit +α3DRit HRit +β0Rit +β1Rit DRit +β2Rit HRit +β3Rit DRit HRit + εit
(e) AACF and MTB: reported as the sign of β3 from the following augmented AACF regression
ACCit = α0 +α1DCFOit +α2MT Bit +α3DCFOit MT Bit +β0CFOit +
β1CFOit DCFOit +β2CFOit MT Bit +β3CFOit DCFOit MT Bit + εit
(f) AACF and NA: reported as the sign of β3 from the following augmented AACF regression:
ACCit = α0 +α1DCFOit +α2NAit +α3DCFOit NAit +β0CFOit +
β1CFOit DCFOit +β2CFOit NAit +β3CFOit DCFOit NAit + εit
(g) AACF and HR: reported as the sign of β3 from the following augmented AACF regression :
ACCit = α0 +α1DCFOit +α2HRit +α3DCFOit HRit +β0CFOit +
β1CFOit DCFOit +β2CFOit HRit +β3CFOit DCFOit HRit + εit
(h) These are Pearson correlations (above the main diagonal) and Spearman correlations (below the main diagonal) between
firm-specific measures.
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for conservatism, and the NA measure and found that the Spearman correlation
coefficient between (1-BTM) and NA was not statistically significant, while the
Pearson correlation coefficient was 0.124 and significant at the 5% level.
Fourth, the correlations between the AT and AACF measures are reported by
Brown et al. (2006). These correlations are not straightforward to obtain because
both AT and AACF are based on cross-sectional regressions. Brown et al. (2006)
circumvented this problem by calculating the country-level AT and AACF scores,
and then estimating the correlation of AT and AACF scores across the countries.
They found that the Pearson correlation was 0.266, and the Spearman correlation
is 0.298. However, neither of them was significant at the 10% level. This lack of
significance is probably due to the small country-level sample, which consists of
only 20 country-observations.
Basu’s AT vs. MTB
The empirical evidence in Table 1.4 is consistent with the finding in recent studies
that there is a negative association between Basu’s AT measure and the MTB mea-
sure9 (Pope and Walker, 2003; Pae et al., 2005; Roychowdhury and Watts, 2007;
Ryan, 2006; Beaver and Ryan, 2005). For example, Pae et al. (2005) find that when
firms are clustered into several portfolios according to their MTB ratio, the high
MTB group has consistently lower Basu measures than the low MTB group and
vice versa.
However, the negative association is inconsistent with the theoretical prediction
that if the AT and BTM measures are both measures of the same underlying con-
struct (i.e. accounting conservatism) they should be highly positively correlated,
9To date, except Table 1.4 in this chapter, the extant literature has not tested whether the AACF
measure is negatively associated with the MTB measure.
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rather than negatively correlated. But how can we explain this negative correlation?
The literature has two competing explanations for a negative correlation be-
tween the AT measure and the BTM measure. One explanation is that there are in
fact two distinct and competing forms of conservatism: conditional conservatism
and unconditional conservatism, and increases in one form decreases the other
(Beaver and Ryan, 2005; Pope and Walker, 2003; Pae et al., 2005). Based on this
argument, the proponents of this view, such as Beaver and Ryan (2005), argue that
Basu’s AT measure estimates the degree of conditional conservatism and the BTM
measure is an estimate of the degree of unconditional conservatism. Therefore,
these two measures tend to be negatively correlated.
A competing explanation is offered by Roychowdhury and Watts (2007), who
show that the negative correlation between the AT and MTB measures is essen-
tially an errors-in-variable problem in that both the AT and MTB measures con-
tain measurement errors. As noted above, in Roychowdhury and Watts’s view, the
main source of measurement error is the inclusion of economic rents in the market
values of the firm and the stock returns. Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) em-
pirically demonstrate that if the earning-return window is lengthened to three to
five years, the correlation between AT and beginning-of-the-period BTM actually
becomes positive. Their explanation is that the error-in-measurement problem is
substantially reduced when the measurement window is sufficiently longer than the
standard one year.
To summarize Section 1.3.1 – convergent validity, I conclude that the evidence
on convergent validity among the five measures of conservatism suggests a low
degree of convergence among the measures. The convergent validity problem is not
easy to resolve, because there seems to be two opposite categories of measures, and
because the measures within the same category show low levels of correlation with
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each other.
1.3.2 Concurrent validity
Concurrent validity is a measure’s ability to distinguish between sample groups that
it should theoretically be able to distinguish between (Messick, 1989; Association.
et al., 1985; Cronbach and Meehl, 1955; Cook and Campbell, 1979). That is, a
measure with high concurrent validity should be quite sensitive to small degrees
of change in the subject measured. In terms of accounting conservatism, a conser-
vatism measure with high concurrent validity should be able to easily distinguish
firms with a high degree of accounting conservatism from firms with a low degree
of accounting conservatism, and vice versa. If a measure of conservatism cannot
easily detect the differences between high-conservatism firms and low-conservatism
firms, it has low concurrent validity.
In order to test the concurrent validity of a measure of accounting conservatism,
it is necessary for us to have some a priori knowledge about the degree of conser-
vatism in the sample firms that can serve as the benchmark against which the mea-
sure can be evaluated. This requirement means that we must already know whether
the sample firms have a high or low degree of conservatism before we look at the
conservatism measure to be evaluated. This is because one cannot test a measure
based on the measure itself; rather there has to be some external benchmark for it
to be evaluated against. In the conservatism literature, I found two tests evaluating
the Basu’s AT measure against independent criteria that can constitute tests of the
concurrent validity of the AT measure. I have not found any empirical evidence that
can be used to evaluate the concurrent validity of the other four measures of ac-
counting conservatism. I consider this as another lacuna in the current conservatism
63
literature. The two tests on the concurrent validity of the AT measure are presented
below.
First, in the sensitivity analysis section of Basu (1997), he compares the results
of the AT measure with a measure of the mean-reverting property of earnings. The
mean-reverting property of earnings is another known property of the asymmetric
timeliness of earnings interpretation of accounting conservatism, which can be re-
garded as an external benchmark of accounting conservatism. The result of this
sensitivity test supports the concurrent validity of Basu’s measure, as the Basu mea-
sure shows a higher degree of accounting conservatism when the mean-reverting
trend is strongest in the sample data.
Second, Givoly et al. (2007) find that Basu’s measure is not sensitive to situa-
tionally aggressive accounting practices. Conceptually, aggressiveness is the oppo-
site of conservatism in financial reporting. Therefore, it is predicted that the degree
of conservatism in those firms that are already known to have aggressive financial
reporting practices should be significantly lower than in the other ‘normal’ firms
(control group). If a measure has a high degree of concurrent validity, it should be
able to detect the difference between the firms in the aggressive reporting group and
the control group. Following this, Givoly et al. (2007) conducted tests of Basu’s AT
method on three groups: two aggressive reporting groups, and one control group.
The two aggressive reporting groups are: Group 1: big issuer firms who owe a large
amount of debt or who engage in equity capital raising activities; Group 2: ‘re-
stater’ firms whose financial statements have been restated downwards in order to
correct the effects of previous aggressive accounting practices or previous account-
ing fraud. Group 3: the control group, consists of ’normal’ firms that do not fall into
either of the first two aggressive accounting categories. When Givoly et al. (2007)
use the AT measure on these three groups separately, the predicted differences in ac-
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counting conservatism between the two aggressive reporting groups and the control
group did not show up as expected. In other words, no significant difference in the
asymmetric timeliness coefficients could be detected between all three groups. The
failure of this test suggests that the AT measure does not have concurrent validity.10
However, given the limited tests conducted in this area, no firm conclusions can be
drawn yet and more tests are required.
1.3.3 Statistical conclusion validity
Statistical conclusion validity is a very broad term that includes any statistical is-
sues relating to the measurement of a construct such as conservatism. In the case
of accounting conservatism measures, Dietrich et al. (2007) examine the statistical
properties of Basu’s AT model and conclude that the observed asymmetry between
earnings’ responses to good news and to bad news is largely spurious: it is mainly
due to a bias caused by the distribution of the sample data, rather than to the de-
gree of accounting conservatism. This analytical result is tested in a Monte Carlo
simulation, in which Basu’s measure is applied to a sample of computer-generated
companies. The results of this Monte Carlo simulation show that even when the
computer-simulated data has zero degree of accounting conservatism, the AT mea-
sure still indicates that a significant degree of accounting conservatism is present.
Based on both the statistical analysis and the simulations, Dietrich et al. (2007)
conclude that the AT measure is biased upwards and hence is not valid as a measure
of accounting conservatism.
10An alternative explanation is that Givoly et al.’s method of classifying firms into aggressive
reporting and non-aggressive reporting samples may be flawed, in which case the AT measure would
not be capable of detecting any difference in the degrees of conservatism between these two samples.
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1.3.4 Internal consistency
Internal consistency is a criterion of construct validity which requires a measure to
be consistent with its own scores when being repeatedly taken on the same subjects,
separated by relatively short time intervals (Messick, 1989). This criterion concerns
the ‘reliability’ of a measure. However, good internal consistency alone does not
guarantee high construct validity, because a measure could have a high internal
consistency but be consistently wrong. Internal consistency is just one aspect of the
general concept of construct validity. An overall evaluation of the construct validity
of a measure requires a holistic approach in which all the criteria are considered and
weighted.
Givoly et al.’s (2007) study is currently the only study that provides evidence on
internal consistency of the current measures of conservatism. Givoly et al. (2007)
test the internal consistency of Basu’s measure and the BTM measure. In a repeated-
measure research design, Givoly et al. find that Basu’s AT measure, if repeatedly
measured over a number of sequential years on the same sample of firms, shows no
consistency. The autocorrelation of the AT measure for each firm over a 5- to 10-
year horizon is not significantly different from zero. However, there is no reasonable
analytical justification for firms’ real degree of conservatism to fluctuate so rapidly
and widely that no autocorrelation would be detected. While it is true that financial
reporting characteristics, including conservatism, are subject to changes from year
to year, any such change is more likely to be incremental and gradual than rapid.
We do not expect to observe wide fluctuations in accounting policy changes in most
firms. It is therefore reasonable to expect that the first-order autocorrelation of the
degrees of conservatism, exhibited in a time series, is significantly greater than zero.
However, Givoly et al.’s empirical result indicates that the first-order autocorrelation
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of the AT measure is basically zero, which implies that the degree of conservatism
would have been moving up and down completely randomly without any consis-
tency from one year to another! That obviously contradicts the expected time-series
behaviour of a reliable measure of the degree of accounting conservatism. On the
other hand, Givoly et al.’s study (2007) show that the BTM ratio is fairly stable over
time, which demonstrates a higher degree of internal consistency than the Basu AT
measure.
1.3.5 Overall evaluation
The limited existing evidence on the four sub-validities constrains my ability to
judge the construct validity of the existing five measures of accounting conser-
vatism. The most frequently examined measure so far is Basu’s AT measure. In
comparison, the other measures of accounting conservatism have attracted much
less attention in the literature, at least from a validation point of view.
Overall, the existing measures of conservatism do not strongly satisfy the tests
relating to these four types of sub-validities. Convergent validity is the criterion
on which there is the greatest amount of evidence, but this also shows the weak-
est result. The available empirical evidence shows only weak convergence among
the five measures: AT, AACF, MTB, NA and HR. Regarding concurrent validity,
Basu’s concurrent validity appears low, while there is limited evidence on the other
measures.
With respect to the third criterion considered – statistical conclusion validity
– it is again Basu’s AT measure that has attracted most attention in the literature.
The evidence in this area is mixed: Dietrich et al. (2007) find that the AT measure
has a low statistical validity. In the fourth type of sub-validity considered, internal
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consistency, the available evidence is negative regarding the internal consistency of
Basu’s AT measure but supports the BTM measure. In all four cases, Basu’s AT
measure is evaluated, and the results are primarily negative.
1.4 Discussion
In this last section, I consider some of the key challenges facing conservatism re-
searchers regarding the construct validity of the measures of accounting conser-
vatism, and I make some suggestions that may help to address these issues. In
particular, I identify three areas that seem to be problematic in the existing mea-
sures of accounting conservatism: (1) the problems with defining the construct of
accounting conservatism; (2) confounding bias in the measures of conservatism;
and (3) mono-operation bias. I discuss these three problem areas in turn and also
make some recommendations that address each area.
1.4.1 How to operationalize accounting conservatism?
Campbell and Cook (1979) called the need for a clearly defined theoretical construct
the “pre-operational explication of the theoretical construct”. They argue that this
is probably the most important step towards designing valid measures of a construct.
More often than not, the precise meaning of a theoretical construct cannot be agreed
upon by different researchers, which leads to quite different empirical operational-
izations of the construct. Not surprisingly, the result is a total lack of consistency
between different measures of supposedly the same theoretical construct. For this
reason, Campbell and Cook (1979, p. 64) list the inadequate pre-operational expli-
cation of constructs as the first major threat to construct validity.
In the case of accounting conservatism the different measures are operational-
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izations of different implications of the underlying construct and it is possible that
even if conservatism is indeed the construct articulated in the IASB definition, the
more specific constructs of asymmetric timeliness and MTB are not implied by
the underlying main construct with equal strength. Below, I list and discuss the
two major operationalizations of conservatism, and each operationalization’s corre-
sponding measures.
1. Basu’s (1997) operationalization: also known as conditional conservatism,
news- dependent conservatism, and earnings conservatism
• The Basu AT measure
• The AACF measure
2. Feltham and Ohlson’s operationalization (1995): also known as uncondi-
tional conservatism, news-independent conservatism, and balance-sheet con-
servatism
• The MTB (or BTM) ratio measure
• The NA measure
• The HR measure
Basu’s operationalization
The most frequently applied operationalization of conservatism is from Basu (1997),
who focuses on the implication that conservatism results in faster recognition of
bad news than good news. Basu has also suggested that an alternative implication
is the tendency to require a higher degree of verification for good news than for
bad news. This latter approach has been adopted in Watts (2003a) and described
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by Watts as the “asymmetric verification” property of accounting, as compared to
Basu’s “asymmetric timeliness” property. The empirical studies generally do not
distinguish between asymmetric timeliness and asymmetric verification. The two
implications are closely linked but there are subtle differences. For example, it ap-
pears that the asymmetric verification property of accounting is the more basic fea-
ture of conservatism than is asymmetric timeliness, and the asymmetric timeliness
of earnings is caused by the asymmetric verification standard of accounting (Watts,
2003a). However, for empirical purposes, researchers generally do not recognize
such differences.
Feltham and Ohlson’s operationalization
Feltham and Ohlson’s (1995) operationalization of conservatism focuses on the
downward bias in the book value of a firm compared to the fundamental economic
value, as suggested by the authors’ analysis of the RIVM. This characterization
of accounting conservatism in the RIVM has been analytically extended by Zhang
(2000) and has been adopted in a number of empirical studies, including Beaver and
Ryan (2000), Penman and Zhang (2002), and Monahan (2005).
While Feltham and Ohlson (1995) focus on the downward bias of the book value
compared with the economic value of the firm, they do not explicitly state how the
accounting system creates this bias. In contrast, Basu’s (1997) focus is more on how
the accounting mechanism produces that downward bias in book value. Thus, while
Feltham and Ohlson’s operationalization focuses more on the end result, Basu’s
operationalization emphasizes the specific mechanism that produces that end result.
Roychowdhury and Watts’s (2007) theory of conservatism can be regarded as a
refinement of Feltham and Ohlson’s operationalization of accounting conservatism.
What sets the theory of Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) apart from that of Feltham
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and Ohlson (1995) is that Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) argue that not all under-
statements of book values as compared to economic values are caused by account-
ing conservatism. Although economic rents of a firm increase the firm’s value, they
are generally non- recognizable in the book values via accounting rules. Since eco-
nomic rents are generally not reflected in the book value whether a firm’s accounting
system is conservative or not, it would be misleading to compare the total market
value of the firm, which includes economic rents, with the book value, which does
not include economic rents. As a solution, Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) pro-
pose that, when using MTB as a measure for conservatism, economic rents should
be excluded from the market value, which will likely produce lower estimates of
MTB for most firms.
To summarize Section 1.4.1, I have shown that the measures of conservatism
currently operationalize different implications of the same underlying construct of
accounting conservatism. Overall, the pattern of the associations among the five
measures, as shown in Table 1.4, is consistent with there being two sets of mea-
sures of conservatism corresponding to two different operationalizations of the un-
derlying construct of conservatism. The AT and AACF measures belongs to one
group that adopts Basu’s (1997) operationalization of conservatism, and the MTB,
NA and HR measures belong to another group of measures that adopts Feltham
and Ohlson’s (1995) operationalization of conservatism. The different operational-
izations of conservatism appear to have led to disagreements among the empirical
measures themselves. I therefore suggest that further studies are required to clarify
the meaning and characteristics of conservatism.
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1.4.2 Confounding bias
In addition to the problems associated with the meaning of conservatism, another
challenge to empirical assessment of conservatism is confounding bias. Confound-
ing bias describes a source of measurement error where a measure is influenced by
not only the theoretical construct of interest, but also other factors, and there is no
adequate control for the effects produced by those other “confounding” factors. In
the following paragraphs, I briefly discuss the confounding factors of the Basu AT
measure, as well as the MTB and HR measures of conservatism. The extant lit-
erature contains no discussions regarding the potential confounding factors of the
AACF and NA measures.
Confounding bias in the Basu AT measure
The literature has recognized a number of confounding factors that may bias the
Basu AT measure of conservatism. First, Gigler and Hemmer (2001) contend that
the pre- emptive voluntary disclosures that occurred before the 1 year stock return
window in the Basu model bias upward the asymmetric timeliness estimate. Gigler
and Hemmer (2001) argue that if one wishes to obtain unbiased estimates of the
degree of accounting conservatism from the Basu AT measure, the extent and timing
of voluntary disclosure must be controlled for.
Second, Beaver et al. (2008) have identified another source of confounding bias
for the Basu AT measure – a simultaneity bias. Beaver et al. (2008) argue that
the relationship between the two sides of the Basu regression – earnings and stock
returns – is not uni-directional, but bi-directional. Basu (1997) recognizes stock re-
turns as a proxy for economic news that causes accounting earnings to change in an
asymmetric manner. However, Hayn (1995) proposes the opposite causal direction,
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and argues that earnings also contain information that may lead cause stock prices
to change in an asymmetric manner. Hayn’s (1995) empirical evidence is almost
identical to that obtained by Basu (1997), except that Hayn’s regression model is
the reverse of the Basu AT model. But Hayn explains the observed asymmetry by
the theory of abandonment options rather than accounting conservatism. Using the
2-Stage Least Squares method, Beaver et al. (2008) jointly estimated both Basu’s
and Hayn’s models, and found that the Basu AT measure is significantly weakened,
which indicates that the Basu AT measure may overstate the true degree of conser-
vatism in empirical studies as a consequence of the simultaneity bias.
Third, Ryan (2006) points out that big bath accounting can also lead to ob-
served asymmetric timeliness of earnings in the Basu AT regression. However,
Ryan (2006) does not offer any practical solutions on how to distinguish between
conservatism and big bath accounting empirically.
Confounding bias in the MTB and HR measures
There is theoretical and empirical evidence showing that both the MTB and HR
measures are confounded by a firm’s growth rate because hidden reserves tend to
accumulate at the growth stage in a firm’s life cycle, and release back into earnings
when the firm’s growth slows (Zhang, 2000; Lev et al., 2005; Penman and Zhang,
2002). As hidden reserves are part of firms’ market value, this process of hidden
reserves accumulation and release affects the MTB measure as much as it affects
the HR measure. Therefore, when a firm is growing, MTB and HR tend to over-
state conservatism; but when the firm’s growth slows down, these measures tend to
understate conservatism. Even when a firm’s true degree of conservatism stays con-
stant, the MTB and HR measures may change according to the firm’s growth rate,
creating an erroneous impression that the firm’s degree of conservatism is changing.
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GAAP requires different degrees of conservatism for different classes of assets.
For example, GAAP is highly conservative in the context of R&D expenditure,
requiring that most R&D expenditures be expensed. In contrast, financial assets are
normally marked-to-market by GAAP. Therefore, different investment profiles, that
is, portfolios of asset allocations, can lead to very different book values and hidden
reserves, which may confound the MTB and HR measures of conservatism.
Suppose firm A and firm B have exactly the same degree of conservatism and
use exactly the same set of accounting standards and policies. And suppose A
mainly invests in Research and Development (R&D), while B mainly invests in
liquid financial assets. Although A and B apply the same GAAP and the same
set of accounting policies, A’s MTB and HR will be generally higher than B’s,
leading to the impression that A is more conservative than B. But in fact A and B
have the same degree of conservatism, since their accounting policies are identical.
What is causing the difference is that A’s assets are different from B’s, such that
conservatism forces A not to recognize most of its R&D (intangible) assets in the
book value while B’s assets are marked-to-market. This example illustrates that the
MTB and HR measures generally do not yield reliable comparisons of conservatism
across firms, if the firms’ asset investment profiles are different.
In addition, Beatty (2007) suggests that the possibility of stock market mis-
pricing, such as the dot-com bubble of the late 1990s, leads to high MTB ratios.
Therefore, market over-valuation could potentially create an upward bias to MTB
as a measure for conservatism. Similarly, market under-valuation could lead to a
downward bias to MTB as a measure of conservatism.
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1.4.3 Mono-operation Bias
The problem of mono-operation bias is articulated by Cook and Campbell (1979)
as follows:
Since single operations both under-represent constructs and contain ir-
relevancies, construct validity will be lower in single exemplar research
than in research where each construct is multiply operationalized in or-
der to triangulate on the reference. (Cook and Campbell, 1979, p. 65)
Table 1.2 - Panel B shows that out of the 53 papers included in this review, 32 of
them use just one measure for conservatism and draw every inference from that
measure alone. That accounts for more than 60% of all the papers reviewed here.
In contrast, only 13 papers applied two measures simultaneously, and even fewer
papers (eight of them) adopted three measures or more. This shows the typical
symptom of the mono-operation bias.
As a consequence of mono-operation bias, the risk of errors is high in each sin-
gle measure of conservatism, especially as none of these measures have been well-
validated. The controversy regarding the cause of the negative correlation between
AT and MTB illustrates the confusion that over-reliance on any single measure of
conservatism can potentially create (see the discussion in Section 1.3.1 of the key
arguments on each side of this controversy).
As Cook and Campbell (1979) suggest, the solution to this mono-operation bias
is to use multiple measures of accounting conservatism simultaneously in the same
research and triangulate the results from multiple measures. This approach can
effectively reduce the measurement error arising from each individual measure in
empirical studies (Campbell and Overman, 1988).
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Furthermore, I suggest that empirical researchers can go beyond simply using
several measures of conservatism first and then comparing the results from each
measure afterwards. In my opinion, researchers can further improve the power of
the empirical measures by designing composite measures of conservatism, which
are measures that combine the information from individual measures of conser-
vatism, along with other control variables, if applicable. Provided that the errors
in individual measures are not strongly positively correlated, composite measures
have the advantage of being able to use more efficiently the information from each
individual measure, by off-setting the measurement errors of individual measures
against each other.11 In addition, there is another benefit of designing composite
measures of conservatism: the logic underpinning composite measures could poten-
tially provide a framework for conservatism researchers to reconcile the differences
between single measures of conservatism.
In order to design composite measures of conservatism, it is important for empir-
ical researchers to know the directions of the biases (i.e. systematic measurement
errors) in each individual measure. Without knowing the directions of biases, a
composite measure can potentially be incorrectly designed such that it may actually
compound the biases in the individual measures rather than reduce them. However,
the extant literature contains no comprehensive analysis of the biases in the exist-
ing measures of conservatism, although some papers have made isolated comments
about the biases in particular measures of conservatism. These known biases have
been discussed in Sections 1.2 through 1.4.2 above, and thus will not be repeated
here.
11Efficiency in this context means the efficiency of statistical estimators. An estimator (i.e. mea-
sure) is efficient if it uses all the relevant information to form the most accurate measure of the
population parameter, with the least possible variance.
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It is beyond the scope of this review to design and test new composite measures
of conservatism. Despite that, the short synthesis provided earlier on the known
biases in the existing measures may help other researchers to design new composite
measures of conservatism. Apart from the biases already reviewed in this chapter,
there are likely other biases yet unknown, such as potential biases in the AACF or
NA measures. Clearly, more research in this area is required to fill this gap in the
literature.
1.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, I have reviewed five measures of conservatism in the accounting lit-
erature and employed construct validity as a means of exploring the validity of these
measures. My analysis suggests that the measures of conservatism employed in the
literature may have a low degree of construct validity. In summary, I have identified
the following key challenges to the construct validity of the existing measures of
conservatism in the extant literature.
1. The lack of general agreement in the literature regarding how accounting con-
servatism, as a theoretical construct, should be operationalized.
2. The possibility of confounding bias in the existing five measures of conser-
vatism.
3. The literature’s over-reliance on a single measure of conservatism in each
study, which leads to the mono-operation bias.
In response to these challenges, I have suggested several solutions, which include:
1. Clarifying the meaning and properties of accounting conservatism, as well as
the relationships among the existing measures of conservatism;
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2. Controlling for the confounding factors in empirical designs; and
3. Using multiple measures of conservatism in the same study, and designing
composite measures of conservatism.
I acknowledge that a truly comprehensive and rigorous assessment of the construct
validity of all five measures of accounting conservatism is a major scientific en-
deaver that is beyond the scope of any single study. A more comprehensive and
rigorous assessment would require a large amount of theoretical analyses and em-
pirical tests, and these cannot be easily accomplished by any single study or indeed
by any single researcher. Furthermore, as an individual researcher making an as-
sessment of the construct validity of the measures of conservatism, I inevitably
suffer from some personal biases of my own, although I have tried to avoid them
as much as possible. That highlights the need to have more researchers conducting
more analyses on the construct validity of the measures of accounting conservatism,
based on different methodologies and different datasets. Only with repeated test-
ing from different angles can the construct validity of the measures of accounting
conservatism be truly understood.
Despite all its limitations, I hope that my analysis of the literature presented in
this chapter can at least raise the awareness of conservatism researchers to the limi-
tations of the existing measures of conservatism. Since our scientific understanding
of accounting conservatism crucially depends on our ability to accurately and re-
liably measure it, sorting out the construct validity of the measures of accounting
conservatism is an important and rewarding scientific endeaver to undertake. Thus,
let me conclude Chapter 1 by inviting other accounting researchers to take on the
challenge of further analysing and testing the construct validity of the measures of
accounting conservatism.
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1.6 Appendix
Table 1.5: Descriptive statistics
Appendix:  Descriptive Statistics 
 
 N=15,735 Min 
1st 
Quartile Median Mean 
3rd 
Quartile Max Std. Dev. 
EPS/P -2.06 -0.04 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.76 0.14 
R -0.84 -0.23 0.07 0.21 0.45 3.98 0.69 
MTB 0.39 1.54 2.60 3.64 4.42 25.41 3.37 
HR -1.90 0.07 0.21 0.27 0.36 3.74 0.35 
NA -0.13 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.33 0.05 
ACC ($ million) -8,409.12 -3.14 0.53 2.86 7.84 6,831.19 420.37 
CFO ($ million) -3,657.00 -0.13 9.78 147.72 65.02 24,550.00 654.27 
TA ($ million) 1.05 46.53 158.80 1,418.00 697.50 250,800.00 6,612.71 
BV ($ million) 0.06 29.20 101.20 637.60 374.50 103,200.00 2,600.88 
MV ($ million) 0.71 66.81 258.90 2,314.00 1,042.00 155,900.00 8,327.51 
 
Note: The sample consists of 15,735 US firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stock exchanges, 
excluding ADR firms, from 1989 to 2007. I trimmed the raw sample by the top and bottom 1% of EPS/P, R, 
MTB, HR, NA, and ACC. I deleted observations that have any missing value in any of the variables listed 
above. I calculated the hidden reserves measure of conservatism (HR) according to Penman and Zhang’s 
[2002] method. I calculated the Negative Accruals (NA) measure by taking the negative of the three-years 
average non-operating accruals, centered on year t, per Lara et al. [2007] and Ahmed and Duellman [2007], 
although the definition of yearly non-operating accrual follows the balance-sheet approach taken by Givoly 
and Hayn [2000]. I take the negative of the average non-operating accrual for the purpose of turning NA into a 
positive measure of conservatism. ACC is defined by Ball and Shivakumar [2005], and is deflated by the 
closing market value of the firm in order to control for scaling biases. 
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Chapter 2
The Impact of Default Risk on the
Basu Measure of Accounting
Conservatism
2.1 Introduction1
Basu (1997) introduced the first, and currently the most popular, empirical measure
of accounting conservatism, commonly known as the ‘Basu measure’. The resulting
measure is described by Basu as the asymmetric timeliness of earnings coefficient
1Acknowledgment: A paper based on this chapter, co-authored with my thesis supervisors, is
currently under the 2nd review at Journal of Accounting & Economics. I thank the editor, Thomas
Lys, and the anonymous referee of Journal of Accounting & Economics for their invaluable con-
structive criticisms and suggestions. I am especially grateful to Robert M. Bushman for suggesting
the option-pricing based method of estimating default risk. I also thank the numerous comments on
earlier versions of this chapter by the following people: Michael Bradbury at the 2009 New Zealand
Accounting PhD Students Colloquium; Richard Morris at University of New South Wales Research
Seminar; Stephen L. Taylor at the AFAANZ 2009 Annual Meeting; and Peter Wells at the University
of Technology Sydney 2009 Summer Accounting Consortium. I also with to extend my gratitude
to all other people who have provided comments on earlier versions of this chapter in the above
conferences and seminars, as well as in the EAA 2009 Annual Meeting, and AAA 2009 Annual
Meeting.
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(abbr. “AT” measure). Since Basu’s influential paper, a large and still growing liter-
ature has emerged applying the Basu measure to examine accounting conservatism
from a variety of theoretical perspectives.
However, the validity and characteristics of the Basu measure of accounting
conservatism have received limited attention. Only recently, Dietrich et al. (2007),
Givoly et al. (2007), Ryan (2006) and others have begun to directly examine the
validity of the Basu measure. These recent studies have highlighted a number of
weaknesses in the Basu measure. Dietrich et al. (2007), for example, find that the
Basu measure is biased upward, because of what they call the sample-variance-
ratio bias and the sample-truncation bias. Givoly et al. (2007) empirically test the
validity of the Basu measure, and discover that the measure can demonstrate neither
the power to distinguish conservative firms from aggressive ones, nor the stability
expected in a time-series context.
The analysis in this chapter has two related objectives: First, I extend this recent
critical appraisal of the Basu measure by investigating the relationship between the
Basu measure and a firm’s default risk. Using Merton’s (1974) call-option pricing
model of equity, I argue that the Basu AT measure is a biased measure of the degree
of accounting conservatism. The higher the default risk, the higher the bias in the
Basu AT measure. In general, default risk means the uncertainty around a firm’s
ability to repay its debts when the debts fall due. In this chapter, I use Merton’s
(1994) Distance-to-Default concept as the analytical definition of default risk.
Second, I use the insight provided by my analysis of the Basu measure to con-
struct an improved version of the ‘Basu’ measure, and I call the new measure the
Default-Adjusted-Basu (“DAB”) measure, because it makes adjustments for the ef-
fects of default risk on the Basu measure. I contend that the DAB measure can
substantially reduce the bias caused by default risk, and hence is a more robust
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measure of accounting conservatism than is the standard Basu measure.
Empirically, I adopt Vassalou and Xing’s (2004) iterative procedure for estimat-
ing firms’ distance-to-default. I find that firms with higher default risk indeed tend
to have a higher Basu measure of conservatism, consistent with my analytical pre-
diction. I also test the validity of the DAB measure of conservatism empirically,
and the result suggests the the DAB measure likely provides a more robust measure
of accounting conservatism than does the original Basu measure.
My analysis of the Basu measure bears a close relationship to the analysis of
the earnings response coefficient (ERC) by Dhaliwal et al. (1991). Dhaliwal et al.
(1991) show that ERC is negatively correlated with the default risk of the firm.
Since the Basu model is essentially a reversed ERC model, the negative associa-
tion between ERC and default risk implies that there exists a positive association
between Basu regression coefficients and default risk. This positive association is
exactly what this chapter attempt to analyze. In addition, this chapter has another
similarity with Dhaliwal et al. (1991) — both papers use the classic Merton (1974)
model as the analytical foundation.
There are, however, also major differences between this chapter and Dhaliwal
et al. (1991). The most significant difference is that Dhaliwal et al. (1991) treat
the value of the firm as a function of earnings, but this chapter treats earnings as
a function of the changes of the value of the firm. This difference is perhaps the
defining characteristic that sets the Basu model apart from the more traditional ERC
models.
Before I proceed to the main analysis, I briefly introduce the Basu measure
itself. The Basu (1997) measure is based on a cross-sectional, piece-wise regression
of accounting earnings on stock returns, as follows:
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EPSit
Pi,t−1
= α0+α1DRit +β0Rit +β1RitDRit + εit (2.1)
where
EPSit : Earnings per share for firm i year t
Pi,t−1 : Opening stock market price for firm i year t
Rit : Stock market return for firm i year t
DRit : Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the stock market return for firm i
year t is negative, and equal to 0 if the stock market return for firm i
year t is non-negative.
The regression model above, known as the “Basu model”, regresses accounting
earnings (EPS/P) on stock returns (R) separately for ‘good-news’ and ‘bad-news’
firms. A firm-year is deemed a ‘good-news’ one if the return on its stock return
is positive or zero. Likewise, a firm-year is deemed a ‘bad-news’ one, if its stock
return is negative. By using the dummy variable, DRit , the Basu model allows
the slope coefficients to differ between the good-news and bad-news groups (β0
and β0 + β1, for good- and bad- news coefficients respectively). The difference
between the bad- and good- news timeliness coefficients, β1, is the Basu asymmetric
timeliness coefficient, which measures the degree of conservatism in the sample of
firms.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 examines analytically
how default risk impacts on the Basu measure. Section 2.3 develops the Default-
Adjusted-Basu (DAB) measure of accounting conservatism, which, I argue, is more
robust to default risk than is the original Basu measure. Section 2.4 discusses the
sample selection and the proxies used in the empirical tests. Section 2.5 reports the
main empirical results with respect to both the original Basu measure and the DAB
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measure. Section 2.6 reports the results of the robustness tests. Finally, I conclude
the chapter in Section 2.7.
2.2 The link between the Basu asymmetric timeliness
coefficient and default-risk
In this section, I derive analytically the relationship between the default-risk and the
Basu measure of conservatism. The analysis in this section is built on the classic
call-option model of equity developed by Merton (1974) and Black and Scholes
(1973), commonly known as the Merton model in the finance literature. I also
develop a simple stochastic process of accounting earnings to model the impacts of
conservatism on earnings. Finally, I use both the Merton model and the stochastic
process of accounting earnings to derive the relationship between the Basu measure
and default risk.
2.2.1 The Merton option-pricing model of equity
The Merton (1974) model characterizes equity as a European call option written on
the value of a firm’s total assets2, with the firm’s debt as its strike price, and the
maturity date of that debt (or the date of refinancing, if the debt is rolled over) as
the exercise date. In order to derive the price of equity as a call option, Merton
(1974) assumes that the value of the firm, Vt , follows a geometric Brownian motion
with a constant drift and constant volatility, as described by the following stochastic
differential equation:
2In this chapter, I use the two terms - ‘value of the gross assets of the firm’ and ‘the value of the
firm’ - interchangeably. In contrast, the ‘value of equity’ is a completely different construct.
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dVt = αVtdt+σVtdW1t (2.2)
In the stochastic differential equation (2.2) above, α represents the (steady-state)
constant growth rate of the value of the firm; σ denotes the standard deviation of the
value of the firm; W1 is a standard Brownian motion that generates the value shocks
to the firm; lastly, the subscript t denotes a point in time. Merton also makes the
following assumptions: (1) The maturity value of debt, D, is the strike price of the
call-option; (2) the debt is a zero-coupon, carrying no regular interest payments; (3)
the maturity value, D, is non-stochastic, and is known ahead of the maturity time
with certainty; (4) the debt can only be paid back at the maturity date; (5) the firm
has only one type of debt; (6) there exists a riskless bond in the economy, with a
continuous rate of return r; (7) there exists a frictionless market for the trading of
the equity (E) and the underlying assets (V) of the firm, without any long- and short-
trading restrictions.
By the method of dynamic hedging, Merton derived the following standard
Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM) formula for the value of equity (Et):
Et =VtN(d1)−De−rtN(d2) (2.3)
where
d1 =
ln(Vt/D)+(r+σ2/2)t
σ
√
t
; d2 = d1−σ
√
t
In equation (2.3), t is the time until the exercise date T , and counts down with the
passage of time. The exercise date, T , is the date on which the firm must pay back
its debt (or the date on which the firm refinances its debt). N(.) is the cumulative
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probability function for the standard normal distribution, which has a mean of zero
and a variance of one.
By Ito’s lemma, we can derive the stochastic process followed by equity (Et):
dE =
∂E
∂ t
dt+
∂E
∂V
dV +
1
2
∂ 2E
∂V 2
dV dV
=
[
Θ+∆αV +
1
2
Γσ2V 2
]
dt+∆σV dW1 (2.4)
which can also be stated in the following integral form:
E(t) = E(t0)+
ˆ t
t0
[
Θ+∆αVt +
1
2
Γσ2V 2t
]
dt+
ˆ t
t0
∆σVtdW1(t) (2.5)
E(t0) is the initial value of the equity at time t0. In Equations 2.4 and 2.5, I use
three the standard option-pricing variables, which are defined as follows:
∆ =
∂Et
∂Vt
= N(d1)
Θ =
∂Et
∂ t
=−Vtσ
2
√
t
N′(d1)− rDe−rtN(d2)
Γ =
∂ 2Et
∂V 2t
=
1
Vtσ
√
t
N′(d1)
2.2.2 A simple stochastic model of accounting earnings
This sub-section presents a simple stochastic process of earnings that can capture
the concept of ‘conditional’ accounting conservatism. Basu (1997), Watts (2003a)
and Ryan (2006) interpret ‘conditional’ conservatism as the asymmetric timeliness
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of earnings, by which the managers recognize good-news into earnings in a less
timely manner than they do with bad-news. I explicitly model this concept of con-
servatism in a continuous-time context. I begin by introducing the intuitions un-
derlying this model. Then I formally set-up the stochastic model of accounting
earnings.
First, economic news items are reflected in the changes in the value of the firm.
In this model, the changes in the value of the firm is described by the Geometric
Brownian Motion:
dVt = αVtdt+σVtdW1(t)
The second term, σVtdW1(t), is the underlying value shock that generates un-
certainty and therefore produces unexpected changes in equity prices and earnings.
Thus, economic ‘news’ is best represented by σVtdW1(t).
Second, the managers of a firm learn about the firm’s value shocks by observing
its operating conditions, and then map each value shock (out of infinitely many)
into the accounting earnings of that firm, according to the rule of accounting con-
servatism.3 Positive value shocks (which is, informally, σVtdW1(t)≥ 0) will make
a smaller contribution to the contemporary earnings than do negative value shocks
[which is, informally, σVtdW1(t)< 0 ].4
Third, contemporary earnings of a firm may not only reflect the contemporary
value shocks, but also other factors, which include: (1) past value shocks to the firm
to the extent that they have not been incorporated in past earnings; (2) other accruals
3For the sake of simplicity, it is also assumed that the debt level of the firm is fixed and the
interest is not accrued in earnings until the end of the debt covenant.
4The expressions in brackets are informal representations of value shocks, because, strictly
speaking, the differentials used here are not defined. The formal representations in the integral
forms are given in Equation 2.6.
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which lead to higher or lower earnings then what is justified by the current value
shock or economic income; (3) earnings management.
The above intuitions can be formalized into the following stochastic process of
earnings. The net income, NI(ε), over a period of time ε, where ε is any given
positive number, beginning from time t, is defined as:
NI (ε) =
ˆ t+ε
t
αVtdt+
ˆ t+ε
t
k jσVtdW1(t)+
ˆ t+ε
t
σeVtdW2(t) (2.6)
where
k j = k0, i f
ˆ t+ε
t
σVtdW1(t)≥ 0;
k j = k2, i f
ˆ t+ε
t
σVtdW1(t)< 0;
0 < k0 < k2;ˆ ε
0
dW1(t)dW2(t) = ρε, ∀ ε > 0.
The following two variables in Equation 2.6 have not been defined before:
W2: A second Brownian motion acting as a random disturbance to the ac-
counting earnings.
σe: A constant rate of volatility for the random disturbance to earnings W2;
σ and σe can have different values.
The income-smoothing literature argues that managers often discretionarily lower
earnings when the real profit for the year is high, and increases earnings when the
real profit is low. This implies that W2, which captures discretionary accruals, might
be negatively correlated with W1, which captured fundamental value shocks to the
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firm (i.e. real economic income). While this correlation between W1 and W2 does
not alter the main result in any fundamental way, I still incorporate this correlation
into the model nonetheless, primarily for the purpose of showing that the result
holds whether or not there is any income smoothing activity in the firm. I formally
write the correlation between these two Brownian motions as:
´ ε
0 dW1(t)dW2(t) =
ρε, ∀ ε > 0. Because ρ is a correlation coefficient, −1≤ ρ ≤ 1, and in particular,
if the correlation coefficient is negative, then −1≤ ρ < 0.
All three terms on the right-hand side of Equation (2.6) have clear economic
interpretations:
(1) A permanent earnings component (
´ t+ε
t αVtdt): This reflects the steady
growth rate of the firm. It does not generate any ‘news’, since it is not random.
(2) A news-dependent earnings component (
´ t+ε
t k jσVtdW1(t)): This reflects
the impact of value-shocks, or economic ‘news’, on the earnings of a firm. This
term is the core of my model, because it reflects the degree of asymmetric time-
liness of earnings, which is captured by the different values of k j, conditional on
the sign of the value-shock
´ t+ε
t σVtdW1(t). If
´ t+ε
t σVtdW1(t) ≥ 0, I set k j = k0;
if
´ t+ε
t σVtdW1(t) < 0, I set k j = k2. The first situation arises when there is good-
news to the firm, while the second situation arises when there is bad-news to the
firm. Since bad-news is recognized in earnings faster than good-news, we have the
following basic inequality: 0 < k0 < k2. The degree of conservatism (k1) is defined
as below:
Definition. The degree of asymmetric timeliness, k1, is defined as k1 ≡ k2− k0.
Since 0 < k0 < k2, it follows immediately that k1 > 0.
(3) A random-error/discretionary earnings component (
´ t+ε
t σeVtdW2(t)): This
term represents the idiosyncratic part of earnings. This term may well be negatively
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correlated with the second (new-dependent) term due to possible income-smoothing
activities.
2.2.3 Main proposition
Definition. The instantaneous Basu regression coefficients at time t are defined as
follows:
β jt ≡ lim
ε→0+
cov
[
NI
E(t) ,
∆E
E(t)
]
(ε)
var
[
∆E
E(t)
]
(ε)
; where j =

0, ∀ ´ t+εt σVtdW1(t)≥ 0
2, ∀ ´ t+εt σVtdW1(t)< 0
(2.7)
In the above definition, the following definitions of variance and covariance for
stochastic processes are used: For two stochastic processes X1 and X2, their means,
variances and covariance over any positive time interval [t0, t0 + ε], where ε > 0,
are defined as:5
Mi (ε) = E [Xi(t0+ ε)−Xi(t0) |F (t0)]
cov [X1, X2] (ε) = E [(X1(t0+ ε)−X1(t0))(X2(t0+ ε)−X2(t0)) |F (t0)]
−M1(ε)M2(ε)
var [Xi] (ε) = E
[
(Xi(t0+ ε)−Xi(t0))2 |F (t0)
]
−M21 (ε)
I have already obtained the stochastic process of equity value E from the Merton
model (∆E is the gross return on equity), and defined the stochastic process of
earnings, NI, as below:
5See Shreve (2004, pp. 201-203) for details.
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∆E (ε) =
ˆ t+ε
t
[
Θ+∆αVt +
1
2
Γσ2V 2t
]
dt+
ˆ t+ε
t
∆σVtdW1(t)
NI (ε) =
ˆ t+ε
t
αVtdt+
ˆ t+ε
t
k jσVtdW1(t)+
ˆ t+ε
t
σeVtdW2(t)
Equation 2.7 is the continuous-time equivalence of the Basu regression coefficients.
The term ∆EE is equivalent to R in Equation 2.1, and the term
NI(ε)
E is equivalent
to EPSP in Equation 2.1. Depending on the value of k j, equation 2.7 can be used to
calculate two Basu coefficients: (1) the Basu good-news timeliness coefficient (β0t),
when
´ t+ε
t σVtdW1(t)≥ 0, and (2) the bad-news timeliness coefficient (β2t), when´ t+ε
t σVtdW1(t)< 0.
Definition. The instantaneous Basu asymmetric timeliness coefficient, which is the
Basu measure of conservatism, is defined as β1t = β2t−β0t .
It should be noted that the Basu measure, β1t , is an empirical estimator of the
actual degree of asymmetric timeliness, k1. In other words, k1 is the theoretical
parameter of interest, and the Basu measure, β1t , is the empirical estimator of k1.
The primary focus of this chapter is to find out whether t β1t is an unbiased estimator
of the degree of asymmetric timeliness, k1. To do that, I first prove the following
lemma:
Lemma. The Basu asymmetric timeliness coefficient, β1t , is related to the actual
asymmetric timeliness parameter, k1, by β1t =
k1
∆
.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2.1. Holding α , σ and k j constant, when a firm’s distance-to-default
(DD) decreases, the firm’s Basu asymmetric timeliness coefficient (β1t) increases
and vice versa.
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Proof. See Appendix.
In Proposition 2.1, I adopt Merton’s (Merton, 1974) well-known ’distance-to-
default’ construct (abbr. DD) as this chapter’s definition of default-risk. The distance-
to-default measures how many standard deviations the value of a firm’s total assets
lies away from its debt level. DD is a negative measure of default risk: the lower
DD, the higher the default risk.
Following Merton (1974), distance-to-default (DD) of a firm at time t, for a
specific forecasting period into the future, t, is defined as:
DD =
ln(Vt/D)+(α−σ2/2)t
σ
√
t
(2.8)
It is common for practitioners and academicians to calculate the distance-to-
default for 1 year ahead, i.e. t = 1 (Crosbie and Bohn, 2003; Vassalou and Xing,
2004). Following this practice by setting t = 1, the DD formula in Equation 2.8 can
be simplified to:
DD =
ln(Vt/D)+(α−σ2/2)
σ
(2.9)
Since α and σ are fixed, the only source of variability in DD must come from
the ratio VtD . This ratio has a very intuitive economic meaning: it is the Assets-to-
Debt ratio of a firm at time t, which indicates the firm’s financial leverage. Merton
(1974) shows that the firm’s naive Asset-to-Debt ratio is VtDe−rt , in which the debt is
discounted at the appropriate rate of interest, r. Merton (1974) called it a “naive”
measure of Asset-to-Debt ratio because the debt is discounted at the risk-free rate
rather than its appropriate risk-adjusted risk. The aim of Proposition 2.1 is to show
that default risk can impact on the Basu coefficients, β jt , by altering the VtD term.
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I emphasize that Proposition 2.1 only establishes the relationship between DD
and the Basu measure of conservatism (β1t) . As the Appendix shows, there is no
such unambiguous relationship between DD and the other two Basu coefficients
(β0t and β2t).
Proposition 2.1 implies that the distance-to-default in the sample firms can cre-
ate a confounding bias in the Basu measure as a proxy for the (average) degree of
‘conditional’ conservatism in the sample. Regardless of whether the Basu model
is fitted to a cross-sectional sample of different firms or to a time-series sample
of the same firm, DD is unlikely to stay the same in all individual observations in
the sample. Some firms (or some particular years of the same firm, as in a time-
series regression) are almost bound to have higher or lower DD than other firms (or
different years of the same firm). This would almost surely create a major omitted-
variable problem to the estimation of the degree of conservatism using the Basu
regression model. If this omitted variable – distance-to-default – is not controlled
for in the Basu model, an increase in the sample firms’ average degree of conser-
vatism may lead to a higher Basu measure of conservatism (β1), while the actual
degree of asymmetric timeliness, k1, stays constant. This will lead to an upward
bias in the Basu measure of accounting conservatism.
2.3 A new measure of conservatism
In light of the theoretic result that the Basu measure of conservatism, β1, contains an
upward bias in financially distressed firms, I propose a new measure of accounting
conservatism, by modifying the original Basu measure. The aim is to propose a
measure of ‘conditional’ conservatism that can not only preserve all the attractive
features of the original Basu (1997) measure, but also substantially reduce the extent
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of the bias from default risk. I call this new measure the Default-Adjusted-Basu (or
“DAB”) measure of accounting conservatism.
The underlying idea for this refined Basu measure is simple, in that I attempt
to remove the influences of default risk from both the dependent and independent
variables of the Basu regression as much as possible. To remove any impact of
default risk is equivalent to remove any effect of leverage on both the earnings and
the equity values of the firm. In my view, the most natural way to achieve this goal
is to regress net income before interest expense (NIBIit) on the return on the total
value of the firm (T Rit), as below:
NIBIit
Vit−1
= a0+a1DT Rit +b0T Rit +b1T RitDT Rit + εit (2.10)
where
NIBIit : Net Income before Interest Expense, calculated as Net Income After
Tax + Pre-tax Interest Expense.6
Vit−1: The total opening value of the firm, as defined earlier when introduc-
ing the Merton (1974) model. It is the sum of the market values of
equity and debt of the firm. Section 2.4 describes these 2 methods of
estimating this variable.
T Rit : The rate of return of the total value of the firm, V , calculated as: T Rit =
(Vit −Vit−1−CFFit)/Vit−1. CFFit is the net cashflow from financing
activities for firm i in year t. CFFit is positive for net cash inflow from
financing activities, and negative for net cash outflow from financing
6In a robustness test in Section 2.6.3, I demonstrate that the results of the DAB measure are not
sensitive to whether we add back After-tax Interest Expenses or Pre-tax Interest Expenses to Net
Income, because both specifications produce very similar results.
94
activities.7
DT Rit : A dummy variable that is set to 1, if T Rit < 0; and is set to 0, if T Rit ≥ 0.
Regression model 2.10 follows the Basu (1997) model but with different proxies
for accounting earnings and economic ‘news’. b1 is DAB measure of accounting
conservatism. In the DAB model, both the (deflated) earning, NIBIit/Vit−1, and the
assets return, T Rit , are theoretically free from the influences of default risk, because
these variables are all for the assets of the firm instead of the equity of the firm. To
this end, the Miller and Modigliani Theorem has long established that the capital
structure of the firm, and thus the default risk, are irrelevant to the value of the firm
itself or its expected return on assets, assuming a zero income tax rate (Modigliani
and Miller, 1958). Therefore, I expect equation 2.10 to be a more robust regression
model for estimating the degree of accounting conservatism than the standard Basu
regression model (i.e. Equation 2.1).
2.4 Proxies and data
2.4.1 Measure of Distance-to-Default (DD)
In this chapter, I employ Vassalou and Xing’s (2004) method of calculating firms’
distance-to-default (DD) as the main empirical proxy for default risk.8 Vassalou and
Xing (2004) offer a robust iterative algorithm for calibrating the volatility (σ ) and
7Unlike IFRS, US GAAP does not allow the option of classifying dividends and interests paid as
either cash flows from operating activities or cash flows from financing activities. Under US GAAP,
all dividends paid must be classified as cash flows from financing activities while all interests paid
must be classified as cash flows from operating activities (FASB, 2009). Therefore, the classification
of dividends and interests payments does not cause any problem to my calculation of T R under US
GAAP. However, some problems may arise if this calculation is performed under IFRS, where the
classification of dividends and interests paid may be inconsistent across firms.
8I especially thank Robert M. Bushman for suggesting to us Vassalou and Xing’s (2004) iterative
method of estimating distance-to-default.
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the daily values (V ) of the firm, based on the Black-Scholes-Merton model of equity
value (Equation 2.3). Once the volatility and the value of the firm are estimated, one
can simply plug them into Equation 2.8 to obtain the Distance-to-default for each
firm-year.
Vassalou and Xing’s (2004) method is a relatively modern technique of calcu-
lating default risk and has shown considerable power in predicting firms’ default
probabilities (Crosbie and Bohn, 2003). Credit-rating agencies, such as Moody’s
KMV, also employ similar methods to evaluate default risk for credit-rating pur-
poses (Crosbie and Bohn, 2003). In accounting research, Bushman and Williams
(2009) have recently employed a similar approach to measure the default risk in
banks which was first used by Ronn and Verma (1986). Although the approach
taken by Ronn and Verma (1986) and Bushman and Williams (2009) is similar
to the Vassalou and Xing (2004) method, it differs from the Vassalou and Xing
(2004) method in not involving any iterations. Crosbie and Bohn (2003, pp. 16-
17) point out that the iterative procedure developed by Moody’s KMV, which was
later adopted in the academic literature by Vassalou and Xing (2004), has a signifi-
cant advantage over the non-iterative approach, because the actual market leverage
moves too fast for the simpler approach to yield a reliable estimate of asset volatility
σ .
Vassalou and Xing’s (2004) iterative estimation method consists of the following
steps: (1) Use daily stock prices over the 12 months prior to the desired balance date
to form an initial estimate of the volatility of equity – σE . (2) Use the initial σE to
derive an initial estimate of the assets volatility, σ , by σ = EE+DσE . (3) Use the
new σ to solve the Black-Scholes-Merton equity-pricing equation (Equation 2.3)
for the value of Vt in each of the trading days over a 12 months period.9 (4) Obtain
9On average, there are 251 trading days per year.
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a new σ from the newly estimated daily values of Vt . This new σ is then used as
the input to the Black-Scholes-Merton equity-pricing equation in the next iteration.
(5) Repeat Steps 3 and 4, until the values of σ from two consecutive iterations
converge, specifically, where the difference between two consecutive σ is less than
10−3. In the actual computation of this Vassalou and Xing algorithm using the
sample data, most of the sample firm-years converge pretty quickly, usually within
2 to 3 iterations.
This iterative procedure is conducted once each year for every firm at the De-
cember fiscal year-end.10 Due to the considerations of data availability and consis-
tent with Vassalou and Xing (2004), the time until debt repayment or refinancing,
t, is kept at 1 year for all firms. The firm’s steady growth rate α , which is also its
weighted average cost of capital (“WACC”), is calculated according to the Capital
Assets Pricing Model (CAPM).11 I first estimate the equity beta for each firm-year
using prior monthly returns up to 60 months, ending in December of the year of
estimation. In the case that there are less than 24 months of stock return data avail-
able, I estimate the equity beta based on daily stock returns in the year of estimation
itself. Once the equity betas (βE) are estimated, I then convert them into asset betas
(βA) by Hamada’s formula (ignoring income tax): βA = EE+DβE (Hamada, 1972).
After that, I can easily calculate the WACC for each firm-year using the estimated
βA and the appropriate market risk premium and risk-free rates. Per Dimson et al.
(2009), I set the risk premium of the US market at 5%. The risk-free rate, r, is the
average rate of 3-Month US Treasury Bills in the relevant year. The default point,
D, is approximated by the firm’s total liabilities (Debt) reported at each year-end
10I remove all firms that do not have their fiscal year-ends in December.
11I disagree with Vassalou and Xing’s (2004) choice of the current year’s realized assets growth
rate as the firm’s expected steady growth rate, because the expected rate is usually different from
the realized rate. Many firms have negative realized growth rates, but not many firms, if any, would
have negative expected growth rates.
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from the Compustat database.
Also using the Vassalou and Xing (2004) procedure, I obtain the first set of
estimates for the value of the firm (Vit). From Vit , I can also calculate the rate
of total return of the firm (T Rit) in any particular year, using the formula T Rit =
(Vit−Vit−1−CFFit)/Vit−1. These two variables, Vit and T Rit , enable us to estimate
the DAB measure of conservatism via Equation 2.10. Later, in Section 2.5, I will
offer a simpler, but less accurate, method of estimating these two variables.
2.4.2 Sample and descriptive statistics
The raw sample consists of all non-financial firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, and
NASDAQ (national and OTC) exchanges from 1999 to 2006, excluding ADR firms.
In order to simplify the computations of the Vassalou and Xing (2004) algorithm,
I delete any firm-years that do not have a December year-end. In doing so, the
sample firms’ fiscal years coincide with the calendar years. To reduce the effects
of outliers, as the standard practice, I trim the top and bottom 1% of the following
variables12: Rit , EPSit/Pit−1, ACCit/TAit−1, CFOit/TAit−1, NIBIit/Vit−1, and two
estimated variables DDit and T Rit . In addition, I delete those observations with a
missing value in any of the key variables, and those observations with a zero or neg-
ative Market-to-Book (MT B) ratio. Since the Vassalou and Xing (2004) algorithm
requires 12 months of un-interrupted daily stock price data, I also delete those firm-
years that do not have un-interrupted daily stock price data in the relevant calendar
year. After this trimming process, the final sample consists of 12,531 firm-years,
covering 8 calendar years from 1999 to 2006.
Table 2.1 provides the descriptive statistics of the final sample. All scale-related
12I obtained similar results by alternatively trimming 0.5% and 2% from the top and bottom of
each variable.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics
mean median min max st. dev.
CFO  ($'million) 229 18 -4,447 24,110 832
DD 4.28 4.05 -1.44 12.73 2.82
DEBT  ($'million) 1,635 111 0 205,700 6,192
EPS  ($) 0.07 0.29 -400.00 212.20 8.53
EPS/P -0.01 0.03 -0.90 0.33 0.14
MTB 3.49 2.20 0.12 86.77 4.97
MV  ($'million) 2,600 344 0 116,800 8,184
NI  ($'million) 89 5 -27,450 13,530 553
NIBI/V 0.01 0.03 -0.29 0.15 0.06
ACC  ($'million) 4 0 -8409 15080 276
P  ($) 19.20 12.35 0.03 2,375.00 50.04
R 0.18 0.06 -0.82 4.11 0.65
TA  ($'million) 2,394 258 0 247,300 8,344
V  ($'million) 4,303 593 1 244,500 13,420
V2  ($'million) 3,944 473 0 250,600 12,530
VOL ( σ ) 0.44 0.34 0.02 4.37 0.34
TR 0.10 0.03 -0.93 7.49 0.50
TR2 0.18 0.07 -1.21 12.62 0.63
CFO: cash-flow from operating activities; DD: distance-to-default estimated with the Vassalou & Xing (2004) iterative
procedure; DEBT : total current and long-term liabilities; EPS: basic earnings per share before extra-ordinary items; EPS/P:
earnings per share divided by opening share price; MT B: closing market value of equity divided by closing net book value;
MV : closing market value of equity; NI: net income including extra-ordinary items; NIBIit/Vit−1: net income including
extra-ordinary items but before interest expense, then divided by opening V ; ACC: operating accrual according to Ball &
Shivakumar’s (2005) balance sheet method (see section 2.6.1); P: opening share price; R: buy-and-hold rate of return of
equity stocks; TA: opening total assets; V : opening value of (of the assets of) the firm, calculated per Vassalou & Xing (2004)
method; V2: opening value of (of the assets of) the firm, calculated as: V 2it = MV +DEBT ; VOL (σ): assets volatility of
the firm, i.e. volatility of the value of the firm, calculated per Vassalou & Xing (2004) method; T R: return on the value of
the firm, defined as T Rit = (Vit −Vit +CFFit)/Vit , where CFFit is the net cash-flow from financing activities; T R2: a simpler
proxy for the return on the value of the firm, defined as T R2it = (V 2it −V 2it−1 +CFFit)/V 2it−1.
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variables, such as Operating Accruals (ACC), Book Value of Equity (BV ), Cash
Flows from Operating Activities (CFO), Market Value of Equity (MV E), Total of
Current and Long-term Liabilities (DEBT ) and Total Assets (TA), vary significantly
across firms, because of the varying sizes of the firms. Some of these scale-related
variables are directly used in the main empirical tests of this chapter (e.g. MVE
and DEBT) or in the process of calculating the Vassalou and Xing (2004) algorithm
(e.g. MVE and DEBT), while others are used in the robustness tests (e.g. ACC, BV,
CFO, and TA). The mean (median) of EPSit/Pit−1 is -1% (3%). The mean (median)
of stock returns, Rit , is 18% (6%), and this fact is consistent with the existence of
the “fat-tail” in the distribution of stock returns.
Several variables, DDit , VOLit (i.e. σ ), Vit and T Rit , in Table 2.1 are calculated
by ourselves using the Vassalou and Xing (2004) method. Table 2.1 shows that the
mean DD is 4.28 (in units of standard deviations), and the median is 4.05. Similarly,
asset volatility, VOLit (which, in my earlier notation used in the Merton model, is
σit), has a mean of 44% (annualized), and a median of 34% (annualized). The mean
(median) of the unlevered rate of return, T Rit , is 10% (3%), which is significantly
lower than that of the levered return (Rit), as expected.
V 2it and T R2it are the second set of estimates for the values of the firm and
the total rates of returns on the value of the firm, similar to the Vit and T Rit above.
However, the difference is that V 2it and T R2it are estimated with a simpler and
perhaps, more naive, method than Vassalou and Xing’s sophisticated method. I will
discuss how to calculate V 2it and T R2it later in Section 2.5.3. Here, I only compare
V 2it with Vit , and compare T R2it with T Rit . It appears from Table 2.1 that V 2 and
V have very similar means and medians. However, there appears to be some major
difference between T R2 and T R, as T R2 have a higher mean (17%) and median
(7%) than T R .
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The correlation table is reported in Table 2.2, which shows no unexpectedly
high or low correlation coefficients. As expected, all size variables, such as MV ,
BV , NI, V and V 2, are positively correlated with each other. The (levered) equity
return (R) is highly positively correlated with (unlevered) asset return (T R), as il-
lustrated by a Pearson correlation of 0.81 and a Spearman rank-correlation of 0.96,
which is expected. But these two returns are not the same nevertheless, and the dif-
ference is important for the removal of the bias in the DAB measure of accounting
conservatism.
2.5 Main empirical results
2.5.1 Results for the standard Basu measure
If default risk does indeed induce an upward bias in the Basu measure according to
Proposition 2.1, then one can expect to empirically observe that the Basu asymmet-
ric timeliness coefficient, β1, increases with the level of default risk in the firm. This
forms the first aspect of this chapter’s empirical testing. To test this relationship,
I follow the augmented regression approach taken by LaFond and Watts (2008);
Roychowdhury and Watts (2007); Ahmed and Duellman (2007); Lara et al. (2009a)
and others. In particular, I estimate the following Basu regression augmented by
distance-to-default (DD):
EPSit
Pi,t−1
= α0+α1DRit +α2DDit +β0Rit +β1Rit ·DRit (2.11)
+γ0Rit ·DDit + γ1Rit ·DRit ·DDit + εit
In equation 2.11, I wish to test whether γ1, which is the coefficient on interac-
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tion between default risk and the asymmetric timeliness coefficient, has the desired
sign. Since Proposition 2.1 predicts that DD is negatively correlated with the Basu
asymmetric timeliness coefficient, I expect γ1 to be (statistically) significantly less
than zero.
Table 2.3 presents the results of regression 2.11. First, I estimate the standard
Basu model (on the left of Table 2.3), and the result shows that the standard Basu
asymmetric timeliness coefficient, β1, is 0.210, and significant at 1% level. This
estimate of β1 is consistent with the values reported in prior research (Basu, 1997;
Ball et al., 2000; Bushman and Piotroski, 2006; Pope and Walker, 1999). The good-
news timeliness (β0 = −0.022) is significantly negative at 1% level. This is also
consistent with the prior studies that measure the degrees of conservatism in US
firms in roughly the same time period (late-1990s to 2000s) as ours (eg. Bushman
and Piotroski, 2006; Zhang, 2008).
The main proposition that the Basu asymmetric timeliness coefficient, β1, in-
creases in the degree of default risk (and decreases in DD) is tested in the second
(middle) and third (right) regressions in Table 2.3. The second regression augments
the standard Basu regression model with distance-to-default (DD). The coefficient,
γ1, on the interaction term, DD ·DR ·R, is −0.011, and is (statistically) significant
at 1% level. The sign of γ1 is consistent with Proposition 2.1, which states that
DD (default risk) is negatively (positively) associated with the Basu asymmetric
timeliness coefficient.
In order to control for the non-linearity between DD and the Basu measure, the
third regression augments the Basu model with the percentile ranking of distance-to-
default DDRANK. By replacing DD with DDRANK, the third regression becomes
purely interested in the impacts of the relative ranking of distance-to-default on the
Basu measure of conservatism. The resulting coefficient on the interaction term,
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Table 2.3: The association between the Basu measure of conservatism and distance-
to-default (DD)
Standard Basu 
Measure
Effects of DD on 
Basu Measure
Effects of 
DDRANK on Basu 
Measure
Independent 
Variables Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
Intercept 0.027 12.40 *** -0.029 -4.43 *** -0.050 -6.07 ***
DR -0.009 -2.53 ** 0.011 1.18 0.029 2.66 ***
R -0.022 -5.70 *** -0.035 -3.17 *** -0.039 -2.86 ***
DR*R 0.210 22.05 *** 0.182 10.13 *** 0.190 8.94 ***
DD 0.010 10.56 ***
DD*DR -0.003 -2.03 **
DD*R 0.002 1.44
DD*DR*R -0.011 -2.52 **
DDRANK 0.121 11.01 ***
DDRANK*DR -0.055 -3.45 ***
DDRANK*R 0.025 1.35
DDRANK*DR*R -0.091 -2.19 **
Adj. R_sq. 7.95% 11.10% 11.60%
F-stat 362 *** 225 *** 235 ***
DR is 0 if R ≥ 0 and 1 otherwise. R: arithmetic rate of stock return; DD: distance-to-default estimated with Vassalou &
Xing’s (2004) iterative method; DDRANK: percentile of DD. The dependent variable is EPSit/Pit−1 . Significance levels:
*10%, **5%, ***1%. All t-statistics are White-adjusted.
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Table 2.4: The association between the Default-Adjusted-Basu (DAB) measure and
distance-to-default (DD)
DAB Measure Effects of DD on 
DAB Measure
Effects of DDRANK 
on DAB Measure
Independent Variables Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
Intercept 0.034 38.40 *** 0.011 4.51 *** 0.003 1.08
DTR -0.010 -7.00 *** 0.003 0.50 0.010 2.34 **
TR -0.019 -10.00 *** -0.024 -3.62 *** -0.026 -3.81 ***
DTR*TR 0.129 30.20 *** 0.118 13.56 *** 0.119 12.48 ***
DD 0.004 11.55 ***
DD*DTR -0.002 -2.80 **
DD*TR 0.001 0.75
DD*DTR*TR 0.002 1.04
DDRANK 0.048 11.20 ***
DDRANK*DTR -0.025 -3.95 **
DDRANK*TR 0.008 0.87
DDRANK*DTR*TR 0.021 1.06
Adj. R_sq. 12.50% 14.40% 14.60%
F-stat 596.0 *** 301.0 *** 307.0 ***
DT R is 0 if T R ≥ 0 and 1 otherwise. T R: growth rate (i.e return) of the value of the firm; DD: distance-to-default esti-
mated with Vassalou & Xing’s (2004) iterative method; DDRANK: percentile of DD. Dependent variable in all 3 models is
NIBIit/Vit−1. Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%. All t-statistics are White-adjusted.
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DDRANK ·DR ·R, is−0.091 , and is statistically significant at 5% level. This result
further supports Proposition 2.1.
2.5.2 Results for the DAB measure
In Section 2.3 above, I proposed the DAB measure of accounting conservatism, via
Equation 2.10. I expect that the DAB measure exhibits very little or no correlation
with DD. I test this prediction by the following augmented regression:
NIBIit
Vit−1
= a0+a1DT Rit +a2DDit +b0T Rit +b1T Rit ·DT Rit (2.12)
+c0T Rit ·DDit + c1T Rit ·DT Rit ·DDit + εit
First, I expect that c1 is not statistically different from zero in 2.12. Second, due
to the fact that the original Basu measure is biased upward and the DAB measure
is theoretically unbiased, I also expect that the DAB measure of conservatism b1 is
lower than the standard Basu measure β1.
Table 2.4 presents the results of testing the DAB measure. In general, the ev-
idence shown in Table 2.4 is supportive of my argument that the DAB measure is
indeed more robust to the influence of default risk than is the standard Basu mea-
sure. First, Table 2.4 shows that c1 is not significantly different from zero in both
the second (middle) and the third (right) regressions, consistent with the first pre-
diction. This lends direct support to the validity of the DAB model. Second, the
absolute value of the asymmetric timeliness coefficient estimated from the DAB
model (b1 = 0.129 in Table 2.4) is 34% lower than the standard Basu asymmetric
timeliness coefficient (i.e. β1 = 0.210 in Table 2.3). I apply the Student’s t test
of unequal variances to test the difference between β1 and b1, and the resulting
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t-statistic for the difference (β1− b1 = 0.081) is 7.80, which is highly significant
at 1% level.13 This shows that, in the presence of default risk in the sample firms,
the DAB measure indicates a significantly lower degree of accounting conservatism
than the original Basu measure. This is consistent with the prediction that the Basu
measure is upwards biased by default risk.
To summarize, there is strong empirical evidence indicating that the DAB mea-
sure is more robust than the standard Basu measure to default risk. Thus, the DAB
measure can potentially enable accounting researchers to achieve a higher level of
precision and validity in their measurements of accounting conservatism.
2.5.3 A simplified version of the DAB measure
The DAB measure of conservatism (Equation 2.10) in the previous subsection re-
quires the estimation of Vit and T Rit using the Vassalou and Xing (2004) method,
which has both advantages and disadvantages. The main advantage of the Vassalou
and Xing (2004) method is that it can produce very precise estimates of Vit and T Rit
based on the Merton (1994) model. However, a major disadvantage of this method
is that it is more difficult to programme and compute than most estimation/statistical
procedures typically used in accounting research and it requires a large volume of
daily price data. Furthermore, a computer program must be written to repeatedly
solve the Black-Scholes-Merton option-pricing model for every single trading day
in every firm-year, and for each iteration in that firm-year.
Given this computational complexity of the Vassalou and Xing (2004) method, it
would be desirable to have a simpler way of estimating Vit and T Rit , while achieving
perhaps a slightly lower but still acceptable level of precision. To this end, I propose
the following two new proxies as the alternatives to Vit and T Rit :
13The formula is: t = (β1−b1)/
√
SE(β1)2+SE(b1)2.
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V 2it : The economic value of the firm (including equity and debts), calculated
as: V 2it = MV Eit +DEBTit . MV Eit is the market value of equity, and
DEBTit is the book value of the total liabilities of the firm.
T R2it : Return on the value of the firm, calculated as T R2it = (V 2it−V 2it−1−
CFFit)/V 2it−1. As above, CFFit is the net cash-flow from financing
activities.
These two new variables (V 2 and T R2) are much simpler and quicker to calculate
than are V and T R. But they may not be as accurate as V and T R because the book
value of debt instead of the market value of debt is used in calculating V 2. The
results of re-estimating the regression models with these variables are reported in
Table 2.5.
On the one hand, the standard model (on the left) in Table 2.5 shows an asym-
metric timeliness coefficient of 0.211, which is very close to the standard Basu
asymmetric timeliness coefficient (i.e. 0.210 in Table 2.3), but is significantly higher
than that of the “full-blown” version of the DAB model (0.129 in Table 2.4). On the
other hand, the coefficients on the three-way interaction terms, DD ·DT R2 ·T R2 and
DDRANK ·DT R2 ·T R2, are not significantly different from zero, in the second and
the third regressions of Table 2.5. This result indicates that the simplified version
of the DAB measure does not interact with default risk. It is therefore possible that
the simplified DAB measure is also robust to the influences of default risk. How-
ever, the estimate of conservatism from the simplified DAB measure is much the
same as the estimate of conservatism from the standard Basu measure. Given the
mixed results regarding the validity of the simplified DAB measure, I suggest that
the Vassalou and Xing (2004) method is probably the best approach for estimating
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Table 2.5: A simpler (and naive) version of the Default-Adjusted-Basu (DAB) mea-
sure
Simplified DAB 
Measure
Effects of DD on 
Simplified DAB 
Measure
Effects of DDRANK 
on Simplified DAB 
Measure
Independent Variables Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
Intercept 0.035 12.24 *** 0.012 2.16 * 0.002 0.31
DTR2 -0.016 -4.45 *** -0.006 -0.88 0.002 0.22
TR2 -0.039 -5.60 *** -0.067 -4.32 *** -0.070 -3.86 ***
DTR2*TR2 0.211 19.73 *** 0.223 10.99 *** 0.225 9.66 ***
DD 0.004 6.17 ***
DD*DTR2 -0.001 -0.87
DD*TR2 0.005 2.46 **
DD*DTR2*TR2 -0.006 -1.32
DDRANK 0.055 6.65 ***
DDRANK*DTR2 -0.021 -1.85 *
DDRANK*TR2 0.044 1.99 **
DDRANK*DTR2*TR2 -0.050 -1.18
Adj. R_sq. 11.60% 13.70% 13.90%
F-stat 548 *** 286 *** 289 ***
DT R2 is 0 if T R2 ≥ 0 and 1 otherwise. T R2: return on the value of the firm, estimated with the simpler (naive) method;
DD: distance-to-default estimated with Vassalou & Xing’s (2004) iterative method; DDRANK: percentile of DD. Dependent
variable in all 3 models is NIBIit/V 2it−1. Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%. All t-statistics are White-adjusted.
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the DAB measure of conservatism.14
2.6 Robustness tests
2.6.1 Controlling for the potential identification issue
In the previous section, the empirical evidence showed that there is a positive (neg-
ative) correlation between default risk (DD) and the Basu AT measure of conser-
vatism. However, simply finding the correlation may not be a sufficient condition
for the existence of bias in the Basu AT measure. That is because the real degree
of accounting conservatism could also have increased with default risk. Therefore,
we face an identification problem: Is the increase in Basu AT measure when de-
fault risk increases the result of upward bias or an increase in the actual degree of
conservatism or both?
To see this problem, let us recall the key equation from Section 2.2: β1 = k1/∆.
I showed how default risk impacts on β1 via its impact on ∆, by holding k1 constant.
While it is easy to hold k1 constant in the theoretical analysis, it is virtually impos-
sible to hold k1 constant across different sample firms in the empirical setting. In
fact, the debt-contracting theory of conservatism has argued that k1 might increase
14Apart from the sophisticated and the simplified DAB measures introduced above, I have also
empirically tested a third (unreported) method of removing the default-risk bias from the Basu mea-
sure of accounting conservatism, based on Altman’s (1968) Z score. In the third method, I use
Altman’s Z score as a control variable in an augmented Basu regression, as follows:
EPSit/Pit−1 = α0+α1DRit +α2Zit +α3DRitZit +β0Rit +β1RitDRit +β2RitZit +β3RitDRitZit +εit
Because the Z score is a measure of default risk, by including the Z score as a control variable
in the Basu regression, I could at least partially remove the impact of default risk on the Basu
asymmetric timeliness coefficient. The empirical results based on this method are consistent with
my theoretical prediction that the Basu measure of accounting conservatism is positively correlated
with default risk. However, this Z score method is not introduced in the main body of this thesis due
to a possible self-selection bias. As Earnings (EPS) is a key input to the Z score, and as EPS is the
dependent variable in the regressions, introduction of the Z score would effectively result in having
EPS on both sides of the equation.
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as as a result of increasing risk-shifting to debt-holders from equity-holders under
high default risks (Beatty et al., 2008; Watts, 2003a; Zhang, 2008). If this theory
is true, the Basu measure of conservatism, β1, will also increase as a result of the
increase in k1, even if there were no biases in the Basu measure itself. Therefore, it
is important to control for the changes in the real degree of conservatism k1 in the
sample.
I therefore need another independent measure of accounting conservatism to
control for the changes in the underlying degree of conservatism k1. In an earlier
study, Ahmed et al. (2002, pp. 383-384) show that, when using the MT B ratio and
the Negative Accruals (NA) measures of conservatism, leverage does not have any
significant correlations with the degree of accounting conservatism. Their study
period is from 1987 to 1992.
In this chapter, I use the Asymmetric Accrual to Cashflow (AACF) measure
of conservatism developed by Ball and Shivakumar (2005) as the control variable
for the actual degree of conservatism. The AACF measure is not subject to the
influences of default risk, because this measure depends on accruals and cashflows
rather than stock prices, which are generally unaffected by the firm’s default risk.
Apart from the Basu (1997) measure and Ball and Shivakumar’s (2005) AACF
measure above, there are several other measures of accounting conservatism that
could potentially be used as the control for the underlying degrees of conservatism.
They include Givoly and Hayn’s (2000) negative non-operating accruals measure,
Penman and Zhang’s (2002) hidden-reserves measure, and the popular Market-to-
Book (“MTB”) ratio measure. In Chapter 1, I have already surveyed and analyzed
the measures of accounting conservatism and have found that only the Basu mea-
sure and the AACF measures are proxies of the so-called conditional accounting
conservatism. In contrast, all of the other measures mentioned above are proxies
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for the so-called unconditional conservatism. I have shown, in Chapter 1, that the
distinction between these two groups of measures is quite sharp empirically, as the
measures within the same group tend to be positively correlated with each other,
but the measures from different groups tend to be negatively correlated with each
other. On this ground, I contend that the AACF measure is perhaps the most rele-
vant benchmark for assessing the Basu measure, because both measures are proxies
for the same ‘type’, or aspect, of accounting conservatism.15
The AACF measure regresses the firm’s operating accrual on its operating cash-
flow in the same time period, as follows:
ACCit = β0+β1DCFOit +β2CFOit +β3DCFOit ·CFOit + εit (2.13)
where
• ACCit : Accruals measured as: ∆Inventory + ∆Debtors + ∆Other current as-
sets - ∆Creditors - ∆Other current liabilities - Depreciation, all deflated by
beginning total assets.
• DCFOit : Dummy variable that is set to 0 if CFOit ≥ 0 , and is set to 1 if
CFOit < 0.
• CFOit : Cash-flow for period t, deflated by beginning total assets.
• β3: the AACF measure of accounting conservatism.
15MTB ratio appears especially unsuitable for the kind of tests conducted in this chapter, because
MTB ratio is not only a proxy for ‘unconditional’ conservatism but also a well-known proxy for de-
fault risk in the finance literature (See Chapter 1 and Fama and French, 1993, 1995; Roychowdhury
and Watts, 2007). In a test that is designed to clearly separate default risk and accounting conser-
vatism as two distinct factors, MTB’s inability to separate them would lead to severe confounding
issues.
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Table 2.6: Robustness Test – Ball & Shivakumar’s (2005) AACF measure of con-
servatism and Distance-to-Default (DD)
AACF measure of 
conservatism
Effects of DD on 
AACF measure
Effects of 
DDRANK on 
AACF measure
Independent 
Variables Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
Intercept 0.018 15.31 *** 0.010 4.50 *** 0.008 3.17 ***
DCFO 0.011 4.31 *** 0.008 1.87 * 0.007 1.38
CFO -0.105 -11.66 *** -0.150 -7.89 *** -0.164 -7.09 ***
DCFO*CFO 0.148 12.35 *** 0.154 6.49 *** 0.158 5.57 ***
DD 0.002 5.65 ***
DD*DCFO 0.001 1.26
DD*CFO 0.004 1.40
DD*DCFO*CFO 0.007 1.53
DDRANK 0.023 5.42 ***
DDRANK*DCFO 0.013 1.35
DDRANK*CFO 0.061 1.78 *
DDRANK*DCFO*CFO 0.052 1.14
Adj. R_sq. 2.36% 3.55% 3.64%
F-stat 102 *** 67 *** 69 ***
DCFOit is 0 if CFOit ≥ 0, and 1 otherwise. CFO: operating cashflow divided by opening total assets (TA). DD: distance-
to-default estimated with Vassalou & Xing’s (2004) iterative method; DDRANK: percentile of DD. Dependent variable in
all 3 models is operating accrual divided by opening total assets – ACCit/TAit−1. [For representational convenience, the
denominator,TA, is not shown in the table.] Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%. All t-statistics are White-adjusted.
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Table 2.6 reports the results for the estimation of Ball and Shivakumar’s (2005)
AACF measure (Equation 2.13). The first regression (left) is the standard AACF
model. Consistent with Ball and Shivakumar (2005), the standard AACF model
shows a negative good-news timeliness coefficient (-0.105), and a positive asym-
metric timeliness coefficient (0.148), and both coefficients are (statistically) signif-
icant at 1% level.
The results of the second (middle) and third (right) regressions in Table 2.6
show that the AACF measure of conservatism is not associated with the default
risk of the firm, which supports the proposition that the observed increase in the
Basu measure when default risk increases is due to bias. For example, the second
(middle) regression augments the AACF model with DD, and the result shows that
γ1 is 0.007 and is not significant at 10% level of significance. The third (right)
regression in Table 2.7 use DDRANK instead of DD as the proxy for default risk,
and yields a similar result. This result is consistent with the finding of Ahmed et al.
(2002, pp. 383-384) that conservatism is not correlated with default risk. 16
The regression results in Table 2.6 are in sharp contrast with the earlier results in
Table 2.3. In Table 2.3 where the Basu model is tested, the Basu measure is highly
negative correlated with DD, which suggests the Basu measure is positively corre-
lated with default risk. But in Table 2.6 where the AACF measure of conservatism is
tested, it shows no correlation between the AACF measure of conservatism and DD
at all. This comparison suggests that the increase in Basu measure as default risk
increases is likely the consequence of the increasingly higher upward bias rather
than changes in the actual degrees of conservatism.
16Ahmed et al. (2002) use leverage instead of default risk in their study. But these two proxies
are closely related and tend to be highly correlated.
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Figure 2.1: Box-plot of distance-to-default (DD) – “normal firm-years” vs. “out-
liers”
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2.6.2 Characteristics of “outliers”
My final robustness test is of a different character compared to all previous em-
pirical tests in the chapter. While all previous tests focus on testing certain priori
theoretical predictions, this final test begins with no priori theory at all – instead I
let the data to reveal their patterns and characteristics. That is done by detecting the
“outliers” of the sample data based on a pure statistical technique, Cook’s distance,
which I introduce below.
In regression analysis, “outliers” are relative to the regression model itself. Fox
(1997) contends that if a regression model has omitted some important (and corre-
lated) explanatory variables, the data will likely show “outliers”. In a strict sense,
they are not “outliers” at all; rather, they are merely observations with special char-
acteristics that the existing regression model fails to explain.
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In this chapter, the main regression model is, of course, the standard Basu (1997)
model. To identify “outliers”, I first separately estimate the Basu model in each
year from 1999 to 2006.17 Then, the Cook’s distance (CD) is calculated for each
observation. Using the cut-off recommended by Fox (1997), I label any firm-year
with CD > k/(n− k−1) as an “outlier”.18
After classifying firms into “normal” firms and “outliers” by their Cook’s dis-
tances, I compare the levels of distance-to-default (DD) between these two classes
of firms. Figure 1.1 graphically depicts this comparison. An analysis of variance
(ANOVA) shows that the “outliers” have lower DD than the “normal” firms: The
average DD in “normal” firms is 4.374, whereas the average DD in “outliers” is
2.775. The difference is statistically significant at 1% level.
In summary, the analysis of “outliers” suggests that firms of high default risk
possess quite different characteristics from firms of low default risk, and it appears
that the Basu model fails to capture that difference. Thus, in an indirect way, the
“outliers” analysis corroborates the argument that default risk is an omitted factor
from the Basu measure.
2.6.3 An alternative specification of NIBI
Recall that in Section 2.3, I defined the Net Income Before Interest (NIBI) as net
income (after tax) plus pre-tax interest expense. Now I conduct a robustness test
to show that the results of the DAB measure are not fundamentally altered if after-
tax interest expense, instead of pre-tax interest expense, are added back to net in-
come. In the US, except for the smallest family owned companies, the average
17This robustness test does not include the trimmed data, or any data with non-December fiscal
year-ends, because the purpose of this test is to show that “outliers” still exist in the Basu model even
after extreme values have been trimmed way, and to understand the characteristics of the “outliers”.
18n is the number of firms in any particular year; k is the degree of freedom in the regression
model.
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Table 2.7: Robustness test - An alternative specification of Net Income Before In-
terest (“NIBI2”) in the DAB measure
DAB Measure Effects of DD on 
DAB Measure
Effects of DDRANK 
on DAB Measure
Independent Variables Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
Intercept 0.029 33.82 *** 0.004 1.57 -0.004 -1.53
DTR -0.011 -7.22 *** 0.002 0.62 0.009 2.22 **
TR -0.018   -9.36 *** -0.022 -4.14 *** -0.024 -3.61 ***
DTR*TR 0.121     28.64 *** 0.106     13.55 *** 0.106 11.31 ***
DD 0.004 13.21 ***
DD*DTR -0.001 -2.16 **
DD*TR 0.001 0.70
DD*DTR*TR 0.002 1.01
DDRANK 0.054 12.84 ***
DDRANK*DTR -0.022 -3.58 **
DDRANK*TR 0.007 0.81
DDRANK*DTR*TR 0.021 1.09
Adj. R_sq. 11.72% 14.34% 14.63%
F-stat 555.5 *** 300.6 *** 307.7 ***
The dependent variable in all 3 models is NIBI2it/Vit−1. NIBI2it is equal to NI plus 65% · Interest Expense. DT R is 0 if
T R≥ 0 and 1 otherwise. T R: growth rate (i.e return) of the value of the firm; DD: distance-to-default estimated with Vassalou
& Xing’s (2004) iterative method; DDRANK: percentile of DD. Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%. All t-statistics are
White-adjusted.
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marginal rate of coporation tax is approximately 35% of the company’s taxable in-
come, which means that the company’s after-tax interest expense is approximately
65% of the pre-tax interest expenses.19 By adding back the estimated after-tax inter-
est expenses to net income (NI), I create an slightly different version of Net Income
Before Interest. In order to avoid any confusion with the existing variable NIBI,
which is calculated by adding back pre-tax interest expenses to net income, I call
the new variable NIBI2.
To test the robustness of the DAB measure to different specifications of NIBI, I
re-run all three regressions in Table 2.4 with NIBI2 as the new dependent variable.
The results of these new regressions are reported in Table 2.7. Comparison of Ta-
ble 2.7 and Table 2.4 shows that there are no significant differences in the results
obtained using either NIBI or NIBI2 as the dependent variable in the DAB regres-
sion. Thus, I conclude that these two alternative specifications of net income before
interest expenses (NIBI) cannot cause any significant difference to the accuracy of
the DAB measure of conservatism.
2.7 Conclusions
In conclusion, Chapter 2 has analytically and empirically demonstrated that the
Basu measure is, in general, upward biased due to the existence of default risk,
and the magnitude of this bias tends to increase with the level of default risk. This
chapter has also proposed a new measure of accounting conservatism, the Default-
Adjusted-Basu (DAB) measure, to address the issue of default risk. Empirical re-
19While the actual marginal tax rate slight varies from firm to firm depending on the specific level
of income, the US corporate tax rates are designed such that the average tax rates for firms of all sizes
converge to around 35% of their taxable incomes. Except for the smallest family-owned companies,
the US marginal corporation tax rate fluctuate between 34% - 39% depending on the actual level of
taxable income, and is a flat rate of 35% for taxable incomes of $18.3 million or higher.
118
sults support that the DAB measure can substantially reduce or even eliminate the
default-risk bias, and therefore can produce more accurate measures of the degree
of accounting conservatism.
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2.8 Appendix
Proof of the Lemma:
First, from the definition of instantaneous Basu good- and bad- news coefficients
(β jt), where j = 0 and 2, we have:
β jt = lim
ε→0+
cov
[
NI
E(t) ,
∆E
E(t)
]
(ε)
var
[
∆E
E(t)
]
(ε)
= lim
ε→0+
cov [NI, ∆E] (ε)
var [∆E] (ε)
= lim
ε→0+
cov
[{´ t+ε
t αVtdt+
´ t+ε
t k jσVtdW1(t)+
´ t+ε
t σeVtdW2(t)
}
, ∆E
]
(ε)
var [∆E] (ε)
In deriving the second line above, I can take E(t) outside both the variance
and covariance terms because the value of equity is already known at time t [i.e.,
E(t) ∈F (t)]. In deriving the third line, I substitute the expressions for NI from
Equation 2.6. After some simple algebra (omitted), I can break the last expression
into two parts:
β jt = ...
= lim
ε→0+
cov
[{´ t+ε
t αVtdt+
´ t+ε
t k jσVtdW1(t)
}
, ∆E
]
(ε)
var [∆E] (ε)
+ lim
ε→0+
cov
[{´ t+ε
t σeVtdW2(t)
}
, ∆E
]
(ε)
var [∆E] (ε)
Now substitute the expression of ∆E into the above two terms (the resulting
expressions are omitted due to length), and evaluate the resulting expression:
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β jt = ...
= lim
ε→0+
k j∆σ2V 2t · ε+o1(ε)
∆2σ2V 2t · ε
+ lim
ε→0+
∆σσeV 2t ·ρε+o2(ε)
∆2σ2V 2t · ε
=
k j
∆
+
σe
σ
ρ
∆
+
1
∆2σ2V 2t
[
lim
ε→0+
o1(ε)+o2(ε)
ε
]
=
k j
∆
+
σe
σ
ρ
∆
+
1
∆2σ2V 2t
·0
=
k j
∆
+
σe
σ
ρ
∆
In reaching the expression in the second line above, I applied the following two
theorems for the variance and covariance of stochastic processes (For details, see
Shreve (2004, p. 203)), as below.
Consider two stochastic processes:
X1(t) = X1(0)+
ˆ t
0
A1(u)du+
ˆ t
0
B1(u)W1(u)
X2(t) = X2(0)+
ˆ t
0
A2(u)du+
ˆ t
0
B2(u)W2(u)
where W1(t) and W2(t) are Brownian motions satisfying dW1(t)dW2(t)= ρ(t)dt,
and A1(t), A2(t), B1(t), and B2(t) are adapted processes. Then, it can be proved
that
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Mi (ε) = E [Xi(t0+ ε)−Xi(t0) |F (t0)]
= Ai(t0)ε+o(ε)
cov [X1, X2] (ε) = E [(X1(t0+ ε)−X1(t0))(X2(t0+ ε)−X2(t0)) |F (t0)]
−M1(ε)M2(ε)
= ρ(t0)B1(t0)B2(t0)ε+o(ε)
var [Xi] (ε) = E
[
(Xi(t0+ ε)−Xi(t0))2 |F (t0)
]
−M21 (ε)
= B2i (t0)ε+o(ε)
These theorems above involve a small quantity o(ε), which is defined as any
quantity so small that
lim
ε→0+
o(ε)
ε
= 0
Now I can derive the Basu asymmetric timeliness coefficient (β1t):
β1t = β2t−β0t
=
(
k2
∆
+
σe
σ
ρ
∆
)
−
(
k0
∆
+
σe
σ
ρ
∆
)
=
k2
∆
− k0
∆
=
k1
∆
(2.14)
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Proof of Proposition 2.1:
I first differentiate β1t with respect to Vt/D, then apply the chain rule in the follow-
ing manner:
∂β1t
∂
(V
D
) = ∂β1t
∂DD
∂DD
∂
(V
D
) (2.15)
Re-arranging Equation 2.15:
∂β1t
∂DD
=
∂β1t
∂
(V
D
)/ ∂DD
∂
(V
D
) (2.16)
Now
∂β1t
∂
(V
D
) = ∂
∂
(V
D
) [k1
∆
]
= −k1∆−2 ∂∆∂ (VD)
= −k1∆−2
[
∂N(d1)
∂d1
· ∂d1
∂
(V
D
)]
= −k1∆−2
[
exp
(
−d
2
1
2
)
· D
σ
√
tV
]
< 0 (2.17)
In the last step above, the expression is less than zero because all of the terms,
k1, ∆−2, exp(−d1/2), and Dσ√tV are positive and just -1 is negative. The product of
all positive terms times −1 must be negative.
And
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∂DD
∂
(V
D
) = = ∂
∂
(V
D
) ln(V/D)+(α−σ2/2)
σ
√
t
=
D
σV
√
t
> 0 (2.18)
It follows from Inequalities 2.17 and 2.18 and Equation 2.16 that
∂β1t
∂DD
< 0 (2.19)
This completes the proof of Proposition 2.1.
Supplementary note on Basu good-news and bad-news coefficients:
Here, I show that, although the Basu asymmetric timeliness coefficient is increasing
in default risk, the Basu good-news and bad-news coefficients do not necessarily
increase with default risk. As in the proof of Proposition 2.1, I first differentiate the
Basu good-news (and bad-news) estimator, β jt ( j = 0 or 2), with respect to Vt/D,
using the chain rule:
∂β jt
∂
(V
D
) = ∂β jt
∂DD
∂DD
∂
(V
D
) (2.20)
Thus
∂β jt
∂DD
=
∂β jt
∂
(V
D
)/ ∂DD
∂
(V
D
) (2.21)
But
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∂β jt
∂
(V
D
) = ∂
∂
(V
D
) [k j
∆
+
σac
σ
ρ
∆
]
= −
[
k j +
σac
σ
ρ
]
∆−2
[
exp
(
−d
2
1
2
)
· D
σ
√
tV
]
(2.22)
It follows from Equations 2.21 and 2.22, and Inequality 2.18 that

∂β jt
∂DD
< 0, i f k j +
σac
σ
ρ > 0
∂β jt
∂DD
≥ 0, i f k j + σacσ ρ ≤ 0
Therefore, the Basu good-news and bad-news coefficients are increasing in de-
fault risk only if k j +
σac
σ
ρ > 0. On the other hand, if k j +
σac
σ
ρ ≤ 0, these coeffi-
cients will decrease in default risk.
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Chapter 3
The Signalling Role of Accounting
Conservatism in the Debt Market
with Asymmetric Information
3.1 Introduction and background literature1
The objective of Chapter 3 is to analytically examine firms’ demand for accounting
conservatism in a debt-contracting context. Towards this goal, I offer a new eco-
nomic theory of accounting conservatism, which emphasizes the signalling role of
conservatism in a debt market characterised by asymmetric information. In this the-
ory, conservatism serves as a signal by which the borrower firms can convey their
private information about their operating risk to the lenders, prior to signing the
debt contract. This signalling model has a separating equilibrium, in which the low
risk firms choose a high degree of accounting conservatism and the high risk firms
choose a low degree of conservatism. In general, the results of my model show that
1I thank Jacek B. Krawczyk for his valuable comments on this chapter.
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(1) accounting conservatism can be used to reduce information asymmetry in the
debt market; (2) in a debt market, a borrower firm’s equilibrium degree of conser-
vatism is partially determined by the firm’s fundamental operating risk (defined as
asset volatility).
As I discussed in the General Introduction of this thesis, accounting conser-
vatism produces a downward bias in the reported net book values of the firm, and its
accumulated earnings, mainly because conservatism delays the recognition of good
news but accelerates the recognition of bad news, subject to economic uncertainty
(Basu, 1997; Watts, 2003a; Guay and Verrecchia, 2006). While conservatism may
produce the so-called ‘distortions’ to accounting numbers, accounting conservatism
has been documented by overwhelming empirical evidence as a very fundamental
and pervasive phenomenon in virtually all of the major economies in the world,
both prior to and after the introduction of written accounting standards in the mid-
dle of the 20th century (Basu, 1997; Ball et al., 2000; Watts, 2003a,b). Historical
records also show that conservatism has been a key principle of accounting since
the 19th century, and possibly much earlier. But if conservatism distorts accounting
information, why do so many firms still adopt the principle of conservatism in their
financial statements? Furthermore, empirical data have shown that there are some
significant cross-sectional differences in the degrees of conservatism across firms.
So why do some firms choose a higher degree of conservatism than do other firms?
The prevailing view in the current accounting literature is that accounting con-
servatism has a number of benefits. Watts (2003a) contends that there are five main
explanations for the existence of accounting conservatism.2 Of these five expla-
nations, the debt-contracting theory is one of the most widely accepted economic
2These five explanation for the existence of accounting conservatism are: (1) litigation risk (2)
debt-contracting, (3) managerial-contracting, (4) taxation, (5) political costs and regulatory pres-
sures. These theories examines different sources of the demand for accounting conservatism but are
not mutually exclusive.
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explanations for conservatism, and has been tested in a number of empirical studies
(Ahmed et al., 2002; Beatty et al., 2008; Zhang, 2008). The debt-contracting theory
of conservatism argues that conservatism improves the debt-contracting efficiency
between lenders and borrowers, for two main reasons:
1. Under conservatism, earnings reflect bad-news more timely than good-news,
triggering earlier technical defaults on the debt-covenants which allows the
lenders to control the firm earlier and constrains any wealth transfers from
debt-holders to equity-holders in a failing firm.
2. Because conservatism provides more protection to debt-holders in a firm, the
interest rate on the firm’s debt may be lowered as a result.
While the above arguments are intuitively appealing and have some empirical sup-
port (Ahmed et al., 2002; Ball et al., 2008; Beatty et al., 2008; Zhang, 2008), the
debt-contracting theory of conservatism, as described above, has some weaknesses.
The theory is, at best, an incomplete depiction of the role that accounting conser-
vatism plays in the debt-contracting process. For example, Guay and Verrecchia
(2006) criticised the common view held by Watts (2003a), Bushman and Piotroski
(2006) and others that conservatism improves debt contracting efficiency by reduc-
ing the debt covenant slacks. Guay and Verrecchia (2006) said:
“And, under the assumption that difficult-to-verify information about
anticipated profitability is costly to incorporate into financial statements,
it may be more efficient (i.e., less costly) for firms to incorporate more
of the difficult-to-verify bad news and less of the difficult-to-verify
good news into financial statements in a timely manner (the difficult-
to-verify good news will be recognized into financial statements when
it is realized and becomes easy-to-verify good news).
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Note that this role of conservatism in debt contracting is distinct
from the argument made by Ball (2001), Bushman and Piotroski (2006)
and others that conservatism serves a useful role in reducing slack in
debt covenants. Borrowers and lenders will consider the existing ac-
counting system and expected level of bias in reported financial reports
when setting debt covenants. Further, as noted by Leuz (2001), it is
inefficient to set covenants that trigger too often or too infrequently. As
such, the parameters of the covenants are expected to be set so that slack
is neither too little nor too great, regardless of whether the accounting
system is more or less conservative.” (Guay and Verrecchia, 2006, p.
157, Emphasis added)
To date, Gigler et al. (2009) offer the only analytical study on the role of conser-
vatism in the debt-contracting setting, and their conclusion contradicts the above
mentioned debt-contracting theory of conservatism. Gigler et al.’s (2009) model
shows that conservatism may be ‘inefficient’ in debt-contracting because conser-
vatism can trigger too many ‘false alarms’ in debt-contracts. By ‘false alarms’,
the authors refer to the situations where an accounting-based debt covenant is vi-
olated when the actual performance of the firm is still sound. Gigler et al.’s paper
clearly calls for a re-examination of the role of conservatism in the debt-contracting
process.
I argue that a major weakness of the existing debt-contracting theory of conser-
vatism is that the theory itself and the empirical tests of the theory over-emphasize
the benefits of conservatism and ignore any potential costs associated with conser-
vatism. If we could strictly follow this logic, then a higher degree of conservatism
would always be desirable, because it offers greater benefits to the firm, but no ad-
ditional costs. But if accounting conservatism was indeed so good at all times, why
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does not every firm just adopt the highest degree of conservatism? The empirical
evidence that some firms adopt a higher degree of conservatism than others strongly
suggests that there must be some “costs” associated with accounting conservatism.
It is also likely that rational firms choose their own optimal degrees of conservatism
based on the trade-off between their own costs and benefits of conservatism. But
such a trade-off between costs and benefits of conservatism is a critically missing
element from the debt-contracting theory of accounting conservatism.
The analytical studies of conservatism have not addressed this missing element
in the literature. Gigler et al’s (2009) analytical model assumes the degree of con-
servatism as an exogenous variable, which means the model does not really examine
what has led the firm to adopt a particular degree of conservatism in the first place.
For this reason, while Gigler et al’s paper is illuminating in other respects, it does
not directly help us to understand how firms determine their degrees of conservatism
as a trade off between the costs and benefits of conservatism. An examination of this
issue requires that the degree of conservatism be treated as an endogenous variable
in the model.
There are also analytical models that examine the role of conservatism within
the managerial contracting process, rather than the debt contracting process. For
instance, a study by Chen et al. (2007) shows that the manager has incentives to
manage earnings upwards in order to boost stock prices, and when the accounting
system is conservative, the earnings management incentive diminishes. But Chen et
al. (2007) assume that the degree of conservatism is pre-set by accounting standard
setters, which effectively treats conservatism as an exogenous variable. Hence, this
study cannot clearly tell us why a firm adopts a certain degree of conservatism in the
first place. In comparison, Kwon et al. (2001) treat conservatism as an endogenous
variable, and find that conservatism improves the incentive compatibility between
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managers and shareholders, when there is a lower limit on the penalty that can be
imposed on the managers for bad performance. Another analytical study conducted
by Bagnoli and Watts (2005) analyses firms’ decisions on their degrees of conser-
vatism in a signalling framework. The authors contend that a firm chooses a high
degree of conservatism when the managers of the firm expect a high future prof-
itablity, and conversely a low degree of conservatism when the managers expects a
low future profitability. Bagnoli and Watts’ (2005) study also treats conservatism
as an endogenous variable. However, neither the Kwon et al. (2001) study nor the
Bagnoli and Watts (2005) study analyses conservatism from a debt-contracting per-
spective.
In the signalling model of conservatism developed in this chapter, I explicitly
recognise that the decrease in the value of equity is a cost of accounting conser-
vatism. It is not hard to see why: when the degree of accounting conservatism in-
creases in a firm, it will increase the value of debt in that firm, because conservatism
provides more protections to the firm’s debt-holders. Thus, since the total value of
the assets of the firm remains the same, the value of equity must decrease corre-
spondingly by the same amount. Therefore, the trade-off of conservatism in this
chapter is essentially between the benefit of having lower interest rates on debt and
the cost of lowering equity values. In this chapter, I approach the trade-off problem
from the equity-holders’ point of view, and assume that the managers make their
decisions in the best interest of the equity-holders.3
My model of the debt market is based on a strand of economic literature, begin-
ning from Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), that analyses adverse selection and signalling
problems in the debt market. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) shows that when borrower
3This assumption abstracts away the agency conflict between managers and equity-holders, and
thereby allows the chapter to fully concentrate on the agency conflict between equity-holders and
debt-holders.
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firms have more information about the risk levels of their investments than do the
banks, the banks will ration the supply of credit to the market, which leads to an ex-
cessive demand for credit. In other words, the banks will keep the interest rate at a
relatively low level, but not all borrowers willing to borrow at that interest rate can
obtain loans. The main reason for credit-market rationing is that firms with very
risky investments are willing to accept much higher interest rates than firms with
lower risk investments, which would push up the market interest rate in the credit
market. But in the absence of the bank’s ability to differentiate between high risk
firms and low risk ones, the market interest rate would be too high for the low risk
borrowers to borrow. Therefore, the low risk borrowers would be ‘squeezed’ out of
the credit market. That will leave only the risky borrowers in the market, gradually
creating a market for “lemons” in the credit market (Akerlof, 1970). To prevent a
“lemon” credit market from forming, the banks restrict the market interest rate to a
lower level, thereby allowing the safe borrowers to exist in the credit market. But
the banks would be unable to suppy all the loans asked for at such a low interest
rate, which leads to the rationing behaviour in the credit market.
Since Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), there has been a stream of papers analyzing
adverse selection and the signalling problems in credit markets (Bester, 1985; Grin-
blatt and Hwang, 1989; Milde and Riley, 1988; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1987). Some so-
lutions to the credit rationing problem have been proposed and analyzed. For exam-
ple, Bester (1985) and Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) argue that the credit-rationing
may not be necessary if there are certain signalling mechanisms to help reduce in-
formation asymmetry in the market. For example, the size of the loan is proposed
as one possible signalling mechanism Bester (1985).
As part of the signalling theory of accounting conservatism, I provide the ana-
lytical proof of four basic properties of accounting conservatism. These basic prop-
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erties are mostly related to the role of risk. While these basic properties are the
foundation of the signalling theory developed here, they are also useful to other
areas of accounting conservatism research.
The rest of Chapter 3 is structured as follows: Section 3.2 develops the four
basic properties of conservatism. Section 3.3 sets up of the signalling game. Sec-
tion 3.4 discusses the signaling equilibria of this game. Section 3.5 discusses the
implications of this signalling theory of conservatism for research and accounting
standards setting. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Four basic properties of conservatism
In this section, I develop 4 basic properties of accounting conservatism – Lemma
3.1 to Lemma 3.4. The first two of these basic properties (Lemma 3.1 & 3.2) inves-
tigate the joint impact of accounting conservatism and the firm’s risk on earnings.
The second two basic properties (Lemma 3.3 and 3.4) postulate how accounting
conservatism and risk jointly impact on the value of debt in the firm. These four
properties of conservatism thus establish a set of relationships between account-
ing conservatism and risk. Although the fundamental relationship between conser-
vatism and risk has been well recognized in the accounting literature, I explicitly
derive it from Basu’s (1997) definition of conservatism.
Accounting conservatism is inseparable from risk and uncertainty, because the
fundamental role of the conservatism principle is to guide accountants in terms of
recognizing and reporting economic transactions subject to risk and uncertainty.4
The role of conservatism as the accountants’ guide through the waters of risk and
uncertainty is evident in the IASB’s definition of prudence (which is a synonym for
4I do not distinguish the two terms risk and uncertainty in this thesis, as in most other finance
and accounting studies.
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conservatism):
“Prudence is the degree of caution in the exercise of the judgments
needed in making the estimates required under conditions of uncer-
tainty, such that assets or incomes are not overstated and liabilities or
expenses are not understated.” [Emphasis added] (IASB, 1989, pg. 39)
The FASB also states that:
(Conservatism) is a prudent reaction to uncertainty to try to ensure that
uncertainty and risk inherent in business situations are adequately con-
sidered. [Emphasis added] (FASB, 1980)
The four properties (Lemmas 3.1 to 3.4) outlined below can be proved without
making demanding assumptions about the economic and accounting structures. I
analytically prove these properties with only two basic assumptions:
Assumption 1: Conservatism is operationally defined as Basu’s (1997) asymmetric
timeliness of earnings concept;5
Assumption 2: A firm’s operating risk, or simply risk, is measured by Rothschild-
Stiglitz’s mean-preserving-spread (MPS) (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970).
Both assumptions have been generally accepted in the accounting and economics
literatures. Assumption (1) has been widely embraced by accounting researchers
in the last decade or so, as evidenced by the large number of published articles
endorsing and citing the Basu definition of conservatism. Regarding assumption
5In this chapter, I follow Basu (1997) in defining conservatism as the asymmetric timeliness of
earnings. However, the Basu defintion of conservatism, as a theoretical concept, is distinct from
the Basu measure of conservatism. A clear distinction must be made between these two. The
definition of conservatism is an abstract concept; by contrast, the Basu measure of conservatism is
an empirical implemenation, or operationalisation, of that abstract concept.
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(2), the Rothschild-Stiglitz’s MPS measure of risk is a widely accepted measure of
risk in economics.
I would like to emphasize that all four properties of conservatism in this chapter
hinge on the concept of the fundamental operating risk of a firm, or simply risk.
By this term, I mean the volatility of the firm’s ‘news’, which is a terminology used
by Basu to describe the value-shocks to the firm, or more precisely, the information
regarding such value shocks. ‘News’ is essentially the random value-shocks to the
firm, and therefore the volatility of the random value-shocks is a logical measure
of the operating risk of the firm. Firms subject to significant swings in their values
are considered to have higher risks. The relative ranking of risk is measured by
Rothschild and Stiglitz’s (1970) Mean-Preserving-Spread (MPS). The analytical
model in this chapter is only concerned with the relative ranking of risk among two
or more firms, and the absolute level of risk does not matter.
3.2.1 Definitions and assumptions
Before formally stating the 4 lemmas, I first define some key terms, that definitions
closely follow Basu (1997), as follows:
1. ‘News’: it represents the information about unexpected value-shocks to the
firm, and is represented by a random variable, I˜, – the letter I stands for
“Information”. Over a period of time, a firm receives a number of pieces
of news, from 1 to infinity. But each piece of ‘news’ received by the firm
must be an i.i.d. realization of I˜, and can be written as Ii. Furthermore, if a
realization of I˜ is greater than or equal to zero, i.e. Ii ≥ 0, then I say that the
firm has received good ‘news’; if on the other hand, the realization of I˜ is less
than zero, i.e. Ii < 0, then I say that the firm has received bad ‘news’.
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Figure 3.1: Basu earnings function (with discontinuity)
Basu earning function: B(I)
A corner (non-differentiable) 
point at (0, 0)
 I (news/value-shocks)
x (earning)
2. The degree of conservatism: it is defined according to Basu’s asymmetric
timeliness of earnings concept, which states that earnings recognize economic
losses in a more timely manner than economic gains. Basu operationalizes
this idea by specifying that: β1, the percentage of ‘good news’ recognised
in earnings and β2, the percentage of ‘bad news’ recognized in earnings, are
such that β1 < β2. I let c to be the difference between β1 and β2, that is,
c = β2−β1. Thus, c measures the degree of accounting conservatism in the
firm.6
3. The Basu definition of conservatism, in essence, describes earnings as a con-
cave function of realized ‘news’, I. I call it the Basu earnings function, ex-
pressed as B(I). Fig. 1 illustrates the Basu earnings function graphically.
However, in a more realistic situation, a firm may receive many pieces of news
about its economic gains or losses over a particular fiscal year, and each piece
6Note that the notations in this chapter are different from the notations in Chapter 2. β1, β2 and
c in Chapter 3 are equivalent to k0, k2 and k1 in Chapter 2, respectively.
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Figure 3.2: Basu earnings function (without discontinuity)
-k k
Quadratic segment:
Modified Basu earning 
function: MB(I)
Smooth quadratic curve: f(I)
 I (news/value-shocks)
x (earning)
of news may indicate a different level of economic gains or losses that the firm
experiences. A natural way to deal with such uncertainty contained in ‘news’
signals is to recognize the average earnings that are implied by all economic
‘news’ over a period of time. This idea can be expressed mathematically by
letting earnings, x, equal the expected value of the Basu earnings function, as
follows:
x = E
[
B(I˜)
]
. (3.1)
Equation 3.1 is structurally identical to the von Neumann-Morgenstern ex-
pected utility function.
4. The Basu earnings function B(I) is unfortunately not differentiable at the
point (0, 0), where I = 0. (See Fig. 3.1) This point creates a technical issue for
the proof of Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.2 using the Rothschild and Stiglitz The-
orem, which requires the B(I) function everywhere twice-differentiable. To
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solve this issue, I slightly modify B(I) function to remove the non-differentiability
at I = 0, with the following method (see Fig. 3.2 for the modified function):
In a small neighborhood around I = 0, such as [−k, k], I replace the two exist-
ing line-segments of B(I) with a smooth curve, f (I), which has the following
properties
(a) f (I) is increasing in I;
(b) f ′′(I) is a negative constant, to ensure concavity.
(c) f (I) ‘smoothly’ joins with the rest of the B(I) curve at the two end-
points −k and k, without any sharp corners.
In fact, these conditions above imply that the f (I) is a quadratic curve, and as
the Appendix shows, this quadratic curve always exists. The resulting Mod-
ified Basu earnings function, which we denote as MB(I), consists of three
parts: (1) the straight-line from −∞ to −k in the ‘bad-news’ part; (2) the
quadratic curve f (I) in the middle, from −k to k; (3) the second straight-line
from k to ∞ in the ‘good-news’ part. (See Fig. 3.2) In order to minimise the
distortions caused by this change, the middle part of the MB(I) curve can be
made arbitrarily small. Say, if a firm’s earnings are in the scale of million dol-
lars, we can carve the middle portion of B(I) out and replace it by f (I) from
negative $1 to positive $1, i.e. I ∈ [−1, 1]. Obviously, modifying the original
Basu function at such a small scale, when the actual earnings run into millions
of dollars, does not significantly impact on the original Basu earnings func-
tion. This maneuver ensures the removal of the non-differentiability at I = 0.
Within this new earnings function, the reported earnings can be re-written in
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terms of MB(I), as below:
x = E
[
MB(I˜)
]≈ E[B(I˜)] (3.2)
A useful property of the MB(I) curve is that, in the middle segment (i.e. the
quadratic function f (I) ) , its second derivative, MB′′(I), is proportional to the
degree of accounting conservatism, c.7 This property allows us to use either
MB′′(I) or c as the measure of conservatism. See the appendix for the proof.
5. The operating risk of a firm is defined as the volatility of the market value
of the firm, which is the sum of the value of debt and the value of equity.
Since the change in the market value of the firm can be described by the value
shocks to the firm, I˜, I can rank the degree of operating risk of each firm
by ranking the degree of the dispersion of each firm’s value shocks I˜ (it is
also called the “news”). And the ranking of the degree of dispersion of I˜ can
easily be accomplished by applying the well-known mean-preserving-spread
concept of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). In particular, if a risky (R) firm’s
‘news’, denoted as I˜r, is a mean-preserving-spread of a safe (S) firm’s ‘news’,
denoted as I˜s, then we say that firm r is riskier than firm s. Furthermore,
the statement that I˜r is a mean-preserving-spread of I˜s is equivalent to the
statement that I˜r = I˜s+ ε˜ , where ε˜ is an independent random variable with a
zero mean.
7But everywhere outside the middle segment, MB′′(I) = 0, because MB(I) is a straight-line at
these places.
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3.2.2 Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2
I present the first two properties of accounting conservatism in Lemma 3.1 and
Lemma 3.2. Both lemmas focus on the (three-way) connection between conser-
vatism, risk and earnings.
First, suppose that firm R is riskier than firm S, in the sense that firm R’s value-
shocks, I˜r, is a mean-preserving-spread of the value-shocks of firm S, I˜s. Let xr(c)
and xs(c) denote the accounting earnings of the risky and the safe firms respectively,
conditional on c, the degree of accounting conservatism.
Then, it can be proved that:
Lemma 3.1. The accounting earnings of the risky firm is lower than the earnings
of the safe firm, for any given degree of conservatism, c. Or mathematically,
xr(c)≤ xs(c)
Proof. See the Appendix
and that,
Lemma 3.2. When the degree of accounting conservatism, c, increases in both firms
R and S simultaneously, the marginal decrease in accounting earnings is greater in
the riskier firm than in the safer firm. Mathematically, the following inequality
holds:
∂xr(c)
∂c
<
∂xs(c)
∂c
< 0
Proof. See the Appendix.
Remark. Lemma 3.1 is simply a re-statement of the well-known fact that, when the
degrees of conservatism are the same, riskier firms tend to have lower earnings than
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do safer firms.
Lemma 3.2 focuses on the marginal rate of change in earnings, when there is a
small change in the degree of accounting conservatism. Lemma 3.2 shows the rate
of change is greater for the riskier firm than for the safer firm. This relationship
is graphically represented in Figure 3.3. Figure 3.3 plots earnings, x, against the
degree of accounting conservatism, c. There are two curves in Figure 3.3 – one
representing the earnings of the risky firms, the other representing the earnings of
the safe firm. Figure 3.3 illustrates that the risky firm’s earnings decrease at a faster
rate than do the earnings of the safe firm, when c increases.
Lemma 3.2 is akin to the situation where police try to catch drink-drivers on a
Saturday night. If there are a lot of drink drivers in town on Saturday night, then
dispatching more police onto the streets will result in a significant increase in the
number of drink-drivers caught. If, however, there are very few drink-drivers on
Saturday night at the first place, then sending more police onto the streets will not
have as much an impact on the number of drink-drivers caught as in the previous
situation. The relationship between risk, conservatism and earnings reflects the
same idea.
Example. A simple numerical example can help illustrating both Lemma 3.1 and
Lemma 3.2. Let us suppose that a particular firm has an average value-shock of $5,
in a given period. For simplicity, I assume that there are just two pieces of news for
that firm, a good one and a bad one, which averages to $5. By extending the spread
between the good and bad ‘news’, I can create a series of ‘news’ of different levels
of risks. Let me now write the good-news and bad-news in ordered pairs, such as
(20, -10), (30, -20), (40, -30) etc, where the first element in each pair is the good-
news and the second element is the bad news. All these pairs are mean-preserving,
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Figure 3.3: Earnings as a function of conservatism
as they all have a mean of $5.
Then I calculate the earnings for each pair of news, at five levels of conservatism
(c = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, and 1). For simplicity, I set the bad-news timeliness (β2) to 1.
Table 3.1 reports the resulting earnings. It is easy to see two regularities from Table
3.1: First, as the risk level increases, all earnings decrease, which illustrates Lemma
3.1. Second, as c increases, the earnings of the riskier firms decrease more rapidly
than the earnings of the safer firms, which shows the effect of Lemma 3.2.
3.2.3 Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4
Several accounting researchers, including Watts (2003), Ahmed et al. (2002), Ball
et al. (2008) and Zhang (2008), contend that a more conservative accounting sys-
tem can reduce the interest rates charged by debtholders, and thereby increase
the value of the debt in a firm, ceteris paribus. This effect can happen because
142
Table 3.1: Numerical example of Lemma 3.1 and 3.2
conservatism influences accounting-based debt covenants. Accounting-based debt
covenants are contractual agreements that specify the minimum or maximum lev-
els of certain key accounting ratios that the borrower firm can have. The main
purpose of these covenants is to align equity-holders’ incentives with those of the
debt-holders, and to restrain the transfer of wealth from debt-holders to equity-
holders. Examples of accounting-based debt covenants are the minimum net worth
requirement, the minimum interest coverage requirement, the maximum leverage
requirement and the minimum current ratio (working capital) requirements. When
there is an accounting-based covenant in the debt contract, the value of the bond is
simultaneously determined by two categories of factors: (1) market factors, which
include the market value of the firm and its volatility; and (2) accounting factors,
which include accounting earnings and book values to the extent that these account-
ing factors are used in the debt covenant. In fact, the signalling model of accounting
conservatism is basically built upon the notion that the market factors and the ac-
counting factors interact via accounting conservatism.
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Ahmed et al. (2002), Beatty et al. (2008), Watts (2003a) and Zhang (2008) all
argue that, ceteris paribus, accounting conservatism forces the borrower firm to
violate its accounting-based debt covenants more frequently and in a more timely
manner. That makes the covenants more ‘binding’ and default more likely when
the firm is performing badly. A more ‘binding’ covenant can convey bad news
more quickly to the lenders and trigger early (technical) defaults, which provides
a greater degree of protection to the lenders. As a consequence, the bond of the
conservative firm is more valuable than the bond in a non-conservative firm.And
correspondingly, the interest rate of the bond in the more conservative firm is lower,
ceteris paribus, because it is less risky.
In addition, the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem states that, in absence of
tax effects, the value of the assets of the firm, A, is the sum of the value of the debt,
D, and the value of the equity, E of that firm (i.e. A = D+E). Since the value of
assets does not change, any increase in the value of debts, D, must be accompanied
by an offsetting equal decrease in the value of equity, E. Therefore, an increase in
the degree of accounting conservatism will not only lead to a higher value of debt
in the firm, but also a lower value of equity. This idea is formally summarized in
Lemma 3.3 below.
Lemma 3.3. Ceteris paribus, an increase in the degree of accounting conservatism,
c, in the borrower firm, leads to an increase in the value of debt and a decrease in
the value of equity of equal amounts. Mathematically,
∂D
∂c
=−∂E
∂c
> 0 and
∂E
∂c
< 0
I state Lemma 3.3 without a formal proof, because the basic idea of Lemma 3.3
has been extensively discussed by Ahmed et al (2002), Watts (2003), Zhang (2008),
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and others, and is supported by empirical evidence.
Now, suppose that firm R is riskier than firm S, in the sense that firm R’s value-
shocks, I˜r, is a mean-preserving-spread of the value-shocks of firm S, I˜s. Firm R and
firm S both have debt, and we denote the value of debt as a function of conservatism
– as Dr(c) and Ds(c) respectively. Let us also suppose that the debt in both types of
firms is identical, with the same maturity value and maturity date.
Lemma 3.4. If the following conditions are satisfied: (1) Lemma 3.2 holds, and
(2) ceteris paribus, the value of debt, D, is a decreasing and is a linear (or convex)
function of accounting earnings, x, then the following two single-crossing properties
(SCP) of conservatism hold:
∂Dr(c)
∂c
>
∂Ds(c)
∂c
> 0; (3.3)
and equivalently,
∂Er(c)
∂c
<
∂Es(c)
∂c
< 0; (3.4)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 3.4 states that the marginal benefit to debt-holders arising from in-
creased degree of accounting conservatism is greater, if the borrower firm’s risk
level is higher. For example, if a lender holds some senior bonds in a AAA-rated
firm, the interest rate on the bonds is likely to be very low due the low level of
risk. It would then be very difficult to further decrease the interest rate on these
bonds simply by making the accounting system more conservative. In contrast, if
the lender invests in some junk bonds, then there exists a considerable default pre-
mium in the bond’s interest rate. In this case, increasing the borrower firm’s degree
of accounting conservatism can potentially yield a much greater level of protection
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to the lenders, which in turn will lead to a significant reduction in the risk premium
of these junk bonds. Lemma 3.4 captures this idea.
It might initially seem quite surprising that Condition (2) in Lemma 3.4 requires
the value of debt to be a decreasing function of earnings. But this requirement,
in fact, is entirely sensible. When Lemma 3.4 states that the earnings increase,
it means that the reported earnings increase, while holding the value of the total
assets constant, which is what the ‘ceteris paribus’ term is there for. If the value
of assets increases, then without a doubt, the value of debt will also increase, as
demonstrated by Merton (1974).8 However, if the asset value is being held constant,
just increasing reported earnings does not make the firm worth more, but instead,
only makes the firm’s debt-covenant is less ‘binding’. And a less binding debt-
covenant lowers the value of debts, as discussed earlier. Thus, when holding all
other factors constant, increasing reported earnings result in a lower value for the
firm’s debts.
In the economics literature, both of inequalities (3.3 and 3.4) are typically called
the Single-Crossing Property, because if one draws D as a function of c, the two
curves Dr(c) and Ds(c) crosses with each other at most once (Fudenberg and Tirole,
1991). In this chapter, I assume that the increase in the value of the debt in the risky
firm resulting from the increased conservatism is sufficiently large such that the
the value of debt is higher in the risky firm than in the safe one, when c is higher
than a certain threshold value. That leads to Dr(c) and Ds(c) crossing each other
exactly once, as in Figure 3.4. In practice, this may happen when the earnings of
the risky firm become so low due to high conservatism, leading to a very high level
of protection given to the lenders in that risky firm.
As Figure 3.4 shows, when the degree of conservatism is zero, the value of
8Chapter 2, Section 2.2 of this thesis discussed the Merton model in greater detail.
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Figure 3.4: Debt value as a function of conservatism (Single-crossing property)
Figure 3.5: Equity value as a function of conservatism (Single-crossing property)
147
the risky debts, Dr(0), is lower than the value of the safe debts, Ds(0). But when
the degree of conservatism increases, the debts in the risky firm gradually becomes
more valuable than the debts in the safe firm. These two curves intercepts at point
cmin. Figure 3.4 also shows that the Debt curve of the risky firm is steeper than that
of the safe firm, which is also stated in Lemma 3.4. Similarly, the single-crossing
property of conservatism regarding equity is shown in Figure 3.5, which is basically
a mirror image of Figure 3.4.
3.3 Model set-up
In this section, I develop a signalling model of accounting conservatism in a debt
market characterised by asymmetric information. First, I set up the basic structure
of the signalling game.
Consider the following signalling game with two classes of players: (1) the
firms who want to borrow money by selling their bonds, and (2) the lenders who
wants to lend in the bond market. To simplify the exposition in this chapter, I treat
all shareholders of a firm collectively as one individual, and call that individual the
“equity-holder” of the firm. I further assume that the firm’s goal is to maximize the
wealth of the equity-holder, and hence there are no conflicts of interests between
the firm and the equity-holders. So for all practical purposes of this model, such as
determining the payoff for each party, the firm and its equity-holder can be treated
as the same. I also assume that the firm has no initial assets or liabilities, and thus is
just a shell company waiting for investment opportunities and injections of capital
from the equity-holder and lenders. Finally, the debt market is competitive with
many lenders competing against each other.
Suppose a firm has identified a new investment opportunity, but to make this
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Figure 3.6: Timeline of the conservatism-signalling game
investment the firm requires total capital of A, where A is the value of total assets to
be purchased for the project. Since the firm has no initial assets or liabilities, A will
also be the total value of the firm once the investment project is undertaken by the
firm. However, A is more than the money that the equity-holder of the firm has, and
therefore the firm must finance the capital short-fall by selling corporate bonds to
the debt market. The bond that the firm wishes to sell has a fixed maturity value B,
and must be repaid once the project is completed in a pre-specified time period. The
lenders, on the other hand, have plenty of cash so that they can meet the potential
financing needs from all firms.
There are two kinds of possible investment projects, and each carries a different
level of risk: (1) a risky project, denoted by R; and (2) a safe project, denoted by
S. The risky project is riskier than a safe project in the sense that the risky project’s
economic ‘news’ is a mean-preserving-spread of the economic ‘news’ of the safe
project. Obviously, since this new investment project is all that the firms in the debt
market have, if a firm takes on a risky project, it becomes a risky firm; and if a firm
takes on a safe project, it becomes a safe firm.
The order of this signalling game is follows:
Nature moves first in this game by randomly assigning each firm with either a
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risky investment project R with probability ρ , or a safe project S with probability
1−ρ . The prior distribution of these two types of projects (i.e. the value of ρ) is
common knowledge to both the equity-holders and the lenders in the market. But
the true risk level of each firm’s investment project can be observed by that firm
itself (which include its equity-holder), but not by any of the lenders. Furthermore,
the lenders have no other ways of independently knowing the true risk level of any
firm in the market except to the extent of the signalling mechanism to be described
in this chapter.
Given this information structure, this game is a typical game of asymmetric in-
formation. This information structure is also consistent with the economic literature
on the information asymmetry in the debt market, such as the model by Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981). I sometimes uses the terminology from the game theory, which calls
the risk levels (r, and s) as the type of a firm. Thus, the risky firms may be called
the r− type, and similarly, the safe ones may be called the s− type.
The value of the bond, Dtype(c), depends on the risk-type of the firm, as well
as the level of the firm’s accounting conservatism. Using an option-pricing model,
Merton (1974) shows that if a firm’s asset volatility is higher, then the value of the
firm’s debts will be lower, ceteris paribus. At the same time, the value of the firm’s
equity will be higher. Given such a relationship, risky firms have an incentive to
deceive the lenders by telling them that they are safe firms, in the hope of selling
their high-risk bonds at a price that is higher than true values. If this lie works, the
risky the firm (rather its equity-holder) would have earned an abnormal economic
profit by selling its bond at a higher price, in addition to its normal expected returns.
But the lenders, on the other hand, would have suffered an abnormal economic loss
because they have over-paid for purchase of the bond.
However, rational lenders would not allow such a deceptive scheme to work,
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because they can anticipate the potential lies from risky firms. Since they anticipate
the lies, they would not pay such a high price for the bond that is likely to be
risky rather than safe. In the most basic case where the lenders cannot distinguish
between the risky firms and the safe ones, the lenders will simply pay the average
value of the the risky and safe bonds. As there are many competitive lenders in the
market, the lenders will actually offer a price that is exactly equal to the expected
value of all bonds for sale in the market, ρDr(c) + (1− ρ)Ds(c), conditional on
the degree of conservatism c. In this very basic case, the lenders will, on average,
make neither abnormal gains nor abnormal losses. But the risky firms will make an
abnormal gain, while the safe firms will make an abnormal loss. There is, thus, a
wealth transfer from the safe firms to the risky ones.
In the second move of this game, after nature assigns the risk types to each firm,
each firm will choose its own level of accounting conservatism, c, and then will
communicate their chosen c to all the lenders in the debt market. Once a firm is
committed to a particular level of conservatism, they cannot change it afterwards.
High c means a high degree of accounting conservatism. Since c is a trustworthy
piece of information sent by the firms to the lenders, c may act as an information
signal in the debt market. I denote the zero conservatism level by c0, where c0 = 0.
In the separating equilibrium analysis later in the chapter, cs denotes the degree
of conservatism that a safe-type firm would choose , and cr denotes the degree of
conservatism that a risky-type firm would choose.
In the third move of the game, the lenders, upon observing c, decides how much
to pay for the bond of that particular firm, which is denoted by P(c). The lenders
decision about P(c) incorporates the information conveyed by the level of conser-
vatism, c, which updates the lenders beliefs about whether a firm is of the r− type
or the s− type. If they believe that the firm is of the s− type, then they will be will-
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ing to pay a higher price. But if the lenders believe that the firm is of the r− type,
then they will only pay a lower price to compensate for the extra risk involved.
Again, competitions among the lenders force them to pay exactly the true value of
the bond, whether it is risky or safe.
At the end of the game, payoffs are distributed to both parties. This pay-off
determination happens as soon as the bonds are sold. The (net) payoff to a lender,
denoted by vtype(c), is the value of the bond less the price paid for the bond, con-
tingent on the risk type and the degree of conservatism. This is formally stated as
below:
Payoff to lenders:

vs(c) = Ds(c)−P(c)
vr(c) = Dr(c)−P(c)
(3.5)
The (net) payoff to the firm, or more precisely to the equity-holder of the firm,
is denoted by utype(c), and is calculated as the true value of the equity of the firm,
Etype(c), less the initial equity investment made by the equity-holder, E0(c). In
essence, the net payoff to the firm is the value that the equity-holder gets minus the
price paid. More formally, the payoffs to the firm (i.e. its equity-holder) can be
written as:
Payoff to the equity-holder/firm:

us(c) = Es(c)−E0(c)
ur(c) = Er(c)−E0(c)
(3.6)
The amount of equity investment made by the firm, E0(c), is the difference
between the total project value A and the price the bond is sold for P(c). Hence,
E0 = A−P(c) (3.7)
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Equation 3.7 summarises the relationship that: if the bond can be sold at a higher
price, then the equity-holder can make less equity investment; conversely if the bond
can only be sold at a lower price, the equity-holder have to make more equity invest-
ment in the firm. Substituting equation 3.7 into Equation 3.6, we get an alternative,
but equivalent expression for the firm’s payoffs:
Payoff to the equity-holder/firm:

us(c) = P(c)−Ds(c) =−vs(c)
ur(c) = P(c)−Dr(c) =−vr(c)
(3.8)
Equation 3.8 shows that the payoff to the firm is the negative of the payoff to the
lenders. Therefore, the game is a zero-sum game. It is easy to see why the payoffs
add to zero: when the total value of the firm, A, is a constant, any abnormal gain
(loss) by the lender must result in a corresponding loss (gain) by the equity-holder.
The value of debts and the value of equity must add up to A.
The payoffs to debt-holders and equity-holders are net abnormal returns rather
than gross returns. If there were no information asymmetry in the game, each party
in the game would make zero abnormal profit or loss, and therefore all payoffs
would be zero. However, when there is information asymmetry in the game, as is
assumed in this chapter, the payoffs may not be zero. Furthermore, this signalling
game does not impose any restrictions on the risk aversion on both of the lenders
and equity-holders. Nevertheless, it does assume that the both types of players can
perfectly hedge their income, which means that both types of players are present-
value-maximizers.
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3.4 Signalling equilibria
Now I discuss the characteristics of the equilibria of this signalling game. signalling
games can, and often do, have multiple equilibria – some of which are separating,
while others are pooling (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). Without the help of any sig-
nalling or screening mechanisms, the debt market cannot resolve the information
asymmetry problem. One possible outcome would be a pooling equilibrium, where
the lenders pay the average price to buy every bond, without being able to distin-
guish between high risk and low risk borrowers. Another possibility would be that
the debt market turns into credit rationing Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). In the worst
case, the debt market would turn into a market for ‘lemons’, or junk bonds, where
low risk borrowers would exit the debt market leaving the market with only high
risk borrowers. Obviously, such a catastrophe does not generally occur in the real
debt market, which shows that there must be some sort of signalling or screening
mechanisms in place to reduce the information asymmetry in the debt market. In
the rest of Chapter 3, I will show that accounting conservatism could be one such
signalling mechanism.
3.4.1 Separating equilibrium
A separating equilibrium describes a condition where the signals can accurately
reveal one player’s private information to the other players. In the current signalling
game, a separating equilibrium is one in which the risky firm and the safe firm each
chooses a different degree of accounting conservatism, and by observing the degrees
of conservatism, the lenders can correctly infer the true risky type of the borrower
firms.
To derive the separating equilibrium, I first denote the degree of conservatism
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that all risky firms will choose as cr, and the degree of conservatism that all safe
firms will choose as cs. In order for the separating equilibrium to hold, it is neces-
sary that neither types of firms have any incentive to deviate from their equilibrium
levels of conservatism. A firm should always be worse off by imitating the choice
of conservatism by the other type of firms. In other words, all risky firms are worse
off by choosing cs, and conversely all safe firms are worse off by choosing cr. This
is the main separating condition for this signalling game, which is formally stated
below:

us(cr)< us(cs)
ur(cs)> ur(cr)
(3.9)
Furthermore, competitions between lenders will drive the purchase prices of
each bond to the exact present value of the bond. This means that the lenders make
neither abnormal profits nor abnormal losses in the bonds, ex ante.9 Hence, the
following conditions must be true at the separating equilibrium:

vs(cs) = 0
vr(cr) = 0
(3.10)
which implies that

P(cs) = Ds(cs)
P(cr) = Dr(cr)
(3.11)
Since vtype(c) =−utype(c), Equation 3.10 also implies that
9Ex post, or realized, profit or loss from holding the bonds involves random events such as
defaults. But the ex ante, or expected, profit or loss should be zero for the lenders.
155

us(cs) = 0
ur(cr) = 0
(3.12)
Thus, the main separating condition (3.9) becomes

us(cr)< 0
ur(cs)> 0
(3.13)
By substituting the definition of the payoffs of equity-holders, utype(c), (Equa-
tion 3.8) and Equation 3.11 into Inequalities 3.13 above, we have:
Separating condition :

Dr(cr)< Ds(cr)
Dr(cs)> Ds(cs)
(3.14)
In addition, at the separating equilibrium, the lenders must hold a posterior
belief that P(s | c≥ cs) = 1 and P(r | c < cs) = 1. In other words, if a firm chooses
greater or equal to cs degree of conservatism then the lenders will regard that firm as
a safe-type; conversely if a firm chooses a less than cs degree of conservatism, the
lenders will think of that firm as a risky-type. Does such a separating equilibrium
exist? If so, what value (or values) should cs take?
Proposition 3.5. There exists a continuum of Bayesian Nash Separating Equilibria,
if the following Single-Crossing Property of Conservatism (i.e., Lemma 3.4) holds:
∂Dr(c)
∂c
>
∂Ds(c)
∂c
> 0, ∀c
and the Dr(c) and Ds(c) curves cross each other at c∗.
If the above condition is satisfied, then cs > c∗.
156
Figure 3.7: Separating Equilibrium
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Proof. First, c∗ is the value of c such that Dr(c∗) = Ds(c∗), and also let D∗ ≡
Dr(c∗) = Ds(c∗). Now, express the values of debt as integrals:
Dr(cs) = D∗+
ˆ cs
c∗
∂Dr(c)
∂c
dc
and,
Ds(cs) = D∗+
ˆ cs
c∗
∂Ds(c)
∂c
dc
Since,
∂Dr(c)
∂c
>
∂Ds(c)
∂c
, ∀c
we have,
ˆ cs
c∗
∂Dr(c)
∂c
dc >
ˆ cs
c∗
∂Ds(c)
∂c
dc, ∀cs > c∗
Therefore,
D∗+
ˆ cs
c∗
∂Dr(c)
∂c
> D∗+
ˆ cs
c∗
∂Ds(c)
∂c
, ∀cs > c∗
which proves the second half of the separating condition (3.14) that,
Dr(cs)> Ds(cs), ∀cs > c∗
Similarly, we can also prove the first half of the separating condition 3.14. (De-
tails omitted)
It is helpful to visualize the proof by examining Figure 3.7, which draws the
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value of debt as a function of the the degree of conservatism c. Figure 3.7 is simply
a graphical presentation of Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4. Because there are two levels of
risk – Risky (R) and Safe (S), there are also two curves on the graphs corresponding
to each level of risk: the Dr(c) curve for the risky firm’s debts, and the Ds(c) curve
for the debts of the safe firm. These two curves cross with each other when c = c∗.
From Figure 3.7, one can easily observe that if cr, the degree of conservatism
chosen by risky firms, is less than c∗, then the first half of the main separating
condition ((3.14)) is satisfied, because the Dr(c) curve is below the Ds(c) curve in
this part of the graph. Similarly, if cs, the degree of conservatism chosen by safe
firms, is greater than c∗, then the second half of the main separating condition is
also satisfied, because the Dr(c) curve is now above the Ds(c) curve in this part of
the graph.
The above analysis shows that at the separating equilibrium, the level of con-
servatism that the Safe firm can adopt, cs, must be greater than c∗. As a result,
there is an entire continuum of Nash Separating Equilibria, as long as cs > c∗ and
cr < c∗. There is also a Dominant Separating Equilibrium within infinitely many
equilibria. And that is cr = 0 and cs = c∗ (or more precisely cs approaches c∗).
The reason is that 0 and c∗ are the lowest possible values for each type of firms
to choose. Choosing anything higher will only decrease the value of equity in that
firm, because higher conservatism will give the debt-holders more protections.10
10Although not the focus of this chapter, a higher degree of conservatism will also likely cause
more distortions to the information contents of the firm’s financial statements, which may create
higher information costs to the equity-holders of the firm. That is a further reason for the firm not to
adopt a higher than necessary degree of accounting conservatism.
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3.4.2 Pooling equilibrium & the “intuitive criterion”
The conservatism-signalling game also has a pooling equilibrium. In the pooling
equilibrium, both the Safe and Risky firms choose the zero level of conservatism, i.e.
cpool = 0. (Let cpool denote the level of conservatism in the pooling equilibrium.) In
the pooling equilibrium, the lenders hold the posterior belief that: P(r | c = 0) = ρ
and P(s | c = 0) = 1−ρ . In other words, the lenders believe both types of firms
will select zero degree of conservatism and will not deviate from that plan. Because
lenders in the pooling equilibrium are unable to distinguish between high risk and
low risk firms, they will simply pay the average price in the pooling situation, i.e.
Ppool = ρDr(c = 0)+ (1−ρ)Ds(c = 0), for every bond regardless of its true risk
level.
So far the analysis of the conservatism signalling game has produced two pos-
sible solution: (1) the separating equilibrium, and (2) the pooling equilibrium. But
which equilibrium will the players will choose?
In fact, multiple equilibria are typical of signalling games. To counter that prob-
lem, game-theorists have developed a number of equilibrium refinements to limit
the number of admissible equilibria in signalling games. The “intuitive criterion”
proposed by Cho and Kreps (1987) is a particularly popular refinement of the Nash
Equilibrium concept. The intuitive criterion helps researchers to eliminate most
of the unstable equilibria from signalling games and keep only the more stable
ones. I apply this refinement in this chapter. As a result, the pooling equilibrium
is eliminated from the signalling game by the intuitive criterion, because it is not
sufficiently stable. That leaves us with the separating equilibrium as the only stable
solution to the game.
The intuitive criterion works like this: it rules out the pooling equilibrium in the
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current game, if the risky firms are always worse off by deviating from the pooling
equilibrium cp = 0 (and choosing cr ≥ c∗ instead), regardless of the actual belief
held by the lenders. Suppose that this condition is satisfied (which I will prove,
later in this chapter, is indeed satisfied), then the rationale is that since the risky
firms will never defect from the pooling equilibrium, then the lenders will put a
zero posterior probability on the R-type choosing cr ≥ c∗, i.e. P(R | c ≥ c∗) = 0.
In other words, the lender will place zero probability on this particular off-the-path
action. On the other hand, the S− type firms may find defecting off to cs ≥ c∗
potentially beneficial to them. Therefore, the S− type firms can exploit the fact
that the R− type will never go to c∗ or higher by adopting precisely cs = c∗, which
signals to the lenders that whoever adopts c∗ or higher must only be the safe firms.
In other words, the lenders will have the posterior that P(S | c ≥ c∗) = 1. On this
basis, the lenders will be willing to pay a higher price to buy the bond from the
firms deviating from the pooling equilibrium and adopt c ≥ c∗. To continue this
logic, the safe firms in turn will have rationally anticipated that the lenders will
have the posterior belief that:

P(R | c≥ c∗) = 0
P(S | c≥ c∗) = 1
Having anticipated such posteriors, the safe firms will all move to c∗ or higher,
in order to get sell their bond at higher prices and reduce their abnormal loss to zero.
In the next round of anticipation, the lenders, foreseeing that the safe firms have all
gone to c∗ or higher, they will decrease the price paid at the pooling equilibrium
(Ppool) from the average price of both types to the price of the risky bonds only. The
consequence of that is that the players quickly move from the pooling equilibrium
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to the separating equilibrium, which shows the pooling equilibrium may not be a
stable solution to this particular signalling game.
But is the intuitive criterion actually satisfied in this game? The answer is yes.
I formally state the result first, and then prove it.
Proposition 3.6. The pooling equilibrium, where both risky and safe types of firms
choose the zero level of accounting conservatism, fails the Intuitive Criterion, if the
following Single-Crossing Condition of Conservatism (i.e. Lemma 3.4) holds:
∂Er(c)
∂c
<
∂Es(c)
∂c
< 0, ∀c
To prove this proposition, we must to show that no matter what the lenders
believe, moving to c∗ or higher always makes the risky firms worse off.
First, if the lenders believe any firm choosing c≥ c∗ is a risky firm, then
ur(c≥ c∗ | R) = P(c | R)−Dr(c) = Dr(c)−Dr(c) = 0
Note:
ur(cpool) = Ppool−Dr(0)
= ρDr(0)+(1−ρ)Ds(0)−Dr(0)
= (1−ρ) [Ds(0)−Dr(0)]
> 0
Hence,
ur(c≥ c∗ | R)< ur(cpool) (3.15)
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Second, if the lenders believe any firm choosing c≥ c∗ is a safe firm, then
ur(c≥ c∗ | S) = P(c | S)−Dr(c) = Ds(c)−Dr(c)< 0
Therefore,
ur(c≥ c∗ | S)< ur(cpool) (3.16)
The inequalities 3.15 and 3.16 together imply that risky firms are always worse
off by defecting from the pooling equilibrium. This completes the proof of Propo-
sition 3.6.
3.5 Implications
The signalling theory of accounting conservatism developed in this chapter has the
following implications for the accounting literature and accounting standards set-
ters.
First, the signalling theory of accounting conservatism shows that conservatism
may help addresses the problem of information asymmetry in the credit market.
This theory shows that accounting conservatism is a signalling mechanism which
can reduce, or eliminate, the information asymmetry about the borrower firm’s risk-
iness. The model shows that high risk firms tend to adopt a lower degree of conser-
vatism, while low risk firms tend to adopt a higher degree of conservatism. Since the
lenders can learn about the true risk levels in the borrower firms through observing
the borrower firms’ levels of conservatism, credit market rationing problem could
be resolved. This underlines the information content contained in a firm’s degree of
accounting conservatism.
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Second, the signalling theory of conservatism suggests that a higher degree of
accounting conservatism is not always good, or ‘efficient’, if I use the word of Zhang
(2008). In contrast, the prior literature tends to hold the view that the higher the de-
gree of accounting conservatism, the more efficient the debt contract is. Such a view
is evident in Zhang (2008), who interpret ‘efficiency’ as both the ex ante saving of
interest to the borrower firms and the ex post reduction of managerial opportunism.
While this notion of efficiency is intuitive, it may lead to undesirable or even illog-
ical conclusions. If a higher degree of conservatism were always more desirable,
then firms in the real world would have all adopted extreme conservatism, which is
not supported by the existing empirical evidence. The fact that the existing empiri-
cal evidence shows that there is a systematic cross-sectional variation in the degree
of conservatism across firms indicates that there must be some costs to adopting
higher degrees of accounting conservatism.
In this regard, the signalling model of conservatism explicitly recognizes that
one of the costs of accounting conservatism is the decrease in the value of equity,
which is the consequence of increasing the value of the debt. Given such cost,
firms trade off the benefits and the costs of conservatism and adopt a degree of
conservatism that is optimal for themselves. That results in an equilibrium degree
of accounting conservatism for each firm. The contribution of this model is that
it shows that the equilibrium degree of conservatism may depend on the level of
operating risk in the firm.
Third, the results of this chapter differ from the results obtained by Gigler et al.
(2009), whose analytical study concludes that accounting conservatism is not ex
post efficient, in the sense that conservatism triggers too many ‘false alarms’, i.e.
early violations of debt-covenants. Gigler et al’s results indicate that accounting
conservatism is not beneficial to debt-contracts, in contrast to the most of the em-
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pirical literature in this area. In contrast, my model concludes that accounting con-
servatism may indeed be beneficial to debt-contracts, although my model does not
argue that conservatism is always beneficial. Whether a higher degree of conser-
vatism benefits a firm depends very much on the firm’s level of operating risk
The differences between my conclusions and those of Gigler et al. (2009) are
mainly due to the different ways in which each model is constructed. First, Gigler
et al’s theory is based on a moral hazard model, whereas my theory is based on an
adverse-selection/signalling model. Second, Gigler et al.(2009) treat the degree of
accounting conservatism as an exogenous variable, whereas I treat it as an endoge-
nous variable. Third, to a lesser extent, the concept of conservatism receives some-
what different statistical characterizations in these two approaches, which partly
contributes to the differences in the results obtained. I believe that the statistical
characterization of conservatism in this chapter is more intuitive and more consis-
tent with Basu’s (1997) operational definition of accounting conservatism.
Fourth, the signalling theory of conservatism proposed in this chapter identifies
a potential area for future empirical research. The existing empirical literature on
accounting conservatism primarily tends to emphasise the positive effect of con-
servatism on the value of debt, but ignores the corresponding negative effect on
the value of equity. Furthermore, the existing empirical work has predominantly
focused on the economic demand for conservatism in a moral hazard framework
(for example, Ahmed et al., 2002; Zhang, 2008). According to the best of my
knowledge, no studies have yet directly examined the role of accounting conser-
vatism in a signalling framework. It would thus be particularly interesting to em-
pirically test whether firms with low operating risk tend to choose higher degrees
of conservatism, and firms with high operating risk tend to choose lower degrees of
conservatism.
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Fifth, the signalling theory developed here has a direct implication for account-
ing standard setters around the world. The signalling theory contends that account-
ing standards should not be over-restrictive in terms of the degrees of accounting
conservatism that firms can adopt. Instead, firms should have some freedom in
choosing their own degree of accounting conservatism, within a certain range, of
course. If accounting standards forced all firms to adopt the same uniform degree
of conservatism regardless of their levels of risk, the signalling power of conser-
vatism, and hence its potential contribution to value, could be lost.
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, I have proposed a new theory to explain the existence of, and the
demand for, accounting conservatism, which is based on a signalling model of con-
servatism in the debt market. This theory shows that the economic demand for
accounting conservatism may not only driven by litigation costs and moral haz-
ard issues, but also driven by the issue of information asymmetry in the debt mar-
ket. The equilibrium of this chapter’s signalling game demonstrates that accounting
conservatism, acting as a signalling device, can reduce the information asymmetry
between lenders and borrowers. The main findings of this chapter can be divided in
two categories, as below.
First, I established four basic properties of accounting conservatism, as stated in
the four lemmas. The analytical proofs of these four properties are based on Basu’s
(1997) definition of conservatism as the asymmetric timeliness of earnings, and re-
quire very few additional assumptions. The definition of risk is based on Rothschild
and Stiglitz’s (1970) mean-preserving-spread. The four lemmas together examine
the joint impact of accounting conservatism and a firm’s operating risk on the firm’s
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earnings, and the values of debts and equity. These lemmas therefore establish a
bridge connecting accounting conservatism on one side and the operating risk on
the other.
Second, I investigated the signalling role of accounting conservatism in the debt
market. In this chapter, there are two levels of risk: Risky and Safe. The firm it-
self and its equity-holders know its own level of operating risk, but the lenders in
the credit market do not have that information. In the long-run, this information
asymmetry problem may lead to adverse-selection in the credit-market, and possi-
bly a credit-rationing problem (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). The model shows that
accounting conservatism can help resolve this problem, by serving as an informa-
tion signal about the firm’s true level of risk. In particular, this chapter proves that if
the Single-Crossing Property of conservatism holds, then there exists a continuum
of separating signalling equilibria. In the separating equilibrium, the risky firms
choose a low level of conservatism (usually the zero level), while the safe firms
choose a high level of conservatism.
In addition, using Cho and Kreps’s intuitive criterion, I further ruled out the
pooling equilibrium from this signalling game, because the pooling equilibrium is
unstable. This implies that the separating equilibrium is the only stable solution to
the signalling game.
The proposed theory has a range of potential implications for both accounting
researchers and accounting standard setters. In Appendix B to this chapter, I provide
a preliminary empirical test of the signalling theory. The results are supportive, but
opportunities for more rigorous tests remain for future research.
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3.7 Appendix A – proofs
Technical note on the Modified Basu Earnings Function: MB(I)
Recall that the Original Basu Earnings Function, B(I), has a discontinuity at I = 0.
Here, I design a Modified Basu Earnings Function, MB(I), which can preserve the
features of the Original Basu Earnings Function as much as possible, but without
the discontinuity at I = 0. To do this, I just need to replace a part of the original
Basu function, in an arbitrarily small range around I = 0, say between I ∈ (−k, k),
k > 0, such that the new function is continuous everywhere. (See Figure 3.2)
Although there are many choices for the new function between I ∈ (−k, k), I
confine my attention to a quadratic function. The reason is that every quadratic func-
tion has a constant second derivative, which comes conveniently as an alternative
(and equivalent, as it turns out) measure of asymmetric timeliness to the standard
c = β2−β1. The new function, f (I), must join with the two existing straight-lines
at the two end-points: −k and k, which means that f (−k) =−kβ2, and f (k) = kβ1.
In addition, the joints at these two end-points must be smooth, i.e., f ′(−k) = β2,
and f ′(k) = β1. The derivation is relatively straight-forward, and I leave it for the
reader to verify that the following solution satisfies the above requirements:
f (I) =
β1−β2
4k
I2+
β1+β2
2
I+
(β1−β2)k
4
Three interesting points deserve mentioning: (1) since β1 < β2 due to asymmet-
ric timeliness, f ′′(I) is a negative quantity – f ′′(I) = 12k (β1−β2)< 0, which shows
that the function is concave; (2) f ′′(I) is (negatively) proportional to the standard
measure of asymmetric timeliness, c = β2−β1. Hence, the higher the c, the lower
the f ′′(I). In fact, as long as I choose the same k every time, f ′′(I) as a measure of
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conservatism is equivalent to c. (3) The quadratic function, f (I), always exists for
any values of β1 and β2, which guarantees that I can always find the modified Basu
function, MB(I).
Finally, please note that within the range I ∈ [−k, k], the second derivative of
MB(I) is the same as the second derivative of f (I); but outside this range, the second
derivative of MB(I) is zero because of the linearity. In other words,

MB′′(I) = f ′′(I) = 12k (β1−β2) i f I ∈ [−k, k]
MB′′(I) = 0 i f I /∈ [−k, k]
Proof of Lemma 3.1:
By Rothschild-Stiglitz Theorem (1970), the following two statements are equivalent:
(a) E
[
MB(I˜s)
]≥E[MB ˜(Ir)], provided that MB(I˜) is a concave and everywhere
twice-differentiable function of the news-signal, I;
(b) I˜r is a mean-preserving-spread of I˜s.
Because statement (b) is true, statement (a) must also be true, since MB(I˜) is
a concave function of I per Basu’s definition of accounting conservatism. Since
xr = E
[
MB(I˜r)
]
and xs = E
[
MB(I˜s)
]
by definition, statement (a) implies xs ≥ xr.
Proof of Lemma 3.2:
Lemma 3.2 states that certain certain conditions, the earnings of the riskier firm
have more marginal decrease by increasing the degree of conservatism, than do the
earnings of the safe firm.
Based on the approach taken in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970), integrating by
parts twice yields
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E
[
MB(I˜)
]
= MB(0)+MB′(∞)I¯−
ˆ ∞
0
MB′′(I)F2(I)dI
where
F2(I) =
ˆ I
0
(1−F(µ)dµ,
I¯ is the expected value of I˜, and F(.) is the cumulative density function of ‘news’,
I. Then, it follows that
xs− xr = E
[
MB(I˜s)
]−E[MB(I˜r)]= ˆ ∞
0
MB′′(I)
[
F2r (I)−F2s (I)
]
dI
And Rothschild and Stiglitz shows that the condition that Ir is a MPS of Is implies
that F2r (I)−F2s (I)≤ 0. Therefore,
∂xs
∂MB′′(Is)
− ∂xr
∂MB′′(Ir)
=
∂
∂MB′′(I)
ˆ ∞
0
MB′′(I)
[
F2r (I)−F2s (I)
]
dI (3.17)
=
ˆ ∞
0
[
F2r (I)−F2s (I)
]
dI ≤ 0
Thus,
∂xs
∂MB′′(I)
≤ ∂xr
∂MB′′(I)
(3.18)
which shows that as the degree of asymmetric timeliness MB′′ increases, the risky
firm’s earnings decrease faster than the safe firm’s earnings. Because the previous
technical note explained that that MB′′(I) is negatively proportional to c, Inequality
3.18 means that:
∂xr
∂c
≤ ∂xs
∂c
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Furthermore, using Pratt’s (1964) famous Risk Aversion Theorem, it is straight-
forward to prove that the two derivatives above are less than zero, because increas-
ing the degree of conservatism induces a higher curvature to the modified Basu
earnings function, MB(I), which is equivalent to a higher risk aversion in the ex-
pected utility theory (details available from the author). Therefore,
∂xr
∂c
≤ ∂xs
∂c
< 0
This completes the proof of Lemma 3.2.
Proof of Lemma 3.4:
From Lemma 3.3, we know
∂xr(c)
∂c
<
∂xs(c)
∂c
< 0, (3.19)
To derive the next inequality, we use two assumptions here: condition 2 of
Lemma 3.4 requires D being a linear or convex and decreasing function of x; (ii)
given the level of conservatism is constant, the earnings of the risky firm are lower
than the earnings of the safe firm, i.e., xr(c)< xs(c). Combining these two relations,
we have
∂Dr(c)
∂xr(c)
≤ ∂Ds(c)
∂xs(c)
< 0 (3.20)
Now multiplying 3.19 with 3.20, we get:
∂Dr(c)
∂xr
∂xr(c)
∂c
>
∂Ds(c)
∂xs
∂xs(c)
∂c
> 0 (3.21)
Notice that these two terms are the results of the chain rule of calculus below:
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∂Dr(c)
∂c
=
∂Dr(c)
∂xr
∂xr(c)
∂c
and
∂Ds(c)
∂c
=
∂Ds(c)
∂xs
∂xs(c)
∂c
Combining the chain rule and Inequality 3.21, it follows that
∂Dr(c)
∂c
>
∂Ds(c)
∂c
> 0.
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3.8 Appendix B – an empirical test of the signalling
theory
In this Appendix, I report a very simple empirical test of the signalling theory of
accounting conservatism. The purpose of this test is to provide initial evidence re-
garding on the risk-signalling theory as a potentially valid explanation of accounting
conservatism. I first describe the overall empirical design of this test, as well as the
data and proxies used. I then report the results of the test, followed by a brief con-
clusion.
B.1 Test design, data and proxies
The aim of this test is to examine whether the risk-signalling theory of accounting
conservatism has validity in the real world. The theory predicts that firms of higher
operating risk tend to adopt a lower degree of accounting conservatism, and con-
versely firms of lower operating risk tend to adopt a higher degree of accounting
conservatism. Firms make such choices regarding their degrees of conservatism
in order to signal to the lenders on their true risk levels. In Chapter 3, “operating
risk” is defined as the volatility of the economic value of the total assets of the firm.
Therefore, if the signalling theory of conservatism is descriptive of how real firms
behave in the debt market, then we should be able to observe that firms’ degree of
accounting conservatism is negatively correlated with their asset volatility (VOL).
This simple test employs the augmented regressions approach for testing the
correlation between the degree of conservatism and the level of asset volatility. In
particular, three cross-sectional measures of accounting conservatism are used: (1)
Basu’s (1997) AT measure, (2) Ball and Shivakumar’s (2005) AACF measure, and
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(3) the Default-Adjusted-Basu measure proposed in Chapter 2 of this thesis. I select
these measures of conservatism because all three measures are based on Basu’s
(1997) asymmetric timeliness of earnings definition of accounting conservatism,
which is the definition of conservatism adopted in the signalling theory.
The augmented regression for these measures of conservatism are stated below:
(1) Basu (1997) AT regression augmented by asset volatility:
EPSit
Pit
= α0+α1DRit +β0Rit +β1RitDRit + (3.22)
β2VOLit +β3RitVOLit +β4RitDRitVOLit + εit
where:
• EPSit : Earnings per share for firm i year t
• Pit : Opening stock market price for firm i year t
• Rit : Stock markets return for firm i year t
• DRit : Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the stock market return for firm i
in year t is negative, and equal to 0 if the stock market return for firm i in year
t is non- negative.
• VAit : Volatility of Assets for firm i year t, estimated by the iterative method
of Vassalou and Xing (2004)
(2) Ball and Shivakumar’s (2005) AACF regression augmented by asset volatility:
ACCit = α0+α1DCFOit +β0CFOit +β1DCFOitCFOit + (3.23)
β2VOLit +β3CFOitVOLit +β4DCFOitCFOitVOLit + εit
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where
• ACCit : Accruals measured as: ∆Inventory + ∆Debtors + ∆Other current assets
- ∆Creditors - ∆Other current liabilities - Depreciation.
• DCFOit : Dummy variable that is set to 0 if CFOit ≥ 0 , and is set to 1 if
CFOit < 0.
• CFOit : Cash-flow for period t.
• VAit : Volatility of Assets for firm i year t, estimated by the iterative method
of Vassalou and Xing (2004)
(3) The DAB measure is selected for testing the signalling theory, because in Chap-
ter 2, I argued that it is less biased than the standard Basu (1997) measure in
respect of the default risk. The DAB measure is augmented by asset volatility
(VOL) as in the following regression:
NIBIit
Vit−1
= α0+α1DT Rit +β0T Rit +β1DT RitT Rit + (3.24)
β2VOLit +β3T RitVOLit +β4DT RitT RitVOLit + εit
where
• NIBIit : Net Income before Interest Expense
• Vit−1: The total opening value of the firm, as defined earlier when introducing
the Merton (1974) model. It is the sum of the market values of equity and
debt of the firm.
• T Rit : The rate of return of the total value of the firm, V , calculated as: T Rit =
(Vit−Vit−1−CFFit)/Vit−1. CFFit is the net cashflow from financing activities
for firm i in year t.
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• DT Rit : A dummy variable that is set to 1, if T Rit < 0; and is set to 0, if
T Rit ≥ 0.
The relationship between asset volatility (VOL) and conservatism can be tested
through the coefficient of the interaction term, β4, between asset volatility and the
respective asymmetric timeliness coefficients in the three regressions above (3.22,
3.23 and 3.24). The signalling theory predicts that all three β4’s in these regressions
are negative.
However, asset volatility (VOL) is not directly observable. So I estimate it us-
ing Vassalou and Xing’s (2004) iterative method. This method has already been
introduced and applied in Chapter 2 – section 2.4, and is therefore not repeated
here.
This test uses the same data sample as that used in Chapter 2. The net sample
consists of 12,531 firm-year observations after deleting all missing values and trim-
ming 1% from the top and bottom of the key variables. The descriptive statistics
and correlation tables for this sample have already been reported in Chapter 2 –
section 2.4, and therefore are not repeated here.
B.2 Empirical results
Table 3.2 shows the results of fitting the augmented Basu and AACF regressions
(3.22 and 3.23) to the sample data. Panel A of Table 3.2 reports the result of the
augmented Basu regression (3.22). Panel A of Table 3.2 shows that the β4 coeffi-
cient on interaction term, DR ∗R ∗VA, is - 0.101, and is statistically significant at
1% level. This negative interaction effect indicates that when a firm’s asset volatil-
ity increases, its degree of conservatism decreases. This result is consistent with the
theoretical prediction of the signalling model.
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The result of the augmented AACF regression is shown in Panel B of Table 3.2.
The result is very similar to that of Panel A: The β4 coefficient on the interaction
term, DCFO∗CFO∗VA, is -0.189, and is statistically significant at 1% level. Thus,
when VOL increases in a firm, i.e. when the firm’s operating risk increases, its
degree of conservatism tend to decreases, as predicted by the signalling theory. The
other regression coefficients in Table 3.2 - Panel B are generally consistent with the
prior literature (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). The good news timeliness, which is
proxied by the regression coefficient of CFO, is -0.149 and is significant at 1% level.
The asymmetric timeliness coefficient (DCFO∗CFO) is 0.260 and also significant
at 1% level.
Table 3.3 reports the results of the augmented DAB regression (Equation 3.24).
The value of β4, which is the coefficient on the interaction variable T R∗DT R∗VOL,
is -0.118, and significant at 1% level. This result is also consistent with the previous
two regressions in that the degree of conservatism is decreasing in the volatility of
assets.
To summarise this simple test of the signalling theory, the evidence obtained
from this test is strongly consistently with the signalling theory of accounting con-
servatism. The higher the degree of risk in a firm, the lower the degree of conser-
vatism is in that firm. Three measures of accounting conservatism – the AT measure,
the AACF measure and the DAB measure – all yield similar results. This further
increases the robustness of the results. However, the test reported here is currently
the only empirical test examining the relationship between the degree of accounting
conservatism and the volatility of assets.
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Table 3.2: Basu AT & AACF regressions augmented by Asset Volatility (VOL)
Panel A: Basu AT measure and Asset Volatility (VOL)
Estimate t value p value
(Intercept) 0.073 18.14 < 2.2e-16 ***
DR -0.001 -0.22 0.827
R 0.021 2.42 0.016 **
VOL -0.153 -14.20 < 2.2e-16 ***
DR*R 0.155 7.92 0.000 ***
DR*VOL -0.005 -0.28 0.778
R*VOL -0.028 -2.11 0.035 **
DR*R*VOL -0.102 -3.20 0.001 ***
Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%.
Residuals standard error: 0.1222 on 12523 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-Squared:0.202; Adjusted R-Squared:0.2015
F-statistics: 452.7534 on 7 and 12523 DF. P-value:0.
Panel B: AACF measure and Asset Volatility (VOL)
Estimate t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 0.023 11.72 < 2.2e-16 ***
DCFO 0.031 6.75 0.000 ***
CFO -0.149 -9.18 < 2.2e-16 ***
VOL -0.011 -2.19 0.029 **
DCFO*CFO 0.260 11.46 < 2.2e-16 ***
DCFO*VOL -0.024 -3.23 0.001 ***
CFO*VOL 0.100 2.62 0.009 ***
DCFO*CFO*VOL -0.189 -4.57 0.000 ***
Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%.
Residuals standard error: 0.0685 on 12523 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-Squared:0.0309; Adjusted R-Squared:0.0304
F-statistics: 57.0936 on 7 and 12523 DF. P-value:0.
Note: All t-statistics are White-adjusted.
178
Table 3.3: Default-Adjusted-Basu measure and Asset Volatility (VOL)
Estimate t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 0.057 38.97 < 2e-16 ***
TR 0.000 -0.02 0.988
DTR -0.005 -1.92 0.055 *
VOL -0.076 -18.29 < 2e-16 ***
TR*DTR 0.140 15.69 < 2e-16 ***
TR*VOL 0.002 0.40 0.690
DTR*VOL -0.003 -0.39 0.693
TR*DTR*VOL -0.118 -9.45 < 2e-16 ***
Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%.
Residual standard error: 0.05565 on 12523 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.2218; Adjusted R-squared: 0.2213 
F-statistic: 509.8 on 7 and 12523 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16 
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Conclusions and Implications for
Future Research
In this thesis, I have studied accounting conservatism from three perspectives. In
Chapter 1, the existing measures of accounting conservatism were surveyed from
a construct validity perspective, and it was argued that the construct validity of
the existing measures is not robust. In Chapter 2, the impact of default risk on
the Basu (1997) measure of accounting conservatism was examined. Chapter 2
not only concluded that the Basu measure is potentially biased by the existence
of default risk of a firm, it also proposed a Default-Adjusted-Basu (DAB) measure
that is free from this bias. Chapter 2 proposed a signalling theory of accounting
conservatism in the debt market characterized by asymmetric information. This
signalling theory suggests that conservatism can be used by borrower firms to signal
their risk levels to the lenders, and provides a new perspective for understanding the
economic demand for accounting conservatism. Since a more detailed summary of
these chapters has already been given at the General Introduction to this thesis, the
concluding section will instead discuss some possible areas for future research.
The first area for future research is to more systematically study the construct
validity of the existing and new measures of conservatism. In particular, the dif-
ferences between the two major groups of measures need to be reconciled. In fact,
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the reconciliation task has already begun with Roychowdhury and Watts (2007).
But Roychowdhury and Watts’s study only focus on two measures of conservatism,
AT and MTB, and there is still a lot more work to be done to reconcile the other
measures of accounting conservatism.
The second area is to re-examine the existing empirical studies that apply the
Basu (1997) measure of conservatism in light of the bias identified in this thesis.
Because the default-risk induced bias was previously unrecognized in the literature,
it is possible that some studies using the Basu measure have been affected by this
bias. For example, many empirical studies have relied on the Basu AT measure
to prove that leverage is a determinant of conservatism (e.g. Lara et al., 2009b).
But given the bias analysed in Chapter 2, that conclusion is likely to be incorrect,
because leverage should be highly positively correlated with the Basu measure of
conservatism simply because leverage is highly correlated with the default risk of
a firm. Thus, it would be useful to re-examine the existing empirical evidence and
question whether leverage is really an economic determinant of the degree of ac-
counting conservatism in firms. In this regard, the Default-Adjusted-Basu measure
proposed in this thesis might be a useful aid to empirical researchers, because this
measure is free from the default-risk bias.
The third area is to build more rigorous analytical models to study the role of
conservatism in the debt-contracting process. The existing debt contracting theory
of conservatism proposed by Watts (2003a), and widely accepted by empirical re-
searchers, is intuitive but often fails to pass rigorous examination. For instance,
Guay and Verrecchia (2006) have criticised the view held by Watts (2003a), Bush-
man and Piotroski (2006) and others that conservatism improves debt contracting
efficiency by reducing the debt covenant slacks.
The work in Chapter 3 agrees with Guay and Verrecchia (2006) in principle.
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The first reason is that debt-holders can always price protect themselves, no mat-
ter what the degree of conservatism is in the borrower firm are. Hence, a more
conservative firm can sell their bonds at a higher price, but that does not mean its
debt contract is more efficient. Efficiency and bond price are two different things.
Gigler et al. (2009) in fact argue that the debt-contracting efficiency is decreased by
conservatism. The second reason is that it is hard to accept the argument that if a
firm nearly defaults on its debts, its managers would voluntarily increase the firm’s
degree of conservatism, given that a higher degree of conservatism can erode the
equity value of the firm. Is it not irrational for a shareholder to voluntarily decrease
the value of their own shares? The existing debt-contracting theory of conservatism
fails to provide a satisfactory answer to the above problem. Clearly, more rigorous
analytical research, such as that by Gigler et al. (2009), is needed to fully understand
the debt-contracting role of accounting conservatism.
A fourth area for future research is to examine the information content of ac-
counting earnings under conservatism. While conservatism can reduce the informa-
tion asymmetry in the debt market as shown in Chapter 3, it arguably also creates
more information asymmetry in the equity market, because conservatism ‘biases’
accounting numbers. The loss of information content is often used as an argument
against conservatism by accounting standard setters (e.g. IASB, 2006; FASB, 2006).
However, this argument, to date, has not been substantiated by any empirical or an-
alytical evidence. On the contrary, LaFond and Watts (2008) find some empirical
evidence that accounting conservatism may actually lead to a lower information
asymmetry in the equity-market, which implies that earnings under a conservative
accounting system contain more useful information than do the earnings under a
less conservative or neutral accounting system. Thus, it would be worthwhile for
accounting researchers to further investigate the role of accounting conservatism in
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the equity-market, and in particular, the impact of conservatism on the quality of
earnings for the purpose of equity-valuation.
A fifth area would be to examine the relative importance of public and private
debt in determining a firm’s choice of its reporting conservatism. The signalling
model in Chapter 3 has explicitly assumed that all lenders in the market do not have
any private information about the risk characteristics of the borrower firms. That
assumption resembles more of the information characteristics of the public debt
market, where the lenders do not personally know, and have never met with, the
borrowers. However, private lenders, such as commercial banks, would normally
have much closer relationships with the borrowers, which allows them to gain more
private information about the borrowers. In that case, information asymmetry is not
as great as that in the public debt market, which indicates that perhaps the signalling
power of conservatism in the private market is not as strong as that in the public debt
market. This is another interesting topic for empirical researchers to investigate.
A sixth area for future research is to empirically investigate the association be-
tween firms’ operating risk and the degree of accounting conservatism. The sig-
nalling model outlined in Chapter 3 suggests that there may be a negative corre-
lation between operating risk and accounting conservatism, but empirical testing
of this model (such as the tests reported in Chapter 3) is still at an early stage.
Thus, in future research, it would be very useful to conduct more detailed and more
powerful empirical tests on the association between operating risk and accounting
conservatism.
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